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INTRODUCTION
In the First World War, Imperial Germany and Ottoman
Turkey were associated with the Central Powers„ From
Berlin's point of view, Turkey's participation was a.
definite advantage because it crea.ted a new front for
Russia in the Caucasus and affected the security of Great
Britain's life line through the Suez*

To further Germany's

policies, Berlin requested that Turkey carry out several
tasks„ These were to close the Turkish Straits to coun~
tries other than those aligned with the Central Powers; to
close the supply route through the Suez Canal; to invade
Russia through the Caucasus; and, finally, to declare a
holy war against the Triple Entente,
During the following four years of the war, Turkey
was able to close the Straits and successfully attack the
Russians„ However, the Suez Canal remained open and the
holy war was largely disregarded by the Moslems,
1

Germany

2

willingly supplied the Turks with officers to run the army
which was able to defeat the Allied attack on Gallipoli
and keep the Russians out of Asia Minor, However, the
Germans were reluctant to support Turkey’s ambitions among
the Turkish minorities in Russia, because Berlin felt
that it was diverting attention from prosecuting the war
on other fronts in the Near Eas t,
By March 1918, Turkey's value to Germany was becoming
questionable,

Berlin felt the Turks were more a burden

than an asset,

Turkey's closing of the Straits - once an

important act - had lost much of its significance because
of Rumania's defeat and Russia's withdrawal from the war.
Further, the entry of the United States into the conflict
and the resulting pressure on Germany caused many of the
German troops in Turkey to be recalled to the Fatherland,
And the Turks were left largely to their own means in con
tinuing the war.
In spite of Germany’s and Turkey's differences over
political objectives during the war, there was very little
animosity after defeat in 1918,

Whatever vindictiveness

either country held against the other was undoubtedly
directed towards the victorious Allies who, in the eyes of
Berlin and Ankara, had Imposed outrageous peace terms on
the defeated nations.

Thus, it was not difficult for the

Weimar Republic to regain the friendship of the Turks,
And throughout the 1920’s, numerous German technicians,
teachers, and construction firms were invited into the
new Kemalist Turkey,

3
The birth of the Third Reich did not alienate Turkey
from its old ally.

Many people in Turkey viewed the re

juvenation of Germany with a deep admiration.

There was

little concern expressed in Turkey for the revisionists’
ideas and the totalitarian methods of the Nazi regime, as
long as Germany kept its hands off southeastern Europe.
Hitler's foreign policy did not call for a close
association with the Turkish Republic.

While speaking of

his policy against allying with weak powers, the Ftlhrer
stated with reference to Turkey:
Even in peacetime it was bad enough that the
German alliance policy, for want of any aggres
sive intentions of our own, ended in a, defensive
union of ancient states, pensioned by world his
tory. The alliance with Austria as well as
Turkey had little to be said for them. While
the greatest military and industrial states on
earth banded into an active aggressive union, we
collected a few antique, impotent state formations
and with this decaying rubbish attempted to face
an active world coalition. Germany received a.
^
bitter accounting for this error in foreign policy.
This was the view that Nazi Germany took toward the Turkish
Republic during the twelve years of diplomatic relations
between the two countries.
Interest in Turkey,

Germany had a deep economic

However, it did not overshadow Hitler’s

basic premise that to be drawn too closely in that direc
tion at the expense of forming a strong alliance with Great
Britain or Italy could be disastrous if another world con
flict exploded.

Adolph Hitler, Hein Kampf, (Boston, 19^3), 657.

k

In the following chapters a. study is made of the
relations "between the Third Reich and the Turkish Repub
lic*

The subject is approached topically in an effort to

isolate what the author believes are the most important
events of the twelve years from the standpoint of Berlin*
Running throughout the pages is the question:
Reich use Turkey to the utmost advantage?
did*

Did the

I believe it

CHAPTER I
GERMAN AND TURKISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BALKANS
1933 - 194-1
Prior to the advent of the Third Reich in 1933. the
Balkan countries were searching for a way to guarantee
their 'boundaries against encroachment by an outside power.
The initial step in reaching this goal was to effect a
suitable rapprochement between the states„ Throughout
the 1920’s and the early part of the 1930’s numerous
treaties, generally bilateral, were concluded.,

2

Turkey

had signed, by 1933. friendship or commercial treaties
1

Since the First World War, the Balkans have con
sisted of Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Albania, Rumania,
and Bulgaria,
2

For a.list of the various treaties, see Robert J,
Kerner and Harry N„ Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the
Balkan Entente: 1930-1935. (BerkeIey7~193^T. 21 -2 0 [Hereafter cited as Kerner, Balkan Conferences,j
5

1

6

with Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, 3 However,
these and the various other treaties did not remove the
noticeable measure of distrust existing between the various
Balkan powers.
On February 9. 193^* the Balkan Entente, or Pact,
was signed by Turkey, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia,
The precise aim of the Entente was to guarantee Balkan
frontiers against invasion by a Balkan state, specifically
Bulgaria, either acting by itself or in combination with
an outside power.
from the start,

The weakness of the Entente was evident
A protocol, signed along with the Entente

but kept secret, stipulated that if a. signatory were attac
ked by a non-Balkan power and later assisted by a Balkan
power, the Entente members would be obliged to go to war
against the aggressors.

However, Russia and Italy, the

two countries most interested in the Balkans, were assured
by Turkey and Greece respectively that this section would
L\.

not operate against them if they invaded a Balkan state.
The Wilhelmstrasse viewed the formation of the Balkan
Entente with considerable suspicion.

Although Berlin was

not in a position to influence directly the Entente, it
did not favor the principle of Balkan cooperation,-*
3

South-

Kerner, Balkan Conferences, 22,

Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World, (Washington,
1959) * 52-3« [Hereafter cited a.s Kilic, Turkey,!
-5 Theodore I, Geshkoff, Balkan Union: A Road to
Peace in Eastern Europe. (New York, 19^l), 212, ["Hereafter cited as Geshkoff, Balkan Union,]

7
eastern Europe was an important trade area, which the Nazis
did not wish to lose, and as Germany grew stronger it took

6

a more negative view of the Entente„

In an attempt to quiet Germany's doubts about the
Entente, Tewfik Aras? called on German Foreign Minister
Konstantin von Neurath

8

in Berlin,,

Aras told Neurath that,

contrary to what certain "channels" were saying, the Tur
kish government was not pursuing an anti-German policy in
adhering to the Balkan Entente,

Turkey supported the al

liance of the Balkan States because it believed peace in

the Balkans would be best guaranteed by this pact, and with
it the peace of the European continent.

9

On March 7, 1936, Hitler addressed the Reichstag and
announced the decision to remilitarize the Rhineland,
shock of his speech was felt throughout Europe,

The

In commen

ting on Turkey's reaction to the announcement, the Foreign
Secretary, Numan Menemencioglu,

^

lo

said that though his

Kilic, T u r k e y , 51®

? Tewfik Rtlsttl Aras, (1883)» Turkish Foreign
Minister 1925-1938; twice President of the League of Nations
Assembly; resigned as Foreign Minister after the election cf
Ismet InSntl as President; Turkish Ambassador to Great Britain

1938-19^2„
8

Baron Konstantin von Neurath,
Foreign Minister 1932-1938,

(1873-19

)®

German

9

U, S, Department of State, Documents on German
Foreign Policy, 1918-19^-5, Series c"7Til’’"766-02„ ["Here
after cited as D aG , F 0P 0 , Series C„]
^6 Numan Menemencioglu,
General Secretary of the
Turkish Foreign Office, 1937-mid-19^2; Foreign Minister

19^2-19^,

8
government sympathized with Germany’s action, the question
of utmost importance to Turkey was whether or not it con
stituted a threat to world peace.

In this respect, the

Turks were interested in the effect, if any, remilitarization would have on the Locarno Pact,

11

Menemencioglu re

fused to take a definite stand in advance of the League's
decision, saying that as a non-Locarno power, Turkey should
let the directly concerned countries decide.

12

During this period, the basis of Turkish policy in
the Balkans was friendship with Greece, followed by good
relations with Yugoslavia,

In 1937» diplomatic relations

existed between these countries, but they were not extremely
close because of Turkish and Greek fear of an expansionist
Yugoslavia, 13 This feeling of uneasiness on the part of
Turkey and Greece developed after the signing of the
Belgrade Pact between Italy and Yugoslavia on March 25,
1937s and both the Italian and Yugoslavian governments were
well aware of the fact, 1^
11

The Locarno Pact was a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
between Germany, Belgium, France, Grea.t Britain and Italy
signed October 16, 1925o Its primary object was to safe
guard the status quo in Europe, For the text of the treaty,
see Alexander Baltzly (ed,), Readings in Twentieth-Century
European History, (New York, 1950),172-7^, [Baltzly, Readings,]
12 P*G°FoP,. Series C, V, 135,
did not act against the Germans,

The Locarno powers

Galeazzo Clano, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers. 193619^2, (London, 19^8), 102-03, LHereafter cited as Ciano,
Diplomatic Papers,]
lk

Ibld°. 152-53,

9
In November 1937» German Foreign Minister Rlbbentrop

15

held talks with Mussolini 16 and Italian Foreign Minister
Ciano 17 over Italy's aims toward Turkey,, Rlbbentrop des
cribed Turkish concern over the Italian attitude, adding
that Turkey would be a, good card in Italy's hand,

Mussolini

denied that his government held any hard feelings towards
the Turks and referred the German Foreign Minister to the
Turkish-Italian Treaty of 1928,. 1R Further, Mussolini re
quested Rlbbentrop to inform Ankara that under the right
conditions, the Italian government would be willing to
strengthen the treaty. 19
On March 12, 1938, the German army occupied Vienna
in the Nazis' first move in the direction of the Balkans
and Turkey,

The reaction in Ankara, came during the first

week in April when the Turkish President, Kemal Ataturk,

20

Joachim von Ribbentrop, (1893~1946), Made com
missioner for disarmament affairs 1934; appointed Ambas
sador to London 193&; called back to Berlin and made
Minister of Foreign Affairs 1938; hanged at Ntlrnberg 1946,
16

Benito Mussolini, (1883-1945), Chief of the
Italian government 1922-194-5; executed by partisans 194\5o
^
Count Ga.lea.zzo Ciano, (1903-1944), Mussolini's
son-in-law; Italian Foreign Minister 1936-1943; Ambassador
to the Vatican 1943; executed in January 1944,
1R
Ciano, Diplomatic Pa,pers, 145-46, According to
Ciano, the treaty of neutrality and conciliation between
Italy and Turkey, signed in Rome May 30, 1928, was auto
matically renewed every five years, unless denounced after
six months notice had been given,

19 18id,, 145-46,
2A
Kemal Ataturk, (1881-1938), Also known as Mustafa
Kemal, Military Commander during World War I, Elected
President of the Turkish National Assembly 1920j served as
Turkey's first President 1923-1938,

10

instructed the Turkish Ambassador in Germany, Hamdi Arpag, 21
to inform Berlin of Turkey's political position.

The Am

bassador explained to Ribbentrop that his country's policies
rested on a three-fold basis;

the Peace of Lausanne, pre

servation of national security, and the Turkish National
Pact of Ankara, 22

Accordingly, Turkey followed a policy of

neutrality toward all sides.

The Ambassador mentioned his

government's friendly ties with the Balkan Pact and other
surrounding countries.

But most emphatically, Turkey con

sidered as her friends - first, Germany, then England,
Russia, the United States and Italy,

Arpag carefully poin

ted out that Turkey was trying to keep out of all coalitions
and, most importantly, to refrain from any harmful act
against a. friendly country,

Ribbentrop answered that Ger23
many also desired good relations with Turkey,
About one year later, Germany made another military
stride toward the Balkan peninsula.

On March 1^, 1939,

Germany occupied Czechoslovakia causing the collapse of
2^
the Little Entente,
Turkey became deeply concerned now
21

The Turkish Ambassador to Germany,

Op

U0 S0 Department of State, Documents on German
Foreign Policy. 1918-1945. Series D, V, 719-20. [Hereafter cited as D,G.F,P., Series P.] The Turkish National
Pact was a statement of the principles of the National
Turkish Revolution, such as self-determination, the open
ing of the Straits, etc. It was adopted on January 28, 1920,
23

2A

I M d ,. 719-20,

Originally, a triangular set of agreements signed
in 1920-1921 between the three major states of the former
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and

11

with the future of the Balkan Entente.,

The protective zone

Interposed between Turkey and the major European powers by
the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact had received a fatal
blow, and the Turks began looking for a way to strengthen
their Balkan defenses.
With talk of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia
still on the lips of Europe’s diplomats, the Italians, on
April 7, invaded Albania,

In a. matter of days, Mussolini's

forces occupied that mountainous country providing them
with a springboard to Yugoslavia, Greece, and perhaps Tur
key,

The Turkish government viewed the situation with con

siderable alarm.

It was regarded in some circles, not as

an isolated action, but as the beginning of a major
Italian offensive directed toward a break-through to the
Aegean,

Rumors and reports circulated that the Italians

were reinforcing their garrisons in the Dodecanese.

Later

these reports were proven false, but this did not lessen
Turkey's watchfulness of Italian movements, 2 *5■
When the new German Ambassador to Turkey, Franz von
26
Papen,
arrived in April, 1939, he was Immediately

Rumania. On February 16, 1933 > it was formalized with a
pact of organization signed at Geneva., See J. B„ Hoptner,
Yugoslavia in Crisis: 193^-19^1, (New York, 1962), 11,
[Hereafter cited as Hoptner, Yugoslavia.]
if-6.

2-5 Franz von Papen, Memoirs, (New York, 1953), ^ 5 [Hereafter cited as Papen, Memoirs,]

^
Franz von Papen, (18?9~
)« German Chancellor
1932; Vice-Chancellor under Hitler 1933; Ambassador to
Austria 1936-1938; Ambassador to Turkey 1939-19^; imprisoned
at Nttrnberg but freed in 19^6 by International Tribunal;
later imprisoned by German denazification court; released
19^9.

12

confronted with questions by the Turkish Foreign Ministry
as to the intentions of the Germans,

Papen denied German

support of the Italian invasion and promised to ask Hitler
to influence Italian policy in the Balkans,

27

The Am

bassador immediately sent a telegram to Hitler and
Ribbentrop in which he stated the fear and apprehension
of the Turkish government.

The German Foreign Office took

immediate note of the situation and informed the Italian
government that a statement of its intentions in the
Balkans should be relayed to Turkey.

Thus, on May 3»

Ciano gave the Turkish Ambassador assurances that Italy
had "neither economic, political, nor territorial aims
with respect to his country." 28
The Germans now considered other Implications of the
Albanian invasion, that is, the distinct possibility that
Turkey might be driven into the camp of the Allies,

This

was particularly dangerous if one viewed Turkey's geo
graphical worth as Papen did when he stated In a tele
graph to Berlin:
Turkey is the key to the military situation
in the Near East. Whichever side is denied
the use of her territory as a base for oper
ations can rule out the idea of domination
of the Middle East.^9
27

Papen, Memoirs. 445-46.
see Bullock, Hitler, 507«

For an opposing opinion,

^
Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-194-3,
(New York, 1946), 77“9« Thereafter cited as Ciano, Diaries.]
^9 Papen, Memoirs. 447. The possibility of this
happening is also stated in D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 228.

13
In his initial meetings with the Turkish president, Ismet
IniSntt,

30

Papen warned the Turks that the German government

might change its friendly attitude toward their country if
they associated themselves with the Western Pow e r s .

The

Ambassador added that Germany expected strict neutrality
from Turkey in the event of war in the Balkans,

31

InSntl

assured Papen that the Turks did not have a. hostile
attitude toward Germany but added that Turkey must look
to its own security.

In June 1939, during a. conversation with Papen,
Menemencioglu explained the Turkish position in the event
of an outbreak of hostilities.

The Turks would take an

active role in any conflict involving the Mediterranean,
because it was in their best interests that neither Great
Britain nor Italy gain hegemony.

An invasion of Yugoslavia

would not concern Turkey as long as Bulgaria did not take
part.

However, this would not be the case if Rumania were

invaded and its Blaek Sea. coast occupied, for then Turkey's
sphere of interest would be infringed.

Overall, the Turks

desired the complete neutrality of the Balkans in the event
of a war in northern Europe.

Turkey firmly hoped that the

Balkan Pact would not be used as a means for the great
powers to bring the member states into a war,
Ismet In8n$, (188*1—
)«
1923-1937; President 1938-1950.
31

D.G.F.P. . Series D, VI,

32

Ifrid. . 76^ - 6 5 .

32

Turkish Prime Minister

The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23,
1939* followed closely by the German invasion of Poland on
September 1, 1939s was a bombshell on Turkey’s illusions
that it might Insure its boundaries by utilization of the
natural animosity between the Nazis and the Communists,,
Now, however, the Turks had good reason to fear that the
next move of either power might be at the expense of Tur
key,,

The inadequacy and uselessness of the various

treaties with the Balkan countries also became evident.
As a result, the Turkish government continued to stress
33
neutrality which was in line with Berlin’s views,
There was some talk in Berlin that Turkey might back
the action of Great Britain in declaring war on Germany in
view of their mutual interests expressed in the AngloTuTkish Declaration of May 12, 1 9 3 9 ° But it soon became
evident that popular Turkish feeling was to avoid war at
all costs.

The Turks would not even say if they would

oppose Italy should the Italians enter the war.

All that

the Turkish Foreign Office stated on this question wa,s:
"if Italy entered the war, Turkey would act according to
her own interests," 35
33

P.G.F.P., Series D, VIII, 27-8,

34

The Declaration provided that negotiations should
take place between the two countries with the aim of reach
ing a reciprocal security pact. Moreover, while the nego
tiation was taking place, the two powers would co-operate
"in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediter
ranean," See Sir Hughe Kna.tchbul'l-Hugessen, Diplomat in
Peace and War, (London, 19^+9) * 147, [Hereafter cited as
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat,]
35

D°G,F,P,. Series D, VI, 440,

15
During the German campaign in Poland., Berlin adopted
a policy favoring the sta.tus quo in the Balkans ,

In a con

versation with Ciano in Berlin, Hitler stated that, at
least in the present situation, the neutral position taken
by the Balkan countries was useful.

He did not believe

anything serious was going to happen in that a.rea in the
near future, but should a state, sdch as Rumania, alter its
present position, he would advocate an attack with the aid
of Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria,^

Actually, Hitler’s

opinion of the power of the small countries wa.s summed
up in his statement to a group of German military commanders
prior to the war:
The small countries do not frighten me. After
Kemal’s death, Turkey will be ruled by morons
and half Idiots, Carol of Rumania is a thor
oughly corrupt slave of his sexual desires.
The King of Belgium and the Northern kings are
weak puppets, depending on the good digestion
of their over-fed and tired peoples,?’
As the period of the "Phony War" drew to a close
and Germany readied its armed forces for the invasion of
France, a question arose concerning Turkey’s position if
Italy came into the war,

Menemencioglu stated that above

all Turkey hoped Italy would stay out of the war.

However,

36 Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, 31^-15® Hitler was
especially interested in the attitude of Rumania because
of reported attempts by the Allies to enlist her support.
See Ibid,, 308,
?? U, S, Department of War, Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, (Washington, 19^6-19^877 VII, 735® [Hereafter
cited as N,C„A,]

16
should Italy enter the conflict, Turkey would not disavow
qO
its obligations' under the Tripartite Pact,
If Italy did
not attack the Balkans, the Turks would not take an active
part, but would allow Allied warships to use some ports.
This non-action, Turkey hoped, would spare the Balkans
from the ravages of war,

Germany was in accord with this

attitude and emphasized to Papen that it be supported with
the hope of effectively resisting further Allied pressure. 39
After the German invasion of France, May 10, 19^0,
the Allies increased the pressure to draw Turkey into the
war, thereby diverting any possible Italian operations in
southern France,
Mackensen,

kn

Papen and the German Ambassador to Rome,

considered bringing joint German-Italian

pressure on Turkey to insure its neutrality.

But this

idea was abandoned after Ribbentrop telegramed that such
an action would be neither "expedient nor necessary in
the present situation," 41 Evidently, this decision was
based on the stunning German successes in northern France,
With German victory in France imminent, Italy, on
June 10, declared war on the Allies,

Turkey was now faced

3® Signed in Ankara on October 19, 1939, between
England, France, and Turkey, this was the result of nego
tiations following the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of May 12,
1939, and is discussed in Chapter VI,

39 P.G.F.P.. Series D, IX, 200,
J^0
Hans-Georg von Mackensen, (1883-194?) <» German
Minister in Hungary 1933-1938; Ambassador in Italy 194*3*
^

P.G.F.P.. Series D, IX, 443-44,

1?
with the choice of declaring war on Italy in accordance
with the Tripartite Pact, or.maintaining neutrality„

In

view of its ill-equipped armed forces, the Turkish govern
ment chose the side of neutrality.

Great Britain, realiz

ing it could do little to aid the Turkish cause, accepted
42
the decision to r&main neutral.
The Axis was now virtually supreme in Europe with the
exception of the Iberian peninsula, the Balkan states and
Bussia,,

It was natural, therefore, that Germany develop

a. stronger line towards the Balkan peninsula,

Papen re

iterated to IntSntJ the Importance of Germany’s position as
the paramount European military power.

And in expectation

of an early German victory in Great Britain, the German
Ambassador stated Berlin’s bafflement that Turkey %as still
playing the English game,”43
On October 28, 1940, Italy invaded Greece,

The Greeks

reacted by calling on Great Britain to honor its commitment
of April 1939 to defend the sovereignty of Greece,

With

out hesitation, the British government sent four squadrons
44
of aircraft and a military mission to Greece,
According
to the terms of the Balkan Pact, Turkey was under no obliga
tion to enter the conflict unless Italy was aided by a
42

Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, 167«
D.G.F.P.. Series D, X, 488-89,

44
198 ,

Hastings.L, Ismay, Memoirs, (New York, I960),
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power within the Balkans. 45
^

Nevertheless, the Turks were

in an embarrassing position, considering the close ties
between the two countries.
sion of the Axis

Clearly now, it was the deci

whether or not the

would be able to maintain a neutral

Turkish government
position.

The Italian venture in Greece
did not have
theblessing of Hitler. 46 Hitler had not planned on operations
in this area, but with the Italian reverses in the face of
the combined forces of Greece and Great Britain, the Ftlhrer
had little choice but to aid the Italian armies.

On

November 12, Hitler issued Directive No. 18 which concerned,
in part, preparatory measures to be taken in advance of
47
German military operations in the Balkans.
In the direc
tive Berlin instructed the operational planning staff to
take into account possible Turkish military activities
when forming the approximate ten divisions for operations
in the Balkans.
By the latter part of November, Turkey was still
clinging to the role of a neutral.

The reverses suffered

by the Italians created a new problem for the Turkish
government, namely, what would be the reaction on the part
^
Series I), XI, 408-09<.
suspicious of Bulgaria,

Turkey was most

^
The ironic aspect of the invasion was that "His
own system of presenting his partner with a fait accompli
had turned into a boomerang." Papen, Memoirs, 464~
’
47
H. H. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg to Defeat, (New
York, 1965), 42-3. [Hereafter cited as Trevor-Roper,
Blitzkrieg,]
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of the Reich if the Italians were driven out of Greece, or
Albania, or both?

When confronted with these queries, Papen

disregarded such possibilities and asked Menemencioglu the
Turkish position*

Menemencioglu simply repeated that Tur4-8
key would act only to protect her interests*
Throughout this period, both sides made numerous
attempts to obtain Turkey's allegiance*

The British Foreign

Office felt that unless it did something quickly, Turkey
would surely be absorbed by the Germans*

Thus, the British

requested Turkey and Yugoslavia to make a joint declaration
to Bulgaria that they would declare war on the Bulgars if
German troops were allowed to cross their territory*
British Foreign Office was unsuccessful*

The

The Turks were

well aware of their weak military position in the Balkans,
and there was no reason for a belligerent policy when aid
from Britain would nowhere approach their needs*

Lio

Hitler moved one step closer to a.ction in the Balkans
when, on December 13, 1940, he issued Directive No* 20,
Operation M a r i t a * I n this directive, he assigned the
Bulgarian forces the task of providing flank protection
along the Turkish-Bulgarian border while the German armed
forces invaded Greece*

He also made provisions for German

P qG*F.P*„ Series D, XI, ?02~03*
4a

Ernst L, Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War* (London, 19^27", 129-30~ [Hereafter cited
as Woodward, British Foreign Policy*]
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg * 46-8*
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forces to be r e a d y if Turkey should make a move*

The fate

of the Balkans was soon to be decided*
During January 19^1* Great Britain offered Greece more
troops and arms*

Much to the surprise of the British* the

Greeks declined the offer*

The Greek government reasoned

that a further build-up might cause the Germans to attack.

51

The Germans, however, did not slow their troop movements
into Rumania., much to the consternation of both the Greeks
and the Turks.

Ribbentrop used the movements in an attempt

to bring the Turkish government into a position of guaran
teed neutrality*

He instructed Papen to inform the Turks

that the number of troops in Rumania was sufficient to meet
any eventuality in the Balkans*

Further,

if they should

happen to call these forces into play, such action could be
tantamount to the destruction of the Turkish state*

On the

other hand, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop stressed that the
Reich had no intention of deliberately attacking Turkey,
nor would it violate Turkey's Thracian frontier, as long as
the Turks remained neutral*

52

In Operation Marita, the Germans planned to enter
Greece through its Bulgarian frontier*

Papen knew that

the German troop movement through Bulgaria would not be wel
comed in Turkey unless assurances were given that Turkish
sovereignty would be respected and that the troops would

^
52

R„ J* Collins, Lord W a v e l l , (London, 19^7)8 310*
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stay at least twenty miles from the Turkish-Bulgarian border„53
Papen reported this information to Hitler and -advised the
Ftlhrer to send a personal letter to the Turkish President
InSntt stating what route the Wehrmaeht would follow if the
Reioh advanced on Greece„
On February 27, Papen received a telegram from Rib
bentrop stating that the Bulgarians would accede to the
Tripartite Pact

<Ll

on March 1 and that the entry of German

troops into Bulgaria was. imminent.

The Ambassador was in

structed to inform the Turkish government of these facts
on February 28,

Papen was also told to notify the Turkish

President that the Ftlhrer was transmitting to him a. personal

letter clearly explaining Germany's actions in the Balkans, 55
On March 1, 19^1, the Turkish President received the
message from Hitler,

In the communique, Hitler discussed

the unfortunate circumstances which necessitated the German
involvement in the Balkans,

The Ftlhrer stated that the

Third Reich had no territorial ambitions in that area, and
promised to withdraw the Wehrmaeht as soon as the danger
was eliminated.

Further, Hitler guaranteed that German

units traversing Bulgaria would remain an adequate distance
53 Papen, Memoirs » ^71*
5k

Originally, the pact cementing the Rome-Berlin
and Tokyo-Berlin Axis, For a. copy of the agreement, see
Baltzly, Readings. ^17-18,
55

D.G.F.P.„ Series D, XII, 187-88,

from the Turkish frontier„

In reply, President Indntt

stated that if the German forces had to "become involved,
Turkey would not object as long as Turkish territorial
rights were not infringed., 57 Hitler was extremely pleased
with Indntt fs position*

He felt that the Beich could now
58
discount any Turkish action in the current situation*
As the time for the implementation of Operation

Marita drew closer, the German government encountered
difficulties from another Balkan state - Yugoslavia.

In
the first week of March, Yugoslavia’s Prince Regent Paul 59

visited Berchtesgaden.

Hitler, in an effort to get Yugo

slavia. to accede to the Tripartite Pact, offered the Regent
the Greek city of Salonika*

On March 25, the Yugoslav

government signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna.

However,

on the night of March 26-27, a number of Yugoslav officers
rebelled against the pro-Na.zi leanings of their government
and a.ffected a coup d ’dtat in Belgrade* 6o Hitler was
furious*

He immediately issued Directive No* 25 with the

dual purpose of crushing Yugoslavia as quickly as possible
^
D qG.F.P*, Series D, XII, 201-03* The "unfortunate
circumstances" referred to the Involvement of Great Britain*
Ibid** 309*
57

Ibid*. 286-87*

Franz Haider, The Private War Journal of GeneralOberst Franz Haider, (n*p„ ,-n*d*)1, VI,"38T [Hereafter
cited as Haider, Journal *]
SQ
Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, (1893)« Nephew
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60
Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, (New
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a.nd showing Turkey the futility of opposing Germany
with force
Following orders from the Wilhelmstrasse, Ambassador
Papen informed the Turkish government on April 6, 1941,
that the Third Reich had been forced to take military
mea.sures in both Greece and Yugoslavia,

He explained that

this action had been caused, first by the continual buildup of British forces in Greece, 62 and second by the illegal
coup d'etat in Yugoslavia, 63
J
While Papen was enumerating the reasons for German
involvement, the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece were
taking place.

By April 13, Belgrade had fallen to the

Nazis, and four days later, the rest of Yugoslavia capitu
lated,

On April 24, the Greek government surrendered and

the British began to evacuate in the direction of Crete,
Hitler then issued Directive No, 28, Operation Mercury, for
the conquest of that island. 64 Mercury was launched on
May 20, 1941, and within six days, Crete was controlled by
the Third Reich,

With the sole exception of European Turkey,

the Axis now controlled the Balkans,
^

Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, 60-2,

62

The Greeks' desire that further British military
reinforcements be halted, as mentioned on Page 18, was
reversed after the German concentrations in Bulgaria be
came evident,
63
64
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Throughout the 1930's, the Third Reich tried to keep
the Balkans as divided as possible*

The Nazis believed that

if the peninsula could be prevented from forming a united
front against outside intervention, then it would be more
easily exploited economically and politically*

Turkey, on

the other hand, continually searched for ways to strengthen
the Balkan Entente and keep foreign influence out of south
eastern Europe*

However, Turkey's attempts were largely

fruitless for two reasons:

the distrust that the Balkan

states felt for each other, and the fear created-by expan
sionist-minded Russia and Italy*
German influence increased in the Balkans prior to
World War II, especially in Rumania and Bulgaria.*

Berlin

did not make any military moves into the peninsula during
1939-^0, because it felt at that time that those countries
were neither strategically important nor did they pose a
threat*

The Reich mainly desired that the Balkan states

adopt a position of neutrality, the more "benevolent" the
better*
Italy's disastrous invasion of Greece and the Yugo
slavian coup d'etat caused the Third Reich to intervene
militarily in the southeast*

Turkey was the only Balkan

country able to remain neutral throughout this period.
And the Turks accomplished this partly through their own
maneuverings, but largely because the German Wehrmaoht was
destined for Operation Barbarossa*

CHAPTER II
GERMANY'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TURKEY
1933 - 1 9 ^
When the Nazis gained control of Germany's politics
in 1933. the economy had recovered very little from its low
point of the depression,,

The economic policy prior to the

advent of Hitler consisted mainly of government spending
and other money measures aimed at increasing employment
and income.

Accompanying this was strict control of wages

and prices in the hope that the impact of Increased public
expenditures would be on employment and output rather than
on wages or prices.

The National Socialists did not change

this basic strategy; rather they tried to make it more
effective.

Government expenditures were increased, and the

controls over prices, wages, and foreign exchange were
25

26
tightened,,

Thus, Na2i policy could not be considered a

basic change in Germany’s economic policy,^
In 193^* Germany's balance of trade dropped to a.
dangerous low.

The gold and foreign exchange In the

country’s coffers were almost depleted,
Economic Minister Schacht

2

At this point,

introduced his •famous-Mew Plan

to guarantee the necessary imports.

The Mew Plan dissolved

the system of foreign exchange allotment and substituted
an arrangement whereby every import transaction was sub
ject to the approval of the proper supervisory office.
The alms of the Mew Plan were three:

(1) to cut imports

to what Germany could buy with foreign exchange, (2) to
channel German purchases only to the countries that bought
equal amounts from them, (3) to give preference to the im
port of certain commodities, especially those vitally
connected with rearmament.
It also set up twenty-seven control boards whose
function it was to help determine the value and sources
of the various imports and issue instructions as to where
they were to go within the domestic market.

The boards

were used as a tool in the bargaining for more favorable
bilateral agreements.

In addition, they were to try

1 Burton H, Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparation
for War, (-Cambridge*. 1959T7~&<> Tiereafter■citbd;:as Klein,
Economic Preparation,]
2

Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht* (1877),
President of ReieM>ank 1933-1939; Economic Minister 19331938,
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restricting, as much as possible, imports to countries with
which Germany had. clearing agreements.

This made it possible

for Germany to pay for foreign goods in Reichsmalks:rather
than in foreign exchange.

Along with this policy was

another designed to restrict purchases from each non-clear
ing country to the actual amount of goods that Germany ex
ported to that country.

The larger states, and those not

dependent on German goods, could retaliate by restricting
purchases from Germany,
little choice.

But for the others, there was

This was particularly true in the Balkans,

3

The clearing agreements, or bilateral trade agreements,
had been created prior to the Hitler regime as a means of
overcoming the extreme exchange difficulties in the various
countries in South America and southeastern Europe,

The

arrangements were complex since the monies arising out of
the agreements were available only for bilateral trade and
thus segregated into special accounts.

In order to increase

the demand for their goods, the Germans bought from clearing
countries far above the world prices.

Or they fixed special

rates of exchange for the Reichsmark below the official rate
and sometimes subsidized their exports.

The Germans gained

from these arrangements, a.s did many of their trading partners,
3

Maxine Y, Sweezy, The Structure of the Nazi
Economy, (Cambridge, 19*1-1), 117-18, [Hereafter cited as
Sweezy, Nazi Economy,1
Li

Arthur W„ Lewis, Economic Survey: 1933-1939,
(London, i960), 93°

28

In the Balkans, Germany was often the creditor in the
trade agreements,

If one of the countries could not pay

for German imports in foreign exchange, the Beichsbamk
would establish a. special account for the central bank of
the particular government, For the special account, the
amounts German importers paid for the goods shipped into
Germany were added, and the expenditures of German expor
ters were subtracted.

The foreign country discharged its

obligation at its central bank in domestic currency, and
5
that bank settled the account at the Reichsbank,
Through these agreements, Nazi Germany extended its
sphere of economic and political influence in the Balkans,
The economic plight of this area, aided the German effort
to garner them into the bilateral trading system, for the
Nazis tended to push trade with the weaker countries for
cing dependence.

The reason also existed, perhaps high in

German minds, that trade in the Balkan area, could more
easily remain accessible in time of war, 6
A smaller country, such as Turkey, once caught in the
clearing network, could hardly escape without help from a.
large nation.

Initially, Germany bought the available sur

plus and sold in return imports actually needed by the
small country.

As time went by and the state became more

dependent on Germany because of the clearing agreement, it
^

Sweezy, Nazi Economy, 115,

6

Ibido, 121,
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had to take what Germany could spare and sell only those
things Germany wanted,

7

Germany's trade with Turkey had been on the Increase
prior to the rise of Hitler*

One reason was the close

association they had had during World War I, but more im
portant was the confidence the Turks felt in German prod
ucts , and, conversely, the German need for Turkish ra,w
materials such as chromite ere.

8 The Nazi government and

the manipulations of Dr„ Schacht helped to further trade
between the two countries0 Between 1933 and 1936, of the
total Turkish exports, Germany's share rose from nineteen
to fifty-one per cent,

As a result, the sums owed by

Germany to Turkey had reached a level equal to more than
the total German clearing debts to the entire Balkan area. 9
In April 1936, Numan Menemencioglu of the Turkish
Foreign Office met with members of the German Ministry in
Turkey to discuss what could be done about the situation,
at least from the Turkish standpoint*

Menemencioglu said

the increase in Turkish exports to Germany had caused' a.
decline in exports to other countries; consequently,
7

Sweezy, Nazi Economy, 122„

® The principal ore from which chromium is derived.
Due to its harshness', surpassed'only by the diamond in its
non-tarnishing properties and in its resistance to corrosion
and heat, it is indispensible for steel of unsual toughness
as required in armor plate, gun barrels, aircraft engines,
ship machinery, etc, Turkey exported the raw material,
24l,

^ Ernst J&ckh, The Rising Crescent, (New York, 19^),
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several states were now waiting payment for shipments to
Turkey,,

However, because of the lack of foreign exchange,.

Turkey was unable to meet her debts#

Furthermore, Turkey's

high credit balance with Germany had the undesirable effect
of restricting the Turkish government's freedom of action
in commercial policy, for it had been compelled in the case
of almost all orders to attempt having them placed in
Germany#

As a result, Germany had become too strong com

mercially in Turkey#

The Turkish delegation, therefore,

declared that the only way Turkey would be able to carry
on her present exchange of goods with Germany would either
be for the Germans to pay a proportion of their liabilities
in foreign exchange, or to ship the goods, paid for by
Turkey through the clearing account, to third countries to
which Turkey owed the foreign exchange#1^)
In reply, the Germans said definitely their government
could not entertain the question of a favorable balance in
foreign exchange#

Although the second porposal did not

seem to be a practical solution, they would submit the idea
to their government#

Menemencioglu then mentioned that he

hoped to talk to Schacht concerning the aforementioned
ideas when he met with him later in the year in Berlin#1'1
'
In the meetings that followed, Turkey showed an in
clination not only to maintain the exchange of goods between
10
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Germany and Turkey at the same level but to increase it.
The Germans did not raise any basic objections, and trade
agreements were soon concluded to the general satisfaction
of both countries.

The main significance of these meetings

was that the question of the balance of foreign exchange
was brought to the fore, as was the question of German econ
omic dominance in the Turkish Republic.

These two Issues

were to play a major role during the following eight years
of economic and commercial relations.
By 19379 Germany had succeeded in becoming the numberone purchaser within the Balkan countries.

In terms of

actual value, foodstuffs bulked largest in the exports,
but most important to the Germans was the acquisition of
several scarce metals.

Turkey supplied the Nazis with

large quantities of raw wool, raw cotton, as well as with
skins, cereals, and dried fruits.

But of all the goods

Turkey exported to Germany, of prime importance was the
ferro-alloy chromite.

From 1933 to the end of 1937, chro

mite exports of the southeastern countries to Germany in
creased from 1^,000 tons to 79,000 tons.

Turkey was the

leading source, accounting in 1937 for around thirty per
cent of German supplies. 12

This percentage was equal to

seventy per cent of Turkey's total export of chromite. 11J
12

Klein, Economic Preparation, 6l-2„

William N, Medlicott, The Economic Blooade, I,
(London, 1952), 269° [.Hereafter cited as Economic Blocade, I.]
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During this same year , Great Britain and. France
(particularly Great Britain) became interested in the
economic situation in Turkey, partly as an effort to coun
teract the predominant influence of Germany in that area.
But Great Britain was limited in the degree of pressure it
:sould apply to the Turks, both because of their self-suf
ficiency as far as the maintenance of their standard of
living was concerned and because of the inroads of the
Germans in the areas of trade, capital, and technical aid.

14

In 1937, Great Britain, in particular, and France supplied
a mere fourteen per cent of the total Turkish imports and
received just eighteen per cent, while Germany supplied
forty-four per cent and took thirty-nine per cent. 15 With
these facts in mind and cognizant of the growing power of
the Nazis in Europe, the British government saw Turkey as
a strategically important position from which it might be
able to exert considerable economic pressure on Germany.
Thus, during the following year, Great Britain strengthened
its position in Turkey by negotiating agreements estab
lishing a large credit in favor of the Turks and enabling
the Turkish government to order war material on credit
l6
terms o
^

Medlicott, Economic Blocade. I, 269o
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Ibid.. 270.
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Prior to the economic negotiations with Turkey in
1937, the Germans viewed seriously their large unfavorable
balance in clearing payments evidenced by the following
figures:
Imports
Exports
(In millions of Reichsmarks)
1932
1933
19341935
1936

4-0.1
37.9
67.5
93-4118.5

31.0
36.3
50.9
67.3
79.4-17

These payments had developed a balance of 91.000,000 ReichsX8
marks
in favor of Turkey and, by clogging the clearing
system, threatened to paralyze the entire exchange of goods.
To counteract this trend, the Germans deprived the Turks of
the right to export unlimited quantities to Germany and cut
the German imports from Turkey to about sixty per cent of
those of the previous year.

This arrangement had such ex

cellent results for the Germans that from September 1937 to
March 1938 the balance was shifted by 90,000,000 Reichs
marks.

By the time new negotiations between the countries

began in 1938, the balance in favor of Turkey had been en
tirely eliminated and in fact had shifted in favor of Ger
many. -^9
17
1A
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19

P.G.F.P.. Series D, V, 724.

In 1931 the Reichsmark was worth 10.4-033 in
United States dollars. This was the approximate value to
1945. Irvine E. Eastman (ed.), Morld Almanac and Book of
Facts for 1945, (Ne# York, 1946),
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On June 30, 1938, German negotiator Karl Clodius20
and Menemencioglu began their discussions in Berlin for the
new trade agreement.

The Germans were in a very advantageous

position because of the favorable balance of trade and could
now easily concede an increase in Turkish exports, plus
extending a large credit.

Further, the Germans could see

possible political significance in the negotiations, par
ticularly because of Great Britain's efforts to eliminate
German influence in Turkey, especially in the economic sphere.
Berlin considered the agreement between Grea.t Britain and
Turkey as an attempt on the part of the Turks to prevent
the danger of too grea.t an economic dependence on Germany.

21

It was evident to the Germans from the outset that the
Turks desired a considerable increase of trade, with the
prime idea, of regaining a favorable balance.

The method

proposed to accomplish this was that both parties lift all
restrictions on imports.
agreed.

The Germans waivered but finally

They reasoned that, since the imports from Turkey

included a very large proportion of vitally important goods,
such an arrangement would be to their advantage.

Thus, im

ports were unrestricted on both sides for the next treaty
year. 22
20

Karl Clodius. German diploma!; expert in econ
omics concerning the Balkans,
21
22
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In former years, Turkey had been promised a guaran
teed rate of exchange for the sums credited to it in the
German clearing house.

The Turks wanted to maintain the

193? level of 28,000,000 Reichsmarks, but the sum was re
duced to 26,000,000 Reichsmarks through the insistence of
the Germans that the higher level was, in principle, bad
for their trade neogitations with other countries,^3
In view of the agreements between Great Britain and
Turkey and the known fact that the Turks had given the Bri
tish definite commitments as to what raw materials they
would send to cover the credits granted, Germany demanded
at least equal treatment.

The Turkish delegation was re

luctant to grant this point.

But since Germany was Turkey’s

best customer by far, the Turks finally guaranteed at least
the same deliveries of ores and wheat as had been exported
in 193?o Menemencioglu further stated that he would try
to provide for an increase in the export of chromite ore
from the 65,000 tons of 1937 to 100,000 tons in the coming
24
years.
This statement seemed to quiet any fears that the
Turks planned to reduce tra.de with the Germans and gravi
tate towards Great Britain,
The Turkish negotiators stressed the importance of
the two countries understanding that during the following
treaty year, war materials would be delivered through the
23
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clearing system*

Germany realized that Turkey did not have

the foreign exchange to buy war materials otherwise and felt,
economically and militarily, that this policy was desirable*
The countries agreed on this point for the duration of the
25
treaty*
At the conclusion of the treaty on July 25, 1938,
Germany felt it had successfully countered Great Britain’s
move of the previous May.

However, it came to the atten

tion of the German Foreign Office that the French were soon
to offer Turkey a considerable trade credit in the near
future.

The Germans realized that this offer, along with

that of the British, could go a long way in undermining
Germany’s economic position in Turkey,

And to a larger ex

tent, it was regarded by the Economics Ministry "as a part
of the economic offensive against Germany launched in southeast Europe and the Middle East by France and Great Britain."
Germany immediately offered a credit to Turkey before France
could act, hopefully stabilizing the position.
On January 16, 1939, after several months of nego
tiations over the particulars of the credit agreement, the
two countries came to terms.

By the agreement, the Ger

mans set up a credit of 150 million Reichsmarks for the
payment of industrial orders from the Turks.

The time limit

on the credit was ten years, By pouring sufficient capital
25
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into Turkey, Germany thought it possible to stop any Tur27
kish dependence on British goods.
With the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the
Italian invasion of Albania and the conclusion of the Pact
of Steel.during March,' April, and May, 1939, the war tempo
in Europe was quickly reaching the breaking point.

Germany’s

economy was not designed for an all-out conflict, and if
war broke out, it would have to be short and fast, or more
simply stated - a blitzkrieg.
In May, the question arose whether Turkish orders
for war materials should be delivered.

During the first

part of the month, G8ring informed Weizs&cker
livery to the Turks of six

pQ

that de

cm, guns could not now be

considered for military reasons.

He added that the Ftlhrer

agreed with this opinion, and some excuse must be given for
29
non-delivery.
This led to a conference later in the
month concerning what policy the Germans should follow in
their dealings with the Turks in these matters.

It was

mentioned that, if the contracts were not fulfilled, es
pecially in cases where Turkish inspectors at the manu
facturing plants knew they were ready for shipment, the
effects could be disastrous for future economic contracts
27

P.G.F.P.. Series D, V, ?^2.

^
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with foreign countries,

Clodius pointed out that this

was not the purpose of the conference, but that they were
gathered to examine how the deliveries of the heavy war
materials could be separated from those not as important
in a manner which would create the least friction possible
between Germany and Turkey, With the decision of the
Ftlhrer not to continue deliveries of heavy war material,
the committee only suggested that other current delivery
transactions be continued, especially since the country
needed Turkish chromite
The Turkish Embassy in Berlin did not waste any time
complaining about the non-delivery of shipments,

Clodius

was approached several times by the Turkish Ambassador
who asked questions about the heavy guns and, when the ne
gotiations for the renewal of the trade agreement were to
begin, Clodius claimed ignorance of the withheld guns,
adding that the Germans were not able to send a delegation
to Ankara at the present.

The Germans were trying to keep

the Turks in suspense until they had something definite to
say,

Franz von Papen was directed to stall the Turkish

home office on these points.

He tried to do this by calling

the Turks1 attention to their political attitude toward Ger
many,

This question had arisen in light of the recently

concluded Anglo-Turkish Friendship Treaty,
3°
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Throughout the rest of June a.nd July, further economic
talks between Berlin and Ankara were at a. standstill.

The

main point of contention was German non-delivery of con
tracted for war materials. On August 20, with the ter
mination date of the current trade and payments treaty
only eleven days away, Germany sent a list of proposals to
Turkey hoping the trade agreements could be renewed.
proposals Included:

The

(1) cancellation, by mutual consent,

of all outstanding armament contracts remaining unfulfilled,
(2) non-ratification by Germany of the Credit Agreement of
January 16, 1939, envisaging a 60,000,000 Reichsmark credit
for arms purchases and continuation of more purely indus
trial contracts, (3) prolongation of the Payments and Ex
change Agreement of July 25, 1938, for a year on condition
32
that the governments agreed on points (l) and (2)„
Three days later,. Papen called on the Turkish Foreign
Minister Sttkrti

S a r a c o g l u , 3 3

to ask about his government's

decision on Berlin's1proposal of August 20,

The Foreign

Minister replied to the effect that if Turkey could not
buy in Germany, then Turkey could not supply,

Papen at

tempted to keep the question open by proposing that they
at least agree to a month's extension of the current com
mercial treaty due to expire on August 3
32
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was submitted, formally on August 28, but on September 12
Papen reported that Turkey had declined the extension on
the basis that it believed in the principle of complete
fulfillment of contracts. 35
Turkey’s action in refusing to renew the trade agree
ment and in placing all trade with Germany on a compensa
tion basis gave Great Britain the opportunity it was
anxiously awaiting.

However, it did present a problem in

that exports to Germany would be resumed if the Allies
were not able to find markets for Turkey’s commodities.
On September 6, the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir
Hughe Knatchbuli-Hugessen,
London

sent an urgent telegram to

suggesting large purchases of the more important

commodities.

Since this was the harvest season, he fur

ther stated, considerable losses would result if there were
no markets, and more important, Great Britain’s position
in Turkey would be endangered.
At this same time, the British and French were nego
tiating with the Turks for the conclusion of a military
assistance treaty in the event of aggression by any Euro
pean power against Turkey.
1939.

It was concluded on October 19*

The British used this opening to discuss the limita

tion of chromite exports to Germany.
33
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Turks agreed to cease the export of chromite to the Ger
mans, but they made it a condition that the British govern
ment guarantee the purchase of not less than 200,000 tons
of chromite each year.

The British agreed to the proposals

on October JO only to be faced with a change in Turkish
demands.

The Turkish government now wanted to add similar

guarantees on Turkish exports of tobacco, hazel-nuts, raisins,
38
and figs.
These demands impeded negotiations for the
Allies knew that they could never completely replace Ger
many as a. market for Turkish exports unless they were pre
pared to buy the goods and sink them in the sea.
Early in November, the German Foreign Office sent
Instructions to Papen requesting him to present the fol
lowing proposals to the Turkish government in the event
it still refused to restore the clearing agreement:

(1)

a comprehensive compensation trade arrangement, and (2)
acceptance of (1) would ensure delivery of part of the im
ports of chromite ore, the rest to be paid for by specific
compensations - preferably industrial material other than
military arms..

Berlin stated that it desired the equal of

last year's chromite ore imports of 80,000 tons but would
settle for 60,000 tons.-^

Papen reported on November 9

that the Turkish Foreign Minister seemed agreeable to the
German proposal, especially the part in which war materials
could possibly be sent in exchange for chromite ore.
Medlicott, Economic Blocade. I, 273®
39
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promised an answer in a. few days.

It was received on

November 17 to the effect that it would enter into negotiations for a general settlement. 40
When the discussions began, the Turks drew a clear
distinction between chromite ore deliveries and "other"
deliveries.

They believed chromite was to be delivered

only in exchange for war material.

The Germans, unwill

ing to send certain heavy war materials, threatened not .
to negotiate unless chromite ore was included.

However,

as the discussions continued, it became evident the Turks
were not to be forced into yielding, especially since the
British were trying with equal vigor to obtain all the
chromite ore for the Allies,

The Germans began to see

they would get no chromite ore if they made no deliveries
of military equipment„ Such deliveries could not be prom
ised at the time because of the directive issued the previous May l k a
The Germans now had to decide whether further nego
tiations should be entered into before the chromite ore
question was settled, or whether the talks should be com
pletely cancelled at least for the time being.

There were

several good reasons why Germany should continue the dis
cussions, among them the risk that the other goods of in
terest such as cotton and olive oil would probably be sold
P.G.F.P.. Series D, VIII,
^
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to Great Britain and the lesser items left to Germany
unless they negotiated.

But of greater significance w&s

real danger that the Turks would be drawn into the arms of
42
Great Britain if they were ignored.
At the London econ
omic negotiations, the Turks made full use of this German
eagerness to obtain chromite ore.
Turkey was aware that the Allies were in a better
position to grant the heavy war materials desired because
of the considerable quantity stockpiled in Great Britain
43
and previously destined for the Polish front.
Further,
the Turks knew that the Allies were willing to go to al
most any lengths to corner the chromite market.

Thus,

Menemencioglu insisted on certain positive guaranteed
purchases before he would agree to the complete with
holding of chromite ore from Germany.

Finally, on January 8,

19^0, in Paris the agreements on chromite and other ex
ports were signed.

The chromite agreement was to run for

two years with the option to extend it for an additional
year.

Menemencioglu had tried getting the Allies to con

tract the purchase of chromite for the next twenty years,
but he had to be satisfied with the two-year agreement.
Another interesting item was the British desire that con
siderable amounts of Turkish chromite be marketed in
Scandinavia.

Turkey agreed with certain limitations.

P.G.F.P.. Series D, VIII, ^56.
^
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Later events proved the British would have been wiser to
have tied up the chromite for a longer period and kept it
from going to Scandinavia*

LiL\,

The negotiations between Germany and Turkey on items
other than chromite had been progressing throughout Decem
ber 1939-.

On January 6 , 19^0, Papen telegraphed Berlin

that agreement had been reached with the Turkish Minister
of Commerce; in return for the delivery of papers for the
goods in customs storage, Turkish products with an approx
imate total value of 10,000,000 Reichsmarks would be exported*

k5

The list included products ranging from olive

oil to tobacco.

The Germans in return would send indus

trial goods such as spare parts and railway equipment.

A

further transaction was concluded later in the month which
dealt with virtually the same materials.

The German Foreign

Office reminded Papen during those negotiations that it was
not interested in the greatest volume of trade, but its
basic economic interest in Turkey concerned only "concesi.f-6

sions in the chromium ore question.1'

The chromite ore situation in German industry was
not yet at a critical point.

The total mobilization re

quirement was 12,000 tons of ore per month, and according
to the figures of the Reich Office for Iron and Steel the
current supplies were adequate for the next thirteen months.
Lih.
^
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Further, Germany was obtaining chromite ore supplies from
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria equaling another 32,000
tons per year above the current stockpile.

The possibility

also existed that Russia would provide another 100,000 tons
before the end of the year.

If Germany received all po

tential resources, an adequate supply would be assured for
the next two years,

Germany was also working on separate

arrangements to obtain 35,000 tons from Norway and 40,000
tons from Hungary,

The Interesting aspect about the chro

mite in Norway and Hungary was that it had been mined in
Turkey, 47
Berlin was still interested in Turkish chromite but
was not interested enough to pay the necessary price.

Ger

many's forthcoming invasion in the west meant that virtually
all heavy war materials would be headed towards France.
Thus, German policy now was to keep Turkey neutral though
still economically connected.

Turkey's tripartite pact

with France and Great Britain and the economic agreement
with the same two countries aroused considerable suspicion
in Berlin that Turkey was drifting into the Allied orbit.
However, Germany still held one trump card - the Turkish
doubt concerning Russia's attitude since the failure of the
Russo-Turkish commercial negotiations of October 1939.

The

Germans hoped this active distrust would forestall any
Jh O

inclination on Turkey's part to join the Allies.
^

48
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eye continually on Turkish chromite, Germany worked for a.
gradual improvement of relations through economic agreements
on a moderate scale.
Direct trade between Germany and Turkey fell con
siderably between August 1939 and July 19^0.

During 1939,

Germany supplied the Turks with fifty per cent of its total
imports, but by the middle of 19^0 this figure decreased to
ten per cent.

if,9

The primary reason being the failure to

come to an agreement after the lapse of the 1938-1939 treaty
on August 31, 1939*

The principal countries to gain from

this situation were the Allies who, as previously mentioned,
were able to corner the Turkish chromite market.

Germany,

however, developed another method to obtain withheld sup
plies from Turkey through use of its economic connection
with other Balkan states.
Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria all had economic rela
tions with Germany and Turkey.

Germany had established

clearing agreements with these states and had a consider
able hold on their economies.

Through these countries,

the Germans bought Turkish goods ordered specifically for
resale to Germany.

Great Britain objected strenuously,

reminding the Turks of their agreement to prevent such a
practice.

Turkey justified its actions on the grounds that

the assurances had applied to enemy and occupied territory
and not to a country such as Hungary.
concerned with its own well-being.

Actually, Turkey was

Since the British could

Medlicott, Economic Blocade, I, 610.
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not guarantee purchase of the commodities being resold to
Germany, no valid reason existed for Turkish producers to
suffer.^0

After the conclusion of the German-Turkish agree

ment of July 25, 19^0, the Germans were not as dependent
on this practice.
to certain items
The Germans

It was, however, still used in relation
such as jute bags,^
had not been satisfied

with the

of the earlier economic negotiations of January 19^0,
discussions that

followed did not yield

in Turkish attitude until the

outcome
The

any notablechanges

invasion of France in 19^0,

The speed of the German victories impressed the Turks and
caused them to re-evaluate their relations with Germany.
In an interview with Papen, Turkish President Indntt stated
"despite their option for the Allies, his government had
always wished to maintain friendly relations with old
52
allies,"
Indnti added that he desired the conclusion of
an economic agreement as a show of Turkish good will.

How

ever, the question still remained concerning Turkish reac<3
tion to the entry of Italy into the war.r
Two days later,
Turkey decided to remain neutral.

It was thus possible for

Germany and Turkey to exchange notes and begin full-scale
economic negotiations,
^
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Germany hoped that these talks would Include the ques
tion of chromite ore, and Turkey had given indications that
they well might,

Papen, however, on June 14, reported to

Berlin that, though such prqspects had looked good, InSnti
now stated it was impossible ‘
because of the firm commitments
which Turkey had entered into with the Allies the previous
cJl
January,
The other items in the negotiations were readily
agreed upon.

The major obstacle to the conclusion of the

treaty was Turkish suspicion that the Germans would quickly
buy up and export Turkish products but fall into arrears
with their own deliveries.

The Turks, therefore, submitted

a formula by which German goods must arrive in Turkey before
the government would give the Turkish exporter permission
to ship goods to Germany for the equivalent amount,

Papen

was hesitant in agreeing to this, but he did include it in
the exchange of notes to allay Turkish mistrust. 55
On July 25, 19^0, the German-Turkish commercial agree
ment' was signed.

It was to last for one year.

According

to its terms, the volume of commercial exchange between
the two countries was to equal ^2,800,000 Reichsmarks.
Elaborate lists were devised whereby only designated Ger
man goods could be exported in order to obtain certain Turkish goods and vice-versa, 56 ■ All told, both countries were
^
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reasonably satisfied with the outcome.

Germany, of course,

regretted that chromite had not been included but was re
lieved that Turkey had decided to remain neutral.

The Turks

had fared better than the Germans, primarily because they
still retained their economic connections with Great Britain
concerning several commodities Germany would have liked to
pre-empt - most notably chromite.

The Turks had also bene-

fitted by the inclusion of finished products from Germany
such as locomotive, railway equipment and pharmaceutical
products, compared with such raw materials as olive oil,
cotton, and similar products they could readily supply. 57
The German conquest of Greece and takeover of vir
tually all the Balkan peninsula in the spring of 19^1
ushered in a new phase of German-Turkish economic relations.
Previously, the Turks had the buffer sta.tes of Bulgaria and
Rumania, between themselves and the Third Reich, but now they
were faced with a direct threat along their Thracian fron
tiers.

Germany was anxious to cultivate this Turkish neigh

bor and lead it into close relations with the "New Order,"
but if this were not possible, at least be assured of Tur
kish neutrality.

The reason for Germany's desire to main

tain a friendly Turkey was the planned invasion of Russia
Earlier Hitler had considered either luring the Turks into
57
y
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the Tripartite Pact

58

with Great Britain,

or forcing them to scrap their alliance

However, with "Barbarossa." to begin in

a matter of a few weeks, he would be satisfied with a gua.rantee of neutrality. 59
Early in May, Hitler called Papen to Berlin and told
him to start negotiations for the conclusion of a closer
alliance with Turkey,

Discussions began in Ankara and a

Friendship Treaty was signed on June 5» 19^1°

The treaty

merely stated that both parties would respect the integrity
of the other's territory and consult each other "in a
friendly spirit in all questions affecting their common in
terests,"^

There was also a secret protocol in which Ger-

many agreed to recognize Turkish sovereignty in the Straits, 6l
Germany had gained no more than a guarantee of Turkish
62
neutrality.
At this time, the Germans began to exert
pressure on Turkey for the conclusion of an economic agree
ment that would include the sale of chromite to Germany.
Karl Clodius arrived in Ankara, soon after the conclu
sion of the Friendship Agreement,

The prime item on his

58
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agenda, was the acquisition of Turkish chromite„ The Germans
were prepared to offer the delivery of considerable war
material to obtain access to chromite, but one obstacle
confronted them*

In 19^0, the Turks had signed an agreement

with the British whereby their entire output of chromite
would be bought by Great Britain for the next two years.
Attached to this agreement was the option for the British
to extend their acquisition of chromite for another year.
When pressed as to whether they would sell Germany chromite,
the Turks made it clear they would not be free to do so un
til January 19^3»

Clodius suggested that the Turks sell

chromite ore to Germany after they supplied the quantity
desired by Grea.t Britain*

The Turks answered that the chro

mite ore agreement bound Turkey not to exceed the produc
tion of 250,000 tons yearly and to deliver the entire amount
to Great Britain*

Thus, if the Turks supplied only chromite

to third parties, it would be a breach of contract which
Turkey was not about to commit without a release from Great
63
Britain*
The Germans offered heavy guns in return for
the chromite, and Clodius even threatened to cut off the
negotiations * The Turks repeatedly explained that their
hands were tied but added that after January 8 , 19^+3» they
would be willing to supply Germany with any desired quantity
of chromite ore*

Further, Turkey was willing to stockpile

the amount of chromite desired by Germany from the beginning
63
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of the present treaty period, and would, therefore, he able
to ship the necessary chromite as soon as the present treaty
with Great Britain expired,

Menemencioglu pointed out that

according to his information, Germany was sufficiently
supplied until the end of 19^2,

Thus, it should make no

difference if chromite ore were not shipped until that time,
Clodius reported to Berlin the stalemate in the nego
tiations, and German authorities were not at all pleased
with the failure to obtain agreement on the acquisition of
chromite.

The question was raised as to whether negotia

tions should stop, but Berlin realized there were other
factors to be taken into consideration.

For one, the pros

pect of obtaining chromite ore was valuable for the future.
For another, if German successes in Russia, continued, Tur
key might feel pressured to supply chromite ore in 19^2,
Also, Turkish deliveries of copper and cotton, promised for
19^2 , would be extremely valuable and would form the basis
of an acceptable treaty,

Berlin decided that a treaty
65
should be arranged without the inclusion of chromite.
The proposals to be offered Turkey divided German
armament deliveries into three groups, the guiding prin
ciple being delivery of the most valuable armament in re
turn for chromite.

The first group, including such items

as anti-tank guns, explosives, and machine guns, was to be
DoG,F»P,, Series D, XIII, 556-57«
65
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used in bargaining for copper or cotton, , The second group
consisted of larger equipment such as field cannons, bridgebuilding materials, and mountain guns,

These were to be

traded only in the event that chromite ore was obtainable
in 1942, in which case deliveries would be made item by
item for the individual shipments of chromite,

The third

group contained the heaviest equipment such as howitzers,
Only in the event that an agreement was reached that chro
mite would be delivered after January 8 , 1-943-* could these
armaments be promised,^
On October 9, 1941, the economic agreement was signed,
Germany obtained copper, cotton, and lesser items in ex
change for machine guns, anti-tank guns, and explosives.
It was further agreed that before March 31, 1943, the two
governments would negotiate a treaty concerning the delivery
of chromite ore to Germany,

The Turkish government would

then approve the export to Germany of an annual amount of
90,000 tons of chromite ore for the periods January 15 to
December 31, 1943, and from January 1 to December 31, 1944,

67

Germany had finally concluded an agreement for Turkish
chromite, but it would be fifteen months before it could
make use of it.
Since December 1940, Turkey had been receiving ship
ments of foodstuffs and war materials from the United States,
66
67
f
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Originally, the goods had been contracted by Great Britain
from the United States and then shipped by the British to
Turkey,,

In November 19^1, the Americans announced they

were going to deal directly with Turkey and ship the goods,
themselves.

Berlin did not particularly care for this

situation, but little could be done,

Turkey vitally needed

certain of the items it was receiving from the United States
and told the Germans that it was the duty of the Turkish
government to utilize every possibility in strengthening
its military position.

The part of the arrangement that

irritated the Germans was the American acquisition of Tur
kish chromite. Papen attempted to counter the American
moves by suggesting to Berlin that a statement be issued to
the press to the effect that these deliveries showed Presi
dent Roosevelt’s intention of extending the war to peace
ful countries.

WeizsScker instructed Papen to ask Turkey

to confirm the fa.ct that these commercial agreements did
not involve any political or economical concessions.

The

Turks denied any such implications, and lend-lea.se continued.
The halt of the German offensive in Russia in December
19^1, combined with the Russian counter-offensive, had
serious repercussions in Turkey.

The Turks knew Russia, de

sired partial, if riot full, control of the Dardanelles.
January 19^2, Papen wrote to Berlin that President Inbntl
had recently stated that "Turkey was Interested to the
68
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highest degree in the ’destruction of the Russian colossus'
and that Turkey’s present neutrality was in the Axis inter
est, as otherwise the British navy would be able to support
the Russians in the Black Sea.1'69 With this problem in mind,
Menemencioglu approached the Germans in an attempt to gain
further arms for the defense of Turkey* He proposed that
the Funk Agreement be revived, 70 Papen answered that Ger
many would expect some political equivalent,

Menemencioglu

balked at the idea,, but Papen, considering the overture by
the Turks as a chance to draw them further from the Allies,
flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. 71
Papen explained to Hitler that the British at that
time were in Ankara, studying Turkish military requirements.
However, Great Britain was reluctant to send arms to Turkey
as long as the Turks were hesitant to join the Allies. Papen
suggested Turkey might remain neutral more easily if Germany
supplied its urgent military needs.

It was also possible

Turkey would acquire the altitude it could defend itself
against a Russian attack without British assistance.

Hitler,

under the impression that the arms would tempt Turkey to
69 George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs:
1939-1946; The Middle East in the War, Royal Institute of
International Affairs, (London, 1952), ^51• [Hereafter
cited as Kirk, Middle East.]
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71 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
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join the Axis, authorized Papen to begin discussions, The
following summer, Clodius visited Ankara., and an agreement
was signed granting the Turks a loan of 100,000,000 Reichs
marks for the procurement of German arms.

The loan was to

be repaid by the shipment of goods, particularly chromite,
72
due to arrive in 1943,
In January 19^3» Germany and Turkey began final nego
tiations for the conclusion of the promised "arms for chrome"
agreement.

During the period from January 15 to March 31»

Germany received quantities of chromite under the Clodius
agreement.

However, because Germany did not supply the

amounts of war materials promised, Turkey believed that
they were responsible to provide only a part of the 45,000
tons of chromite that Germany was entitled to receive by
March 31,

This failure of delivery on the part of the

Germans could have allowed the Turks to refuse further sup
plies of chromite, but Turkey declined to use this option,
and on April 18, 1943?
ment was signed.

new German-Turkish trade agree

The chromite provisions of the Clodius

agreement were delayed until December J l t 19^3* thus allow
ing the Germans an extension to make the shipments on which
the chromite allotments would be based, 73
72
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The new Clodius agreement generally followed the
lines of that concluded in October 1941«

The importance

of German arms to the Turks was clearly demonstrated by
the fa.ct that all the goods most important to the Third
Reich would be set aside for it.

Such Turkish goods as

copper, cotton and tobacco were to be traded for German
war materials., pharmaceutical products, copper products,
?4
and iron and steel wares.
Chromite was not mentioned
in the main agreement which was to last for a period of
fourteen months, that is until May 31* 19^.

It is clear

that when Germany could withhold the arms needed by Turkey
it was an effective weapon in driving advantageous agree
ments with the Turks,
Chromite shipments under the Clodius agreement had
not reached German expectations during the first few months
of 19^3* but this was at least partially explainable for
two reasons.

First, chromite shipments were generally

light during the winter months because of bad weather con
ditions,

Second, Great Britain had previously contracted

for all chromite stocks above ground up to January 8 , 1943*
Thus, Germany was only entitled to the new output which
was generally small at that time of year.

All told, approx

imately 1,000 tons of chromite ore were shipped to the Third
75
Reich during the first quarter of the year,
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During the following quarter, Germany imported in
creasing amounts of Turkish chromite to the total of about
13,500 tons by the end of June,

The Germans were likewise

sending increasing amounts of war materials to the Turks
which by the end of August had almost reached the value of
100,000,000 Reichsmarks,

At the beginning of November,

around 30,700 tons had been delivered from Turkey to the
Third Reich, and by the close of 19^3 about 46,783 tons had
been received by Germany since the preceding January,

The

average chromite delivery by Turkey, i*rhich had been a. little
over 3,000 tons through the first nine months, increased to
76
about 7 9800 tons in November and 8,100 tons in December,
In spite of the fact that the war was going more and more
against the Third Reich in 19^3* Turkish supplies to Germany
were continually increasing. 77
Throughout 19^3, the Allied powers met to discuss
their combined operations against Nazi G e r m a n y , T h e
question of Turkish participation against Germany was
occasionally raised, but other than suggesting that Turkey
be asked to join the Allies, no strenuous effort was made
to enlist its aid0

In the fall, however, the British pre

sented a note demanding, among other things, Turkey's
Medlicott, Economic Blocade, II, 531°
77 For the total Turkish exports to Axis countries
during 19^3, see Ibid,, 540,
78
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The conferences were held at Casablanca, Adana,
Quebec, Moscow, Teheran and Cairo,

59
complete severance of trade with the Axis powers,,

Turkey,

knowing full well that the German air force was only a few
hundred miles away,

79

stated its intention of fulfilling

present agreements.
During the first quarter of 19^, shipments of war
materials and chromite between Germany and Turkey con
tinued at an increasing rate.

By the beginning of March

19i}4, the Germans had received approximately 62,000 tons
of chromite. 80

However, there was increasing pressure by

Great Britain and the United States on Turkey to break its
commercial agreements with Germany.

Finally, on April 1^,
O "i

19^, United States Ambassador Steinhardt

and British

Ambassador Knatehbull-Hugessen presented the Turkish gov
ernment with identical notes stating that if the Turks
continued to furnish the Reich with important war materials
including such items as chromite, copper, iron, and steel,
the United States and Great Britain would be forced to apply
Qp

a blockade against Turkey.
79 Papen, Memoirs, 507.
base at Constanta, Rumania.
80
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fearing a, break with the Allies, informed Papen that the
Turkish government was obliged to suspend further deliveries
of chromite starting May 1, 19^.^^
Papen was not surprised at this decision, but Berlin
reacted in a different manner„ On April 2?, the German
government, after ordering Papen!s return to Berlin, issued
a. communique stating that the German Ambassador in Ankara,
would not return to Turkey for the time beinge When For
eign Minister Ribbentrop informed Papen of this decision,
plus the fact that he was considering counter-measures,
the Ambassador answered that such an act would have no
effect beyond causing the Allies to rejoice. 8^ Upon joint
consultation with Papen, the Ftihrer agreed that it was ri
diculous to threaten counter-measures since Germany was in
no position to carry them out; further it was essential
85
that the Ambassador return to his post.
Because the production of durable armour plate was
dependent on the availability of chromite, the stoppage
of the Turkish source dealt a blow to the German war econ
omy,

Thus, in the few remaining days, the Reich transported

every available stock into Axis controlled countries.

On

May 18, Great Britain and Turkey began serious discussion
on the possibility of cutting Turkish exports to Germany
83 papen, Memoirs, 52^°
Ibid., 524.
85

Ibid., 52^-25 .
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in certain other areas to fifty per cent of such exports
in 194*3.

These trade negotiations were halted during

the Turkish Straits affair which resulted in the resigna
tion of Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioglu on June 15,
O ry

but resumed shortly thereafter.

The Turks then agreed

to reduce exports of certain commodities to the Germans by
fifty per cent and to discontinue the other fifty per cent
when the Allies could provide the corresponding Imports,
OO
The Allies agreed with this view.
It was evident in July 1944 that the Germans would
have their troubles holding the Allied invasion.

In view

of the continueing successes of the Allies and their in
creasing pressure on Turkey, the Turkish government agreed
to sever its commercial and diplomatic relations with Ger
many on August 1, 1944.

As is clear, Germany's trade with Turkey was a bene
fit to the Third Reich's economy,

Germany was a ready

market for Turkish raw materials, and its industrial goods
were in great demand in the Turkish Republic,

The Turks

had earlier developed confidence in German industry, and
Germany's trade experts took full advantage of the situation
86

Medlicott, Economic Blocade, II, 544-45,

8^ This affair involved the passage of twelve armed
German ships through the Straits, and will be discussed in
Chapter III on the Turkish Straits,
OQ
Medlicott, Economic Blocade, II, 545,
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The Germans had an ingenious method of obtaining economic
exchange with Turkey,, and as a result Turkey became more
and more dependent on the Third Reich,

With Hitler's

establishment of the Four-Year Plan, economic relations
with the Turks increased significantly,

Germany's prime

interest in Turkey concerned chromite ore.
alloy had immense strategic importance.

This steel

However, when

the Germans could:no longer import chromite from Turkey in
the latter part of 1939, their preparations for war were
not seriously endangered,

Germany knew, before the invasion

of Poland, that it could not win a lengthy world conflict
without the aid of at least two major powers,

German

economy, therefore,' was built on the basis of a short war.
After the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact a.nd the
lightning successes on the Polish front, the Germans did not
feel that it was necessary to increase their production of
war materials; thus the import of Turkish chromite was not
considered vital.

However, when Germany failed to end the

war in 19^0, its need for chromite became painfully evident,
and it was forced to turn to other suppliers.

The Reich

obtained limited amounts from Greece and Yugoslavia, but
they were insufficient to meet future needs,

Germany at

tempted to import chromite from Turkey, but was prevented
by the fact that Great Britain had an exclusive agreement
for the Turkish ore.

It was not until January 19^3/ that

Germany finally negotiated an agreement with Turkey over
chromite ore.
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Had. the Germans been preparing for a full-scale war
when it broke out in 1939» no doubt they would have attemp
ted to gain complete control of Turkish strategic raw
materials0 But the Germans, who were counting on a. short
war, had not deemed it necessary to grant the Turks major
concessions until it was too late.

CHAPTER III
GERMANY AND THE TURKISH STRAITS
1933 - 1 9 ^
From the Straits Convention of 1841 to 191^» it was
a fundamental doctrine of international la,w that, "So
long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit
no foreign ships of war into the said Straits,"'3' It was
the violation .of this principle which aroused the indig
nation of the Allied governments when on August 10, 191^*
2

two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau passed
As quoted in James T, Shotwell and Francis Deak,
Turkey at the Straits, (New York, 19^0), 38* [Hereafter
cited as Shotwell, Straits,] The Turkish Straits consist
of three bodies of water - the Dardanelles, the Sea of
Marmara,, and the Bosporus, It controls the water route
between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas,
2 The Goeben was.renamed the Yavuz and is the only
battleship still In service as a, combatant vessel in any
navy. It is actually rated as a battle cruiser rather
than a battleship and has ten eleven-inch guns.
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through the Dardanelles and anchored off Constantinople.
When the Allies protested this breach, the Turks purchased
the vessels from the Germans, though they were left under
the command of German naval officers.
On September 26, 191^. & British destroyer stopped a
Turkish warship outside the Dardanelles and forced it to
return.

As a consequence, the Turkish government, though

technically still neutral, closed the Straits on the fol
lowing day.

A month later the Turkish fleet, under German

command and without declaration of war, attacked elements
of the Russian fleet and shelled several Russian ports.
As a result, the Allied powers declared war on Turkey; the
3
Straits remained closed until the end of World War I.
After the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918, the
Allies occupied the strategic areas surrounding the Straits.
In the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920) which was never
ratified by Turkey, the Allies attempted to establish the
rule that the Straits would be left open in either war or
peace to both merchant and warships of all countries. How
ever, the Greek invasion of Turkey at Smyrna on Hay 1^,
1919, caused the development of a strong nationalistic
movement which was eventually sufficient to repel the invaders and overthrow the peace settlement.
^

Shotwell, Straits, 96-7.

^

I M d .. 106-07 .

h
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In the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923» which followed the
Greco-Turkish war, Turkey was able to improve its situation
in the Straits,

The principle of full freedom of passage

during time of peace or war, Turkey being a neutral, was
laid down; however, if Turkey was a belligerent, the gov
ernment was allowed to exercise belligerent rights u n d e r
international law.

To insure freedom of the Straits, the

Treaty called for demilitarization of both the Asiatic and
European shores of the passage with the notable exception
of Constantinople,

The regime established by the treaty

lasted until Turkey's demands for even greater improvement
resulted in the Montreux Convention of 1936,

5

Turkey's desire for a revision of the Straits Conven
tion of 1923 was not a. sudden decision.

The Turkish gov

ernment's request came after a series of international
events which seriously changed the original foundations
Of post-war Europe,

Several of these events were:

the

failure of the Disarmament and the World Economic Confer
ences, the undeclared wars of Japan and Italy, the strong
foreign policies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and
the gradual deterioration of the collective security system,^
The advent of the Nazi regime did not immediately affect
Turkey's attitude toward the Straits,

In fact the Germans

5 For the complete text of the Treaty of Lausanne,
see League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol, 28, 115-37.

^

Shotwell, Straits, 120; and D,G0F,P,, Series C,

v, *1530-31.

6?

were never solely responsible for the Montreux Convention*,
However,

the Reich's attempts at economic and. political

expansion towards southeast Europe along with its growing
stature on the international scene did cause considerable
consternation in the League of Nations, making the members

more agreeable to a change of the Straits Convention of the
Treaty of Lausanne,, 7
On April 10, 1936, the German Embassy in Turkey was
informed by Menemencioglu that on the following day, his
government would communicate to the signatories of the
Straits Convention of 1923, that due to the changed politica.l situation, the guarantee provided for in Article 18

8

was ineffective and no longer protected the Turkish terri
tory concerned.

Therefore, the Turkish government was pre9
pared to renegotiate the current status of the Straits,
This message was not surprising to Berlin, for it had
been known to the Germans for several months that the Turks
were desirous of a. change*^
^

However, the Wilhelms trass e

DoGoFoP., Series C, V, ^30-31; and Anthony Eden,

The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of A v o n : Facing the Dic
tators , (Boston, 1962), ^7 2 * [Hereafter 'cited as Eden,
Dictators„]

8

The League itself was not involved in the Montreux
Convention,, According to that article the signatories would
take the necessary action against any country or countries
which violated the provisions,
9

DoGoFoP,, Series C, V, *00-31.

10 DoGoFoP,,. Series C, IV, 889-91* In December, 1935,
the Turkish government had called in several German naval
experts and asked their advice as to what additional naval
forces Turkey would require to defend the Straits if they
were not permitted to fortify them.
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did not care either to attend the Montreux Convention in
an official capacity or to send an observer,

It reasoned

that since the British desired to retain the International
Straits Commission, and since this was not in Germany's
11

interest, it would be superfluous for Germany to attend,

Turkey's request was delivered to the signatories of
the 1923 Convention, plus Yugoslavia and the Secretary
General of the League of Nations,

The unsteadiness of the

world scene exemplified by the Italo-Ethiopian War and the
German remilitarization of the Rhineland did much to cause
12
a generally favorable reaction.
The conference met at
Montreux, Switzerland, on June 22, 1936,
From the outset the conference was a battle between
the colliding interests of Great Britain and Russia.

The

original proposal set forth by the Turks included their
desire not only to refortify the Straits but also to make
Turkey sovereign over navigation.

If adopted, the situation

would have been exceedingly favorable to the Russians,

How

ever, as finally agreed upon on July 20, 1936, the Montreux
Convention was a compromise between the Turkish and British,
positions ,^
11
TO

PaG.F.P.. Series C, V, 669.

13

Shotwell, Straits, 122-23,

Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, 4, Italy, still smarting
from the economic sanctions Imposed on it as a result of the
invasion of Ethiopia, did not attempt the Montreux Convention,
Ciano, in effect, said that Italy would refrain from atten
ding any international meetings until the sanctions had been
abrogated,
For the complete text
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Generally speaking, the chief 'beneficiaries of the
Convention were Turkey and Russia,,

The Turks did not ob

tain complete control over the Straits0 But they did reg
ister several major gains, for both the demilitarization
clauses and the International Straits Commission were abol
ished,

Ands most important, when in the role of the bel

ligerent, Turkey was free to close the Straits to warships
of all nations0 Russia’s long sought-for right to send un
limited, numbers of warships into the Mediterranean from the
Bla.ck Sea was its major achievement in the Montreux Con
vent ion.1^
The agreements reached in Montreux were
not appreciated in Berlin,,

in general,

Although the Germans expressed

satisfaction that Turkey was again sovereign over the Straits.,
the fact that Russia, had improved its position was partic
ularly irritating to the Wilhelmstrasse„

Germany had no

desire to be relegated to a position in Turkey secondary
to that of either Great Britain or Russia.

However, the

German Foreign Office instructed its representatives in
Ankara, not to lodge a formal protest against the agreements
reached concerning the Straits but instead to quietly in
form the Turkish government that Berlin was not especially
happy about its attitude in the matter0 Hopefully, this
Shotwell, Straits, 12d-27„ This right of unlim
ited access by Russian warships through the Straits during
time of peace was also strengthened by the fact that no
non-riparian power (that is a state which does not border
on the Black Sea) could send into the Black Sea a force
greater than, the most powerful fleet of a riparian state.
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would Induce the Turks to alter their views 0 v

by the Heich, however, were too late.

Such feelers

On July 30, 193&,

the Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the Convention,
and on November 9 , 1936, the ratifications of virtually
X6
all signatories were deposited in P a r i s „

. The Montreux

Convention was now international la.w„

Several days after the signing of the Montreux Con
vention, the German Embassy in Ankara sent a. poltical re
port to Berlin discussing the situation created by the
Convention„

Turkey was now to be viewed as a power to be

reckoned with in any international policy dealing with
the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.„

However,

the extent of Turkey*s strategic importance in the area
of the Straits would not be known until it demonstrated
the extent to which the Straits would be fortified and
controlled,,
Turkey’s relations with Russia were also regarded as
an important factor, for, if the Turks gained the distrust
of their northern neighbor as concerns the Straits, it
could develop into a threat to Turkey’s national existence„
D°G°F.,P.» Series C, V, 795-99» An interesting
note to the Montreux Convention is that on July 24, 1936,
the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Belgium had
extended a formal invitation to Germany to attend the
conference, which seems a, little ridiculous in view of the
fact that the Convention had already been signed, though
not yet ratified by a sufficient number of states 0 Ciano,
Diplomatic Papers, 20o
*1 ^

DoGoFcP., Series C, V, 669„ The one hold-out was
Japan whose ratification was received on April 19, 1937,
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On the other hand, it was believed that as a means of
countering any changes in Russian attitudes, Turkey would
pursue a continueing friendly relationship with Great
Britain*

This policy would draw the additional benefit

of security against Italy’s expansionist designs in the
eastern Mediterranean*'1'^
Early in the spring of 1937:. the German government
started making serious overtures towards Turkey concerning
the Reich’s accession to the Montreux Convention,,

Berlin

reasoned that since Germany had regained its position of
equality on the international scene, it should be treated
with equal rights in the Straits question.

Thus, the State

Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Ernst Weizs&cker
informed the German Embassy in Ankara to open negotiations. 18
One serious drawback to the Germans’ desire for nego
tiations was their idea that both Germany and Italy would
enter into discussions at the same time and on the same
basis.

When the German Ambassador, Friederich von Keller, 19'

conversed with his Italian counterpart to see if this was
feasible, he was told that nothing could be done in this
area "until the Abyssinian question was settled in the
League of Nations by recognition of the Italian Empire at
17
1
19

°F°Po. Series C, V, 83^-38.
DoG,F,Po, Series D, V, 706-07*

Friederich August Wilhelm von Keller, (1873-1960)„
Last permanent German delegate to the League of Nations un
til Nazi Germany’s withdrawal in 1933; served in many di
plomatic posts, his last being Ambassador to Turkey, 19351939o
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least on the part of Turkey,"

20

Keller, not knowing whether

to proceed, telegraphed Berlin for additional instructions,
WeizsMcker immediately replied in the affirmative.
Upon consultation with Turkish Foreign Minister Aras
in August, the German Ambassador was informed that while
the Turkish government realized the position of the Ger
mans , it could not agree to a bilateral agreement between
the two countries on the Straits question.

If Berlin uni

laterally declared German adherence to the Montreux Con
vention,

it would be respected by Ankara,

Nevertheless,

the Foreign Minister did not wish to express his govern
m e n t ’s opinion on a future bilateral agreement at this
time.

21
With the passage of several months and still no reply

from the Turkish government on whether it would agree to
treat Germany as a. signatory to the Convention through a
bilateral agreement, Keller again approached the Turkish
Foreign Ministry,

22

After a series of talks with the Tur

kish ministers concerned, he was left with the familiar
statement that before Turkey could assent to such
change of n o t e s , there would have to
23
tion of the points in issue,

20

D.G.F.P. . Series D, V, 710,

21

Ibid,. 710-12,

an ex

befurther examina-

22

The main reason why Germany wanted to gain the
rights of a signatory was because according to article 2 k ,
paragraphs k and 5 of the Montreux Convention, the signa
tories would be informed of all movements of foreign ves
sels of war through the Straits,

23

D.G.F.P.. Series D, V s 716-17.
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Germany was not content to let the matter drop; its
interest in the Straits was again demonstrated in March
1938o

At that time Weizs&cker telegraphed the German Em

bassy that in view of reports that Turkey would soon recog
nize Italy’s Ethiopian Empire, it wa.s highly possible Ger
many and Italy could present their common naval interests
in the Straits simultaneously,

2k

However, during the fol

lowing month, Italy requested that it be allowed to accede
to the Montreux Convention without having to influence
German-Turkish relations on the question,2^

Germany re

luctantly agreed„
On July ?, 1938» the Secretary General of the Turkish
Foreign Ministry, Human Menemencioglu, called on Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin,

Ribbentrop stated that

Germany was ready to conclude a bilateral agreement with
Turkey which would make the terras of the Montreux Conven
tion effective between the two countries.

Inherent in the

agreement would be the understanding there would be no re
vision of the Montreux Convention without Germany,

The

Secretary General answered that the question was the sub
ject of considerable study by his Foreign Ministry9 and
2k

DoGoFoP,. Series D, V, 718-19. Specifically,
both countries wanted to insure a wide interpretation of
the term "auxiliary vessels," which was defined in para
graph 6 of annex II in connection with article 8 of the
Convention, Such a. definition they hoped would affect
the passage of Russian ships carrying war materials or
troops if it were a belligerent,
2<
Fbid,, 721, At this time Germany also lost in
terest in the definition of "auxiliary vessels,"
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he regretted to say that unsolvable problems stood In the
path of Germany's desires ,
Foremost, Turkey did not ha.ve sovereign rights con
cerning the Convention,,

Thus, any alteration such -as the

one Germany espoused, required unanimous consent of the
signatories.

Further, Turkey feared that the Convention

itself would be endangered if it unilaterally concluded an
agreement concerning the Straits,

Menemencioglu said that

the only alternative he could think of was for Germany to
accede unilaterally to the Convention with reservations in
hopes that Turkey could find some way to take cognizance
of the declaration,

26

Ribbentrop expressed his bafflement with the Turkish
attitude, saying that he could not understand how the other
signatories could object to Germany and Turkey arriving at
the same agreement existing between Turkey and the other
signatories.

The Foreign Minister attempted to sway the

Secretary General by stating tha.t a satisfactory GermanTurkish agreement on the Montreux Convention would greatly
aid the further development of relations between the coun
tries,

But Menemencioglu refused to budge from his original

position no matter what insinuations Ribbentrop threw at
him,2'?

Prior to his return to Ankara, the Secretary

General was handed a new draft proposal which took into
26

27

D.G.F.P.. Series D, V, 730-31.
Ibid., 730-32,
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account the legal objections he raised In his conversation
with Ribbentrop,

He promised to examine thoroughly the

document and report any change in the Turkish position to
Berlin,2^
In the following January 1939» Menemencioglu returned
to Berlin,

Though officially he had come to attend the

economic negotiations between the two countries, he immedi
ately brought up the Straits question with State Secretary
WeizsScker,

The proposal he handed WeizsScker granted

Germany equality with the signatory powers concerning no
tification of passage through the Straits of all warships
and merchant vessels.

However, to the consternation of the

Germans it did not mention Germany’s right to attend any
29
conference attempting to revise the Montreux Convention,
Upon notification of the Turkish proposal, Ribbentrop stated
that Germany's position had not changed, and added that in
his view Turkey acutally was not ready for a settlement of
the Montreux question. 30
During the next several months, the relations between
Germany and Turkey on the Straits question took on a dif
ferent aspect.

Due to the slow but steady move by Turkey

towards friendlier relations with Great Britain and France
and the consequent unhappiness of Berlin, Friederich von
p8

D.G.F.P.. Series D, V, 735-36,

29

Ibid.. 7£H-^2,

30

Ibid,, 7^3o
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Keller was replaced by Franz von Papen as German Ambassador
31
to Turkey*
After presenting his credentials, Papen talked with
Turkish President,, Ismet Inbnti*

The President expressed

his fear that if the unsteady situation in Poland was not
settled, it might lead to war*

Inbntt also raised the ques

tion of Italian aspirations in the Mediterranean*

Papen

tried to dispel any anxiety along these lines, but added
that if war resulted, then Germany expected strict neutra
lity from Turkey*

And by strict neutrality Papen meant
32
that the Straits be closed to all countries*
Throughout the summer of 1939» there was a definite

movement by Turkey towards a closer alliance with Great
Britain and France* 33 Turkey, alarmed by the Polish Ques
tion and Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean, was an
xious to safeguard its territory*

Germany, well aware of

Great Britain’s guarantees to Rumania, did not favor the
conclusion of a Turco-British Pact, for such an agreement
might allow the British to send warships through the Straits
In the event of war*

This German desire to force, if

Kilic, Turkey* Von Papen arrived April 27, 1939*
Hitler hoped that von Papen, having served with the Ottoman
army during World War I, might be In a. better position to
keep Turkey in line with the Third Reich’s policy or at
least get the Turks to assume a neutral position if war
should break out*
DoG*F*P,, Series D, VI, 36^.
33 For a. more detailed analysis of this drift and
German reaction, see the later chapter on the Tripartite
Treaty*
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necessary* the Turks to close the Straits was also shared
34by Russia,,
Thus, during the period of negotiations for the Na.ziSoviet Non-Aggression Pact, there was continual pressure
by both Germany and Russia on Turkey to close the Straits
to warships and war materials of non-riparian powers 3 5
After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939,
Turkey held the position that as long as it was a. non
belligerent, war munitions and troops in merchant ships
of any power could pass through the Straits036 Turkey’s
stand did not receive a. favorable reception in Berlin,

In

a. communique to the German Embassy in Moscow, German
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop instructed Ambassador Schulenburg-^ to inform Russian Foreign Minister Molotov3^ that
it was in the common interest of both Germany and Russia
to obtain a Turkish guarantee to prevent the passage of
3A Kilic, Turkey„ Russia previously tried to stop
the passage of warships of non-Black Sea powers through
the Straits at the Lausanne and Montreux Conferences,,
35 Raymond J„ Sontag and James S„ Beddie (eds„),
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-19^-1; Documents from the Ar
chives of the German Foreign Office,(New York,19^8),Pas
s'imT" [Hereafter cited as Sontag, Nazi-Soviet Relations<■]
36 PqGoF.Po. Series D, VIII, 173-7*1-.
37
J

Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, (187519^)o German Ambassador In Moscow 193*1— 19*H; directly in
volved in an anti-Hitler conspiracy in 19*l-*t; executed on
November 10, 19*I-*J-.
Vyacheslav Michaelovitch Molotov, (1890)„
Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (equivalent
to premier) 1930-19*1-1; People’s Commissar for Foreign
Affairs 1939-19^9*
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Anglo-French, war material or troops through the Straits.39
Mo such guarantee was worked out at that time, but on
October 2d, 1939s Russia assured Germany that it would
allow neither a, hostile position to be taken by Turkey
against the Germans or Russians, nor the passage of BriL,0
tish and French warships through the Straits ,
Throughout the period of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggres
sion Pact, the Russians continually brought up their in
terests in the area of the Turkish Straits,

Initially,

and perhaps to maintain smooth relations, the Germans ex
pressed their disinterest concerning Turkish domination of
the Straits and added that they understood Russia's desires
to establish its own bases t h e r e H o w e v e r , a.fter the
German victory in the West in the summer of 19d0, Hitler
reversed his stand and decided tha.t the Russians were not
to be allowed to expand beyond the Baltic area and Bess
arabia, and most Important, they were to be prevented from
it?

seizing the Straits„ ^

German successes in France also

affected the Turks, who began to view their strong stand
on the Montreux Convention as perhaps a little hasty*
39

DqGoFoP°. Series D, VIII, 17d.

it O

United States War Department, Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, (Washington, 19d6~19d8) , VI, 979=. fHereafter
cited, as N,C,A,]
itl

Ibid*, 990* The Russians particularly wanted a
naval base located in the Sea of Marmara, See DoG.F.P.,
Series D, VII, 15d„
Lip

A* _Rossi, The Russo-German Alliance, August 1939June 19dl, (Boston, 1951)» 211~ [Hereafter cited £LS RoS S
Alliance,]
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When discussions between Germany and Russia began
over the future of the Balkans and specifically the Straits
in the fall of 19^0, Russia was quick to remind its part
ners of its ambitions in Turkey,

In a. conversation between

Hitler and Molotov, the Fdhrer agreed that there should be
an alteration of certain terms of the Montreux Convention,
However, Molotov said that he wanted more than a paper
guarantee against an attack on the Black Sea via. the
Straits,

if-3

Specifically, Russia requested not only naval

bases in the Straits but also bases in the Kars-Ardahan
region.

i(4

In a talk with Papen, RiTpbentrop outlined\the ■
progression of the talks with the Russians and stated that
the time had come to discuss spheres of interest,

Berlin

realized that it would have to provide Russia with warm
water ports and wanted to hear Papen's opinion on the
Straits,

Papen said that he believed that Turkey considered

its sovereignty over the Straits as unquestionable.

Although

the Turks might allow a revision of the Convention to per
mit Russia to send its warships through the Straits, any
attempt to alter the Treaty by force would involve Turkey's
entry into the war,^
^
Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, R, H, C.
Steed (ed„), (New York, 1951)*218, [Hereafter cited as
Schmldt, Interpreter„]
Ml-

Kilic, Turkey, The Kars-Ardahan region is lo
cated' in eastern Turkey close to the Turco-Russian border,
^

Papen, Memoirs, ^ 65®
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In an effort to induce Russia, to abandon its plans in
Turkey, Germany presented the Russians with a scheme based
on the conquest of Grea.t Britain which suggested that upon
the dissolution of the British Empire, Russia would receive
land in Asia in the area of the Indian Ocean,

Berlin hoped

that an Interest in the Persian Gulf and its vast oil re46
serves would be enough to deflect Russian ambitions.
Along with these proposals, Berlin agreed to bring, joint
pressure on Turkey to alter the Montreux Convention so that
Russia was granted the right of unrestricted passage of
warships, whereas the non-riparian powers were not allowed
1},7

the right of passage for their warships into the Black Sea.
On November 26, 1940, Moscow replied to Berlin's offer by
demanding, among other things, the granting of military in
stallations in Turkey.

These growing Russian ambitions

alarmed Hitler, who was still contemplating an Invasion of
Great Britain.

Thus, in fear of Russian exploitations, and

before it was too late, Hitler answered the Russian demands
by ordering his Chiefs of Staff to prepare for 'Operation
Barbar ossa,. '
With the invasion of Russia on the drawing board,
Germany's attitude toward the Straits became somewhat re
served.

Ambassador Papen was notified to answer Turkish
Rossi, Alliance, 211; and Papen, Memoirs, 466.

^

Sontag, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 257-58.

ho

Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, 48-52.
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inquiries concerning Germany’s current attitude towards the
Montreux Convention by saying that he had not received in
structions on that subject.

Papen expressed concern that

the failure of Germany and Turkey to reach an agreement on
the status of the Straits might push the Turks closer to
the British.
open.

But Berlin insisted that the question remain

i.f-9

The German buildup of troops in Rumania and its
activities on Rumania's Black Sea coast early in 19^1
caused the Turkish government on March 18 to ask its Ambas
sador in Berlin, Htlsrev Gerede,^0 to question Hitler con
cerning Germany's intentions.

The Ftlhrer denied any ter

ritorial ambitions in the area of Turkey and added that
this attitude was the cause of much difficulty with Russia.
Hitler then mentioned that Russia wanted bases in the
Straits, but quickly pointed out that Germany had refused
to agree.

However, Berlin did advocate a revision of the

Montreux Convention whereby only the warships of Black
Sea powers would have the right of exit and entry through
<1
the Straits.
The Chancellor concluded by saying that
Germany was interested in Turkey remaining the guardian
of the Straits,

Gerede, Impressed by the German attitude,

said that he would relay the information to Ankara..-’2
^
50

P.G.F.P.. Series D, XI, 793.

51

P.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 309-10.

52

Ibid.. 312,

Htlsrev Gerede, Turkish diplomat; Ambassador to
Berlin 1939-19^2; known to be pro-German,
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On March 28, Papen telegraphed Berlin that he had
talked to Turkish Foreign Minister Saraeoglu about the
Hitler-Gerede conversation,

Saraeoglu said that the

Turkish President was favorable to the statements made
by the Ftlhrer, and the President asked that Papen express
to Hitler the Turkish government's satisfaction at the
German attitude adopted in the interest of Turkey, 53
The German conquest of Greece and Crete in April and
May of 1941 placed the German forces within excellent
striking distance of ships going to and from the Straits,
It also influenced the position of the Axis Powers in re
lation to Turkey for the Turks would surely have second
thoughts .about joining the Allies while Hitler was their
54neighbor.This situation did much to cause the conclu
sion of the German-Turkish Friendship Treaty signed at
Ankara on June 18, 1941.-55

Four days later Germany invaded

Russia,
With the German armies striking and advancing along
the Russian front in rapid success, Berlin now became
vitally interested in control of the Black Sea and spe
cifically, the rights of Russian war and merchant ships to
52

D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 384-85.

54

United States Navy Department, Ftlhrer Conferences
on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939~1945, (Wash
ington , 1947-1949), 194-1, I, -98. [Hereafter cited as Ftlhrer
Naval Conferences.!
The events which led to the conclusion of this
treaty are discussed at length in Chapter VI.
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traverse the Straits.

Thus, Papen was instructed to

approach Saraooglu with the proposal that Turkey close
the Straits to-Russian merchant ships,

Germany knew that

the Soviet merchant tonnage approached 400,000 tons and
the Germans did not want it to get away.-'
Papen reported to Berlin that he had talked with
Saraeoglu, and the Foreign Minister was of the opinion
that the Russians would not attempt to send their merchant

ships out of the Black Sea until the ships were definitely
in danger.

The German Ambassador felt that if the situa-

tlon did arise, Turkey would cooperate

with Berlin, 5 ?

However, the Germans were not satisfied with this state
ment and attempted other ways to get Turkey to close the
Straits to all Russian ships.
In August 1941, several suggestions were sent to
Papen concerning ways to stop Russian ships.

State Sec

retary Weizsacker suggested that the Turks be shown the
actual paragraph of Molotov's proposal of November 1940
concerning Soviet bases on the

S

t r a

i t s

, -^8

Ribbentrop said

that perhaps Turkey could be persuaded to do everything
possible under the Montreux Convention to delay the passage
56

D.G.F.P., Series D, XIII, 3« The German Navy had
no forces of its own in the Black Sea at this time with
which to combat the Russians. ^ Further, the Russian Black
Sea Fleet was far superior to 'the few vessels of the German
allies, the Rumanians and the Bulgarians, Karl DJJnitz,
Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, (Cleveland, 1959)» 387,
thereafter"cited as Dffnitz. Memoirs.]
D.G.F.P.. Series D, XIII, 3*
Ibid.. 304.

8k

of Russian merchant ships, thus allowing time to report
the movements of the ships to Axis naval and. air forces
in the Aegean. ■

A third person suggested that Papen point

out to the Turks that the political power change in the
Black Sea caused by the rapid German advance into Russia
was sufficient reason to block the Straits.^0

On August

30, Papen reported that he had discussed the problem with
Turkish President InSnd, but Turkey denied the seriousness
of the situation.

In the eyes of the Turks, the problem

could not be considered acute until the ports of Novorossisk and Batum were controlled by the Germans,

Con-

sequently, Russian merchant ships were free to traverse
the Straits,
Towards the end of 19^1, Germany considered two dif
ferent ways to increase its number of warships in the
Black Sea,

They were designed both to assure that Russian

merchant ships would not enter the Straits, and to pro
tect German convoys carrying war materials to the advan
cing German front along the northern Black Sea coast,

One

proposed the idea that Germany send submarines from ports
in France through the Mediterranean as far as Greece.

From

that point the submarines would submerge and be towed through
the Straits.
*59
60

However, after simulated runs in the Baltic,

D.G.F.P.. Series D, XIII, 35^-55.
Ibid... kQJ-Ok,

^
Ibid,-. 405. The port of Batum was never cap
tured by the Germans.
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the idea was abandoned for navigational reasons.

62

The Reich, however, did adopt the other method of
transferring light naval vessels to the Black Sea.

The

ships first passed down the Elbe to Dresden, then by high
way to Regensburg, and finally down the Danube to the Sea.
In this manner a considerable number of warships were sent
to provide convoy escort, to guard the northern entrance
63
to the Straits, and to harrass the Russian fleet.
With the gradual buildup of Axis naval forces in the
Black Sea. and their increasing effectiveness against Rus
sian. warships and merchant shipping, the Russian Black Sea
Fleet assumed the defensive.

Germany’s army soon controlled

the Russian sea coast with the exception of a. small area, in
the southeast.

This allowed the Axis to send escorted oil

tankers from Rumania into the Straits with little danger
of Russian attack, and assured that Turkey would not close

the Straits.

64

Throughout 1942, the German navy had virtual freedom
of movement in the Black Sea.

However, with the fall of

Stalingrad in the beginning of 1943 and the German wlth62

FtHiisr ‘
Naval Gonf erences . 1941, II , 82-3.
6l

'

,

;

Dbnitz, Memoirs. 387-88. The actual transfer of
vessels was not a simple process as it Involved the dis
mantling of all extra equipment on the larger ships. See
Ftlhrer Nava.l Conferences. 1941, II, 84.
^
D8nitz, Memoirs, 389. During World War II, the
Allies did not attempt to send supplies to Russia via. the
Turkish Straits. The war materials were shipped to Mur
mansk and the Persian Gulf.
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drawal to the west, the German navy’s area of control was
correspondingly less and less. Grand Admiral Dt5nitz, 65
in a conference with Hitler in October 19^3, expressed
his opinion that as long as the Germans held the Crimea,
they could safeguard the shipping going to and from the
Straits,

Hitler agreed and added that only by holding that

Russian peninsula could the neutrality of Turkey be assured.
By mid-lay 19^, the Germans had completely evacuated the
Crimea.
The German reverses in the area, of the Black Sea had
placed their naval vessels in a precarious position.

In

an attempt to avoid scuttling the ships, several of them
were camouflaged and sent into the Straits although it
was a violation of the Montreux Convention.

On June 5,

19^, the war-transport Kassel entered the Bosporus en
route to occupied Greece.

After being stopped and searched

by the Turkish authorities, its true character was discov
ered and passage through the Straits was denied.

Because

of the fact that the same type of German ships had been
previously allowed through the Straits, the incident created
a political crisis in Turkey.

Consequently, the Turkish

Foreign Minister Menemencioglu was forced to resign.

Ger

many reacted to the situation by halting, temporarily, the
^■5 Grand Admiral DSnitz, (1891). Commanding
Officer of Submarines 1935*19^3; Supreme Commander of the
German Navy 19^3-19^5; Head of the German State and Com
mander in Chief of the German Armed Forces May 1 to May 23,
19^5; Convicted at Nttrnberg and imprisoned from 19^6-1956.
66

Ddnitz, Memoirs. 389,
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passage of German ships through the Straits, 6?

On August 1,

19^. Turkey broke diplomatic relations with the Third Reich,

During its initial years, the Third Reich did not
concern itself with the status of the Turkish Straits,

Dis-

Germany was concentrating on rebuilding its internal struc
ture and its position on the international scene.

Thus,

it was not surprising when the Germans did not demand a
representative at the Montreux Convention.
As Germany grew stronger and moved closer to war, its
interest in the Straits increased, and attempts were made
to accede to the Convention as a signatory.

This would

have assured the Germans a voice if another Convention
were held.

However, Germany was not allowed the status of

a signatory.
In its dealings with Russia, Germany expressed ;

-

interest in Russian desires to establish bases In the Straits
as part of the lure In the formation of the Nazi-Soviet NonAggression Pact,

But once the pact was concluded, Germany

reversed its stand because the Reich actually did not want
the Balkans as a Russian sphere of influence.

Germany even

mentioned the Russian interests in the Straits to the
Turks in order to gain special rights in that area, but to
no avail.
^

Ftlhrer Naval Conferences, 19^, 58 and 99.
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With the invasion of Russia, Germany tried to get
Turkey to close the Straits to all Russian shipping*

Tur

key refused the request and said that it would have to see
the full effect of the German campaign before it took
such action.

Had Germany successfully established itself

in the Caucasus, its Influence in the Straits would
been paramount.

have

CHAPTER IV

OPERATION CICERO
OCTOBER 19^3 - APRIL 1 9 ^
By October 19^3* the enemies of the Third Reich were
rapidly gaining momentum.

Italy had been invaded, the Russian

armies were advancing, and the opening of a Second Front- was
being disbussed by the Allied leaders.

The ascendancy of

Nazi Germany was definitely in jeopardy.
On the evening of October 26, 19^3*

man,

1

later

1 According to Elyesa Bazna, I Was Cicero. (New York,
1962) , [Hereafter cited as Bazna, Cicero.!], the spy*s name
was Elyesa Bazna, This wds disagreed with by Robert M, W t
Kempner; ifi "The Highest-d?aid Spy in History,” Reader’s Digest.
June 1950, 92, who stated that the spy’s name was Diello.
Both sources agreed that he was the British Ambassador’s valet.
He was a kavass (in Turkey, a. person who serves a foreigner)
at different times with Jankovio, Yugoslavian Ambassador,
with Colonel Class of the United States Embassy, with Mr, Busk,
First Secretary of the British Embassy, and with Sir Hughe
Knatchbull-Hugessen,
89
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known as Cicero,

2

visited the home of Albert Jenke

very unusual proposition,

3

with a

The British Ambassador's valet

stated that he had taken photographs of highly classified
material in the Ambassador's safe and was prepared to sell
the first two films for 20,000 pounds, British pounds
sterling;

if the Germans accepted the proposition, each

additional film would cost 15,000 pounds.

Jenke answered

that such matters were not in his line of duty, but he
would contact the right man.

Leaving Cicero to wait, the
i

First Secretary phoned Papen's attache, Ludwig C. Moyzisch,
to come right over.

5

In a short time, Moyzisch entered the room and, after
hearing the offer, indicated his interest but said that the
German Embassy did not carry such sums of money and that an
authorization would have to come from Berlin,

Cicero an

swered that he was willing to give the Germans until the
afternoon of October 30 to consider the proposition, at
which time he would contact Moyzisch by telephone and identify himself with the code name Pierre,

6

2

Originally called himself Pierre*
Was given the
code name Cicero for correspondence purposes by Papen be
cause of the very eloquent documents he gave the Germans.
3
Albert Jenke.
Commercial Counsellor to the German
Embassy in Turkey 1 9*f-0-19*1-2; First Secretary of the German
Embassy in Turkey 1 $4 3-19*4; Brother-in-law of German For
eign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

k

L. C. Moyzisch,
Commercial Attache at the German
Embassy in Turkey; member of the Reich Security Department
which was headed by S. S, General Ernsth Kaltenbrunner.
^

Bazna, Cicero. *1-7-9.

6

Ibid.. 51.
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The next morning Jenke and Moyzisch talked with Am
bassador Papen over the advisability of carrying the matter'
any further.

They considered the distinct chance that it

might be a British trap, although Papen felt that in either
case the amount of money involved placed the matter in the
hands of Berlin.

A telegram was immediately sent to Ber7

lin stating the facts and asking for instructions.'

After reading the telegram from Ankara, Ribbentrop
O
contacted Walter Schellenberg of the Foreign Intelligence
Service and requested his opinion on whether the offer
should be accepted.

Schellenberg did not have much on

which to base a decision, but he though that it was worth
a gamble and gave his approval of the project.

Thus, on

October 29, a, telegram was sent to Ankara, instructing
Papen to accept the offer and adding that the money would
9
arrive on the following day by special courier plane.
At three o'clock on the afternoon of October 30» Moyzisch
received the promised call from Cicero, and a rendezvous
was planned for that evening on the German Embassy grounds,
^ Ludwig C. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. (New York,
1965), 30-1. [Hereafter cited as Moyzisch, Operation
Cicero.]
® Walter Schellenberg, (1910-1952). Chief of Amt.
VI (Foreign Intelligence Service) of the Reich Security Main
Office (RSHA) 19^1-19^5; Chief of the unified Intelligence
Service (which assumed the military intelligence functions
of the Abwehr) 19^-19^5.
9 Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth. (New York,
1956), 335-36. [Hereafter cited aa Schellenberg, Labyrinth.]
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At the first meeting, Moyzisch insisted that he be
allowed to develop the films before handing over the money.
Cicero agreed, a.nd the German attache soon found that at
least on the surface the documents looked real enough.

The

money was paid, and another exchange was planned for the
next evening,^0
The following day Moyzisch showed Papen the docu
ments.
became.

The more the Ambassador read, the more excited he
The correspondence contained references to the

gradual buildup of R.A.F, personnel in Turkey, the volume
of Lend-lease equipment being sent to Russia, the creation
Of the Second Front, and other such important matters all

marked either SECRET or MOST SECRET.

However,

Papen

was not completely sold on their authenticity and said that
Cicero's next delivery would help him decide that point,^
At the next meeting with Cicero, Moyzisch obtained two
more rolls of film and then asked the valet a few questions
about his method of operation,
talk about himself.

Cicero was reluctant to

He did say, however, that he worked

alone, used a German Leica camera, and took all the photo
graphs inside the British Embassy.

Moyzisch wanted to

learn more so that he could answer any inquiries from Ber1?
lin, but Cicero quickly changed the subject.

Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 39-41; and Bazna,
Cicero, 6l-4, Both of these accounts differ somewhat;
though generally over insignificant matters.
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 48-9.

12

IM d . .

54 - 5 .
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Berlin’s reaction to the initial documents was very
cautious,

Schellenberg was very Impressed with the con-

tents and sent a copy to Hitler through Heinrich Himmler, 1 3■
He also called in several experts to determine the relia
bility of the material.

Ribbentrop, on the other hand,

believed that it was most likely a British trick, a view
which he held throughout the Cicero affair, 1 *1Berlin sent continual inquiries to Moyzisch asking
him to provide more precise information on Cicero’s actual
name, his usual hang-outs, and his relatives,

Moyzisch

resented the questions, for he thought that it was only

the value of the material that counted.

Particularly

irritating to Papen’s attache? was the personal interest
that the chief of the Main Security Office, Ernst Kaltenbrunner15 was beginning to take in Operation Cicero.
Kaltenbrunner*s large staff sent growing numbers of tele
grams concerning the progress of the affair, and Moyzisch
feared that a leak might occur,
13

,
,
Heinrich Himmler, (1900-194-5) • Chief of the German
Police 1936-19*1-5; Relchsftihrer S,S. 1929-19*1-55 Reich Mini
ster of the Interior 19*1-3-19*1-5; Chief of the Waffen S.S.;
Expelled from the Nazi Party and ordered arrested for trea
son by Hitler in 19*1-5; committed suicide after capture by
Allies in 19*1-5*
1 *1-

Schellenberg, Labyrinth. 337-38*

^
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, (1903-19*1-6). Commander of
S.S. in Austria 1933-193*1-5 Chief of Security in Seyss-Inquart government 19395 Chief pf the Reich Security Main
Office (RSHA) 19*1-3-19*1-5; Tried at Ntlrnberg & hanged 19*1-6.
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 58.

9^
On November 6, another contact was made.

Moyzisch

asked more questions about Cicero's personal life.

Al

though Cicero still refused to give his name, he did men
tion that he was not a Turk, but an Albanian, and further
that he hated the British because they had killed his
father
After showing the newly acquired documents to Papen,
Moyzisch was handed a telegram instructing him to report
to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin.
to bring all the Cicero material.

The attache was

He left on the Ankara

Express the following day to catch a courier plane in Istan
bul .
Meanwhile, Schellenberg received a message that Moy
zisch was on his way to make a personal report to Ribbentrop.
This irritated the Chief of Foreign Intelligence, and he
immediately made arrangements for Moyzisch to see him first.
Schellenberg also met with his immediate chief, Kaltenbrunner,
and complained about Ribbentrop's Intervention in the case.
Schellenberg believed that Operation Cicero fell within the
scope of the Foreign Intelligence Service and not the Foreign
Ministry.18
17 Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 6l. In his personal ac
count, Cicero claims the latter statement was a deliberate
lie in hopes of satisfying Berlin's curiosity. Bazna,
Cicero. 73.
18 Schellenberg, Labyrinth. 338. There is an in
consistency between Schellenberg and Moyzisch as to whom the
German attach^ spoke to first. However, it seems clear that
it was not Ribbentrop. According to Moyzisch, he talked to
Kaltenbrunner then Ribbentrop, but does not refer to any con
versation with Schellenberg. See Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 65.
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Moyzisch’s flight trip from Istanbul to Berlin was
interrupted in Sofia where he received instructions from
Kaltenbrunner to proceed to Berlin by special plane.

Upon

arrival, the a.tta.ch§ was brought directly to the chief of
the German Security Police.

For almost three hours Moy-

zisch answered questions on the status of Operation Cicero.
Later, Kaltenbrunner explained the conflict between his
department and Ribbentrop over the Cicero affair and ex
pressed his desire that all further correspondence be
carried on with his department and not the Foreign Ministry.
He added that further developments of the operation were
necessary before the value of the documents was established.

19

Several days later, the Foreign Ministry informed Moyzisch that Ribbentrop would like to see him.

As he entered

the Foreign Minister's office, the German attach^ was im
mediately aware that Ribbentrop was extremely displeased
about the previous visit to Kaltenbrunner.

Ribbentrop asked

what facts, if any, he possessed which would prove the
authenticity of the documents.

The attache started to re

late all that he knew about the operation but was inter
rupted by Ribbentrop with the comment that he wanted facts
not opinions.

The Foreign Minister mentioned that if Moy-

zisch proved that Cicero worked alone, then Berlin could
assume that the documents were real,

Moyzisch answered that

the only way he could discover if Cicero had an assistant
19

Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 65-8.
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would be for Cicero to give himself away.

The conference

ended with Ribbentrop Instructing the attache to remain in
Berlin for the time being.

20

Soon after Ribbentrop's interview, Schellenberg
called Moyzisch to discuss the Cicero case.

The Foreign

Intelligence Chief stated that even if the photographs
proved to be frauds, the expenditure was justified, for it
was important to know the manner in which your enemy wanted
to deceive you.

Schellenberg personally believed that the

material was genuine because it corresponded to his view of
the present military and political situation.

Before par

ting, he told Moyzisch to send all films received from
Cicero immediately to Berlin, so that additional copies
could be sent to the appropriate authorities. 21
On November 22, the Foreign Ministry informed Moyalsch that he should return to Turkey,

Several days later

in Ankara, the attach^ was contacted by Cicero.

At their

rendezvous Moyzisch told the valet where he had been the
past weeks.
20
pi

Cicero was pleased with the importance that

Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 75-6.

Schellenberg, Labyrinth. 338-39, Schellenberg
gave the messages bearing date-time notations to the mili
tary communications-lntelligence section, in an attempt to
break the British diplomatic codes. However, the British
were superenciphering the most important messages in a
one-time pad, and the Nazi codebreakers found it impossible
to use the Cicero documents in deciphering the one-time
keys of any other messages. The cryptanalytic services of
the German Foreign Office, Pers Z, was probably also invol
ved in the Cicero documents. David Kahn, The Codebreakers,
(New York, 1967), ^51-52.
1
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Berlin plaeed on him*

Only one roll of film exchanged hands

this time for Cicero said that he had had to destroy an
earlier one because of Moyzisch's long absence.

This one

roll, however, proved of considerable political importance
since it showed the attempts by the British to bring Turkey
into the war and Turkey's equal determination to remain
neutral.

The British hoped the first step would be the

termination of German-Turklsh diplomatic relations.

22

After sending these latest documents to Berlin,
Moyzisch received a confidential communication from
Kaltenbrunner,

The attache was told not to show Ambassador

Papen anything concerning Operation Cicero and to forward
all the Cicero material directly to Kaltenbrunner's depart
ment,

Moyzisch did not follow these orders, and his failure

to do so placed him in a difficult position later on.

23

The month of December was the operation's most pro
ductive - and its most dangerous,
of himself.

Cicero became very assured

He provided films every few days and they con-

i
tained such important documents as the complete minutes of
the conferences at Cairo and Teheran,

However, during the

second week of December at a rendezvous, Moyzisch noticed
that he was being followed by another car.

22

A chase followed

Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 85-7.

^
I b id., 91. Moyzisch felt that the documents
would be of value to the Ambassador in his work.
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through the streets of Angara In which the attache finally
managed to elude his pursuer,

Cicero then jumped from the

car near the British Embassy, and Moyzisch returned to his
office.

It was evident that somebody was at least partially

wise to Operation Cicero, and according to Moyzisch, this
2A
was the beginning of their troubles.
Three days later Moyzisch met with Cicero and ex
changed a roll of film which aroused much concern in Ber
lin,

It was not the contents of the documents that in

terested Berlin, but the fact that a finger and a thumb
were clearly visible on the edge of several transcripts.
Without doubt they belonged to Cicero as his signet ring
25
was on the index finger in the photograph.
Previously, Moyzisch explained to Berlin that while
Cicero took the exposures, he held the camera in one hand
without the aid of any other support, and with a. finger of
that hand, he snapped the shutter.

On the surface such a

method seemed impossible, and now that the picture with the
fingers was discovered it appeared that either he had an
accomplice or the Information on his method was incorrect,
Berlin sent a photographic expert to Ankara in an
oh,

Moyzisch,
different and more
streets of Ankara,
who appeared later
were agents of the
Cicero, 109.

Operation Cicero, 95-100,, For a slightly
heroic account of the chase through the
see Bazna, Cicero, 81-3. Cornelia Knapp,
as Elizabet, stated that the pursuers
American Secret Service (0,S,S,)., Bazna,

ff

Ibid,. 102.
26

Ibid.. 102-03.
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attempt to discover what really was happening.

Moyzisch

arranged a meeting with Cicero at which the latter was
quizzed by Moyzisch while the photographer listened in
the next room.

Following the meeting, the expert from

Berlin expressed his amazement at the photographic ability
of Cicero; however, he felt that the odds against Cicero’s
working

alone were about one thousand to one.

The photo

graphic

expertreturned to Berlin the following day, and

to Moyzisch’s delight no further word was heard on the
subject^
Towards the latter part of December, Cicero photo
graphed a. number of documents concerning the gradual build
up of British personnel into Turkey.
mention

of the

possibility

One report made

that Turkey might allowGreat

Britain

to setup radar in Turkish Thrace to guide Allied
pO
bombers in their attacks on the Rumanian oil fields.
The
attache showed them to Papen, which was, of course, against
the instructions of Kaltenbrunner. The Ambassador was very
concerned with the content of the documents sand decided to
talk to the Turkish Foreign Minister Human Menemencioglu.
Papen figured that the mere mention of possible German re
prisals could go a long way in keeping Turkish military
policy more in line with Germany,

The danger in this

approach was that the Turkish government might relate
2?
28

Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 10^,
Papen, Memoirs, 511-12; Bazna,, Cicero. 92,
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Papen's Information to the British and thereby put them
on the alert for a security leak.
29
happened.
Immediately after

This was precisely what

. Papen's interview with Menemen-*

cioglu, the latter contacted the British Ambassador KnatchbullHugessen.

The Turkish Foreign Minister repeated to Knatchbull-

Hugessen what had taken place and they both concluded that
the Germans must be receiving their information from some
top-level source.

After returning to his Embassy, the Bri

tish Ambassador sent a complete report to London,

And the
30
following da.y, Moyzisch had a photocopy of the document,'
The German attach^ had second thoughts about sending
the document to Berlin for he knew that he had disobeyed
Kaltenbrunnerfs orders by showing the material to Papen.
However, the money for the film had been payed to Cicero
and Moyzisch would have to account for it.
he dispatched the documents to Berlin.

Reluctantly

A week later he

received a letter from Kaltenbrunner which said that he was
responsible for a flagrant breach of discipline. 31
Shortly after Knatchbull-Hugessen's conversation with
Menemencioglu, the British began tightening the security
in their Embassy.

Cicero reported that rooms were searched,

different alarm systems were installed, and locks were
29
30
31

Bazna, Cicero. 91; Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 105.
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 106.
Ibid., 107.
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changed.

All In all, It seemed evident that the British

12
thought the lea.kage was from within the Embassy.''

Con

sequently, the documents that Moyzisch received from Ci
cero never again reached the high quality of those deliv
ered in December, and the exchanges were fewer and farther
between.
During mid-December 19^3. Moyzisch was told that a
German diplomat in Sofia was eager to find a, job for his
daughter in the German Embassy in

A n k a r a .

33

The attach^

said that he could use her, and she was employed the fol
lowing January as a secretary to Moyzisch.

The new sec

retary's arrival was to have a profound affect on Opera
tion Cicero.
On January Ity,

, an event occurred which lifted

any doubt concerning the reliability of the Cicero documents.
32
According to Allen Dulles, The Secret Surrender,
(Mew York, 1966), 2^-5, the United States during November
19^3 received word from its contact (code name Wood) in the
German Foreign Office in Berlin that Papen had reported the
acquisition of documents from the British Embassy via a
German agent. Dulles said that he immediately informed the
British who simply changed safes and combinations, thus im
mediately putting Cicero out of business. This account
does not agree with either Moyzisch or Bazna who state that
the change was not made until the following January 19^,
and even then it did not put Cicero completely out of busi
ness, Bazna, Cicero, 105; Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 113*
33 According to Bazna, Cicero, 107-08, the diplomat's
name was Knapp, and his daughter's, Cornelia Knapp, refer
red to by Moyzisch as Ellzabet. Mr, Knapp had served in
the German diplomatic corps at posts in Bombay, and Clev
eland prior to the war, then was transferred to Rome and
Sofia, Cornelia Knapp first engaged in espionage for the
United States (O.S,S.) while employed as a secretary by the
German Embassy in Sofia, during 19^3» Her primary mission
in Ankara, was to find the true identity of Cicero.
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One of the documents previously received by Moyzisch con
tained a reference to the fact that the Allies would soon
begin a number of air attacks on the capitals of the Balkan
countries allied to the Third Reich.

The first city on the

agenda was Sofia, and the attack was to take place on Jan
uary 1^.

Berlin felt that if the air attack occurred,

there would be no further doubt about the truthfulness of
the documents.

On the morning of the 15th, Moyzisch called

the German Legation in Sofia and found that the air attack
had taken place and the deaths of approximately ^,000 Bul
garians had provided Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner with
the final proof.
In the first week of February, Cicero became active
again.

The pressure within the British Embassy had re

laxed somewhat, but more importantly, Cicero had learned
how the new safety measures worked.

One of the initial

films Moyzisch received definitely showed the deteriora
tion of the quality of the documents,

The film consisted

merely of fifteen shots of the statement of petty expen
ditures in the British Embassy.

The German attache refused

to pay Cicero for the film, but said that he would ask
Berlin for its opinion.

And to Moyzisch*s astonishment,

Berlin instructed him to pay Cicero as the film had proved
exceptionally valuable. 3*5
^
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, ll*b Bazna, Cicero,
117; Schellenberg, Labyrinth, 3^3-Jp.j-, who stated that though
there were those in Berlin who believed that the attack
would take place, little could be done to prevent it,
35
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 166-67.
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Elizabet was beginning to get on Moyzisch’s nerves.
Nothing seemed to please her.

Moyzisch tried to find out

what was wrong, but to no avail.

Finally, he went to Am

bassador Papen in an effort to obtain his help to get rid
of her,

Papen was not initially enthusiastic, but when

his attach^ mentioned that such an unstable woman might
endanger Operation Cicero, the Ambassador said that he
would see what he could do.
As the end of February approached, Moyzisch*s meetings
with Cicero became less frequent, and also the importance
of the material was nowhere near the former standard.

Moy

zisch reasoned that because of the tightened security
measures, the important documents remained in the Ambas
sador *s safe for a much shorter period of time.
Cicero was more dependent on luck.

Thus,

However, Moyzisch did

receive one more important series of documents.
During the past weeks, the documents from Cicero had
contained repeated references to a new and evidently im
portant operation.

Berlin sent urgent telegrams to many

of its Embassies and Legations instructing them to find the
significance of the new operation.

In the beginning of

March, Moyzisch received a role of film in which the code
name Operation Overlord a p p eared,^

He considered the sit

uation very thoroughly, remembering past references in the
Cicero documents to something that was to happen on May 1^,
^
Befers to the Allied invasion of Normandy which
took place on June 6 , 19*i4.

10^
19^,

This information, along with the knowledge that at

Teheran Churchill had committed himself to the opening of
a second front in Europe in 1 9 ^ .

caused Moyzisch to

theorize that Overlord was the name of the operation and
the code name for the Second Front.

He immediately sent

a message to Berlin explaining his theory and reasoning,
hut the only reply was "Possible but hardly probable."3?
This film containing the reference to Operation Over
lord was the last received from Cicero.

The British valet

intended to deliver more documents but the work had be
come very hazardous.

There was an increase of agents

within the British Embassy, and Cicero felt that if he
continued it would only be a matter of time before he was
OO

discovered.

Moyzisch thought that the valet might pos

sibly attempt to deliver more material, but events soon
prevented any chance of that.
Towards the end of March, Papen told Moyzisch that he
had contacted Elizabet’s father in Budapest and was in37 As quoted in Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 125-26,
Bazna. gives a somewhat different account of the content of
the documents given to the Germans. He said that by reading
the documents he knew that Operation Overlord referred to
the Second Front, and further the name Eisenhower was men
tioned as the supreme commander of the operation. Bazna,
Cicero, 1^8-50. However, after reading both books, Moy
zisch, I believe, presents a better case.

88

According to Bazna., Cicero, 173, Cicero told
Moyzisch that the film deliveries could no longer be made
because he had seen Moyzisch’s secretary at the British
Embassy, and was afraid that he would soon be discovered.
Moyzisch claims that Cicero gave no reasons for stopping
delivery, much less mentioning anything about Elizabet.
Moyzisch, Operation Cicero. 126-27.
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formed, that It would, be impossible to bring her back until
after Easter.

The attache was happy to hear that she would,

soon be gone, but he was even more elated, a few days later
when Elizabet requested some time off over Easter to visit
her parents.

Moyzisch agreed to the request and even prom

ised to secure the necessary reservations.

However, on

April 6 when Moyzisch went to the train depot to give Elizabet the tickets, she did not appear.
For the next twenty-four hours, Moyzisch searched
throughout Ankara for his secretary - but to no avail.
Finally, he realized that there was no alternative but to
inform Berlin.

Four days later Moyzisch received a dis

patch from Kaltenbrunner ordering him to report to Berlin.

39

Operation Cicero was now history.'

39

Actually, Moyzisch did not return to Germany until
the conclusion of the war. Knowing what his fate would
probably be, he found excuses to stay in Turkey until it
was even too late to return by train because of the Russian
advance into the Balkans, He was interned until transpor
tation by Swedish ship could be arranged to Germany, and
luckily none was available until April 19^5• By the time
the ship reached Gibraltar, the war was over, and he no
longer had diplomatic immunity. Moyzisch was then interned
by the British. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 151-52. Cicero
resigned his position at the British Embassy soon after
the disappearance of Elizabet, He had received 309*000
pounds sterling (over $ 1 ,0 0 0 ,000 ) and lived expensively un
til May
19^5, when it
was discovered that except for the
initial
sums, the money was counterfeit* Bazna, Cicero,
183-201, passim. For further information pn the use of
forged money by the Nazis, see Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret
Front, (New York, 195^), 85. Elizabet had been flown out
of Ankara by the O.S.S. on the same day she missed the train.
She was
never able to
positively identify Cicero, although
all signs had pointed
to the fact that he was employed by
the British Embassy.
Besides her work with Cicero, she gave
her contact all the secret information she could obtain. In
payment for her espionage work during the war, she was al
lowed to become a citizen of the United States. Bazna,
Cicero. 203-0^.
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The documents Berlin first received from Cicero were
viewed with considerable reservation.
to be "too good.”
over the affair.

The contents seemed

Bibbentrop especially seemed skeptical
There soon developed a rift between the

Foreign Ministry and Reich Security Department as to which
should have control over Operation Cicero.

Moyzisch re

ceived conflicting orders on how the documents should be
handled, and it was never clearly settled.

Thus, through

out the Cicero episode, the attache was generally left on
his own, and the messages from Berlin were more of an
harrassing nature than a constructive one.
The information contained in the documents ranged
from the Allied conferences held in Moscow, Cairo, and
Teheran to evidence of T u r k e y ’s absorption by the Allies,
Had Berlin believed the information,

it would have clearly

seen that the Allies were sparing nothing in attempting to
defeat the Nazis, and, consequently, the overthrow of
the Third Beich was only a matter of time.
However, for some unknown reason, Berlin preferred
not to believe the Cicero documents.

Perhaps,

the future

of Nazi Germany was too clearly visible; a fact which
Hitler and his thugs did not care to admit.

But no matter

what the reason, it is clear that one of the most daring
and successful spy episodes in history was virtually a
waste of time.

CHAPTER V
GERMANY AND THE TRIPARTITE PACT
1939 - 19^0
As the Third Reich extended its control into Austria
and Czechoslovakia in March of 1938 and 1939 respectively,
the Turkish Republic assumed a policy of strict neutrality.
This attitude pleased Germany because any Turkish align
ment with the Western Powers would compel Germany to be
come more Involved in the eastern Mediterranean than it
desired at that time.

However, during the latter part

of March 1939 * the Wilhelmstrasse received reports that
Turkey was seriously considering strengthening its ties
During the spring of 1939 , Hitler was considering
the possibility of military operations in Poland, On
April 3, 1939, the Ftfhrer, through the High Command of the
Armed Forces (O.K.W.), issued a directive on war prepara
tions, Annexed to it was a plan containing the details of
Fall Weiss (Case White), the projected attack on Poland.
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg. 3 .
10?

with Great Britain and Prance through the conclusion of
mutual assistance treaties.

State Secretary WeizsIJcker

immediately telegraphed instructions to the German Embassy
in Ankara to contact Turkish State Secretary Menemencioglu
and inform him of Germany*s displeasure should Turkey abandon strict neutrality.

About two weeks later, the German

Embassy notified Berlin that the Turkish government de
nied that it was Involved in any such negotiations 9 and
furthermore, would continue to reject an assistance treaty
2
with any great power.
The German Foreign Ministry had several reservations
about these assurances.

It was well aware through the Tur

kish press that the Turks had not sympathized with Ger
many’s action in Czechoslovakia, and even less with Italy's
action in Albania.

3

The Germans received Information

during April that the Turks were eontlnuelng their talks
with the Western Powers.

The principal topic was possible

defensive measures that Turkey could put into effect with
the aid of Great Britain in the event of an Axis attack in
the Balkans or the eastern Mediterranean.

Thus, Berlin

reasoned that Turkey would maintain neutrality, only as long
as southeast Europe remained clear of conflict between the
2 DoG.F.P.. Series D, VI, 8 ^, On April
the Tur
kish Ambassador Hamdi Arpag personally called on Ribben
trop and stated that Turkey was not adopting a favorable
attitude towards Great Britain's attempt at encirclement
of Germany.
Ibid.. 188-89,

3

Italy invaded Albania on April 7, 1939,
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major powers.

l|,

In an attempt to counter the moves by Great

Britain and France to extend their encirclement of Germany
by an alliance with Turkey, the Germans increased their
press propaganda and economic pressure.

But more impor

tant, Franz von Papen was appointed by Hitler as Ambassador
K
to Turkey.
Upon arriving in Ankara on April 2?» Papen began a
series

of talks with Turkish officials aimed at a reorien

tation

of that country along German lines.

became

clear that Turkey was definitely drifting into

the British sphere of influence.

But it soon

Turkish President Ismet

InSntt told Papen that it was Italy*s actions that were most
instrumental in determining the outcome of the Anglo-Turkish
negotiations.

IniJnti stated that Italy had been following

an unfriendly policy towards Turkey since the Ethiopian
Campaign and that relations between the countries were
slowly deteriorating as was evident in the question of pos
session of the small Islands of the Dodecanese, and more
recently the Italian occupation of Albania.

In respect to

Albania, Turkey was especially alarmed at the size of the
D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 355-56.

^ Kilic, Turkey. 6?. For further information on the
economic pressure, see Chapter II, p. 37, Papen*s appoint
ment to Ankara was based on several reasons: his previous
military experience in Turkey during World War I; his po
litical astuteness shown by his prominent roles in both
Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship and the annexa
tion of Austria.
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z
Italian garrison.

Therefore, the Turkish government felt

that It was obliged to secure Its position even if it meant
alignment with Great Britain,

Papen cautioned the Presi-

dent that any commitment by Turkey to the Western Powers
would probably draw the Turks one step closer to war, but
Intfntt answered that, personally, he discounted the possibility of war.

7

At the conclusion of the interview Papen telegraphed
Berlin that it should advise Rome to Inform Ankara of
I t a l y ’s peaceful intentions in the Balkans and announce a
reduction of Its troops in Albania,

Papen hoped that such

action would forestall the conclusion of a mutual assistance
pact, but such preventive moves by the Axis were too late.

On May 2, 1939» Turkey signed with Great Britain a declara
tion which stated that the two countries would soon conclude
a long-term treaty and in the meantime would cooperate on a
mutual aid basis if an act of aggression occurred leading
to war in the Mediterranean area.

8

Initially Italy had occupied Albania with 20,000
men, but by the end of April, this number had risen to
72,000. D.G.P.P.„ Series D, VI, *K>8.
^ Ihido 9 *1-08-09 o Indntt also added that "if Germany
expected a world war, she would have to make Italy march
twenty-four hours ahead of herself, to be sure of Italian
participation,"

O
Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 76-7, France
would have signed the declaration if problems had not arisen
with the Turkish government concerning the cession of the
Hatay (the Sanjak of Alexandretta). The difficulty was soon
resolved, and on June 23, 1939, a Franco-Turkish declaration
was announced in terms similar to the Anglo-Turkish decla
ration. For the text of the declaration, see Documents on
Events Preceding the Outbreak of the W a r . (Berlin, 1939), 321.
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Several days after the conclusion of the declaration,
Papen visited State Secretary Menemencioglu who stated that,
though It was correct that the agreements, except for minor
details, had been completed, there was still some question
concerning when the declaration would be presented to the
National Assembly for approval.

The State Secretary assured

Papen that it was directed towards Italy, not Germany.
Further, it was purely defensive in character and designed
to quiet anxiety in the Mediterranean and contribute towards
the general peace.

The German Ambassador expressed Berlin*s

displeasure with the entire affair and its hope that Turkey
and Italy would soon be able to resolve their differences.
The Secretary replied that Italian duplicity had gone too
far for any such event in the near future.

9

On May 12, 1939. the Turkish National Assembly ap
proved the declaration of May 2.

Turkey had moved from

Its position of absolute neutrality into the camp of the
Western Powers,

However, all was not lost on the German

side, for a definite pact with Great Britain had not yet
been concluded.

Papen informed Berlin that it was highly

possible that the future pact could be restricted in its
scope by German counter measures and suggested that a way

9
D.G.F.P.„ Series D, VI, ^37-38.
Italian Foreign
Minister Ciano believed that Turkish hostility was also
directed toward Germany; see Galeazzo Ciano, The Cla.no
Diaries. 1939-19*1-3. (New York, 19^6), 8 5 .
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be found for the Italian threat to be reduced in the area
of the Dodecanese, but primarily in Albania.

10

During June, Ambassador Papen met several times with
both the Turkish President and State Secretary.

Following

instructions from Berlin, Papen expressed Germany's sur
prise and displeasure with Turkey's move towards Great
Britain,

He told the Turks that the Wilhelmstrasse viewed

the Declaration a definite move by their country to associate itself with the policy of the encirclement powers.

11

The Turkish officials denied any such implication and
repeatedly stated that their policy was only designed to
serve Turkish security in the Mediterranean and was in no
way intended to damage German Interests,

12

In Berlin, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop met with the
Turkish Ambassador Arpag and discussed the recent AngloTurkish Declaration,

The Foreign Minister was particularly

annoyed by the fact that Turkey had told the German Ambas
sador during April that it had no intention of abandoning
its neutrality;

only two weeks later Germany was faced with

a fait accompli.

Ribbentrop warned the Ambassador that if

it should appear that Turkey was pursuing an aggressive pol
icy, there could be serious repercussions*

10

Arpag quickly

ILGjJhP., Series D, VI, 5 ¥ M l <5.

Refers to Great Britain a nd France and their
policy of trying to surround Germany by the conclusion of
military treaties.

12

D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 66?.
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assured the Foreign Minister that the declaration "was
an agreement directed not towards, but against, aggression,"

13

After receiving the Turkish Ambassador’s report con
cerning the conversation with Ribbentrop, Turkish Foreign
Minister Saracoglu questioned Papen about its significance,
Papen told him that Berlin wanted to make clear the serlousi
ness of the situation that had arisen as a consequence of
the new Turkish policy,

Saracoglu stated that he hoped

Germany would soon decide if there was to be a change in
its relations with Turkey, for this "policy of suspense"
was not appreciated by the Turkish government,

Papen an

swered that he would inform the Turkish Foreign Ministry
Ik
if there were any change.
Several days later, the German Ambassador was told by
Menemencioglu that a Franco-Turkish declaration analogous
to the Anglo-Turkish declaration was soon to be concluded,
Papen mentioned to the State Secretary that Berlin would
consider it a friendly act if the reference to the Balkan
Pact, which appeared in the Anglo-Turkish agreement, were
left out of the Franco-Turkish declaration.

15

He explained

DoGcF.P,, Series D, VI, 673.
^

15

Ibid,, 709.

Papen was referring to paragraph 6 of the AngloTurkish Declaration which stated:
"The two Governments
recognize that it is also necessary to ensure the estab
lishment of security in the Balkans and they are consulting
together with the object of achieving that purpose as
speedily as possible.
Ibid., 636 .
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that the omission of the paragraph would be regarded by
the Wilhelmstrasse as evidence that Turkey was not attempting to draw the other states of the Balkan Entente into
the encirclement against the Axis.
that such an act was impossible.

Menemencioglu answered
An identical text had

already been agreed upon, and the omission of the paragraph
would only cause assertions that the Franco-Turkish Decla
ration was substantially restricted as compared with the
Anglo-Turkish Declaration,

The State Secretary further

stated that the paragraph in point merely meant that the
Balkans were a Turkish sphere of Interest and was not an
attempt at collective security with the help of Great
Britain and France,

Berlin was not pleased with the Tur

kish position; however, it did nothing further to prevent
the agreement, and on June 23 the declaration was conclu
ded.16
While Turkey negotiated with Great Britain and France
throughout the summer for the conclusion of a definite
pact, Germany attempted to limit the extent of Turkey’s
commitments,

Papen gave State Secretary Menemencioglu con

stant warnings that Turkey should not, as advised by
Great Britain, guarantee Rumania’s frontiers, as it would
be viewed as an unfreindly act in Berlin.

The State Sec

retary explained that his country did not unilaterally
guarantee any frontiers; however, if Rumania was attacked
16

D.G.F.P.. Series D, VI, 764.

and it was supported by Great Britain, then the Turkish
treaty would also come into operation,
By the end of July 1939» Papen*s efforts to persuade
the Turks to limit the forthcoming treaties seemed to be
resulting in some success,

Turkey had abandoned the pro

posed bipartite British and French pacts and had decided
to conclude a tripartite pact.

The Ambassador felt that

this arrangement provided the Turks with greater elasti
city, and Turkey could, if the situation occurred, "raise
objections with one of the partners to the policy of the
third if it became too burdensome to her own interests and
18
obligations,"
With the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
Pact on August 25* Berlin instructed Papen to find if there
had been a change in Turkish policy, specifically if the
Turks had returned, as Germany desired, to a position of
strict neutrality.

In a. conversation with Papen, President

Intott stated that though his country was impressed by the
Nazi-Soviet Pact, Turkey would still act in its own inter
ests,

And though Turkey hoped to remain neutral, if a con

flict occurred, it could not withdraw from its treaty ob
ligations,

Papen pointed out that the Nazi-Soviet Pact

had profoundly changed the balance of power in Europe and
that a blockade of the Axis was no longer possible.

There-
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fore, he advised the President to withdraw his country from
the policy of encirclement*

Intfntt answered that if war

did occur, then Italy would likely sooner or later join
against the Western Powers and endanger Turkey’s position
in the eastern Mediterranean*

It was because of this pos

sibility that Turkey had entered into agreements with
Great Britain and France, 19
Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1 had no
immediate effect on Turkey’s attitude towards the proposed tripartite pact*

Foreign Minister Saracoglu men

tioned to Papen that he hoped Turkey would be able to stay
outside a European war but reiterated that his country’s
reaction depended on Italy*

Of more importance to the Turks

in relation to the negotiations with Great Britain and
France were the actions of their northern neighbor - Russia*
As a result of a previous Russo-Turkish treaty, the
Turks were faced with the possibility that their agreements
with Great Britain and France which were likely to be for
malized in a Tripartite Pact might lead Russia and Turkey
into war.

20

Thus, in early September, Turkish Foreign

Minister Saracoglu visited Moscow in an attempt to explain
19
20

- Series D, VII, 189-90.

According to the terms of the Russo-Turkish NonAggression Pact of 1925* Turkey could not conclude any
alliance or agreement with a third country or group of
countries if it were directed against the military and
maritime security of the Soviet Union* D.G.F.P„„ Series
D, VIII, 115*
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the situation to the Soviets and to propose the conclusion
of an assistance pact between Turkey and Russia which would
apply to the Straits and the Balkans. Stalin informed
German Ambassador Schulenburg of the negotiations and
added that the Turkish government wanted the inclusion of
a restrictive clause stating that Turkey would not be re
quired to aid the Soviet Union in actions directed against
Great Britain and France
In his reply to the Soviet government, Ribbentrop
stated Germany's objection to the proposed Tripartite Pact
and added that Turkey might hesitate to conclude the agree
ment if pressured by Russia,

In reference to the proposed

Russo-Turklsh pact, Ribbentrop felt that basically the
instrument would not be in the interest of Germany because
of the implications it would contain towards Germany and
the Nazi-Soviet Pact,

Therefore, if the Soviet Union con

cluded such a pact with Turkey, Berlin would demand that a
reservation in Germany’s favor be included,

22

Schulenburg relayed this information to Molotov who
stated that though Russia agreed with Berlin and was attemp
ting to shape Turkish opinion into the same channel, it
appeared that Turkey was too closely involved with Great
Pi
99

Sontag, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 97 <>

BoGoFoPo, Series D, VIII, ll*f~l6, Ribbentrop
further objected that even if the treaty contained the
reservation in Germany’s favor, it would in practice be
directed entirely against Italy and Bulgaria, both of
which were close friends of Germany,
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Britain and France for a complete abort of the Tripartite
Pact,

However, Molotov added, his government would attempt

to ’’neutralize" the terms of both the proposed Tripartite
23
and Russo-Turkish Pacts ,
During the first week of October* the Turkish gov
ernment, in hopes of smoothing relations between Germany
and Turkey, appointed a. new Ambassador to Berlin, HtJsrev
Gerede,

2k

This move did not change the Turkish attitude

toward either the Tripartite Pact or the Russo-Turkish
Pact, and negotiations continued.

Nevertheless, it soon

became apparent that Turkey’s talks with Russia were run
ning into difficulties.
On October 9* Schulenburg informed the German Foreign
Office that Molotov had mentioned that the chances for the
conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between Russia and
Turkey were not good.

The principal block was that the

Soviet government had specifically told the Turks that it
had to safeguard German interests; therefore, the clause
in favor of the Germans would have to be included in any
assistance pact.

But, he added, the possibility still

existed that the pact might be concluded, as Turkey had
not made a final decision,
D 0G,,FoP,, Series D, VIII, 200; and Sontag, NaziSoviet Relations, 113,
2k

Httsrev Gerede, Turkish diplomatist; Ambassador
to Germany‘1939-19^2; had fought with German forces during
World War I and was notably pro-German,
25

DqG-FcPo, Series D, VIII,

2kk

and 280,
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On October 17, the Turkish delegation headed by
Foreign Minister Saracoglu left Moscow.,
been reached,,

No agreement had

Schulenburg reported that he had been in

formed by Molotov that Turkey's position still was not
clear, and the Turks probably wanted time to consider all
aspects.

Two days later, in answer to Germany and Russia,

the Anglo-Franeo-Turkish Tripartite Pact was signed. 26
The Tripartite Pact brought Turkey firmly into the
Allied camp.

According to its terms, Turkey was to be

assisted by the Allies in the event it was attacked by a
European power.

The Turks would assist the Allies if there

were an outbreak of war in the Mediterranean caused by a
European power, or if Britain and France should have to
enter a conflict because of the promises given Greece and
Rumania in April, 1939*

Turkey also agreed to assume a

position of benevolent neutrality in any other cases in
volving an attack upon either Great Britain or France,
However, Turkey's obligations were qualified by a protocol
which allowed it to refrain from taking any action involving the possibility of war with Russia, 2 7
According to Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 1^,
the Russo-Turkish talks failed "mainly over Russian demands
(1) that the treaty should not involve the U„S,S,R, in
taking part in a war against Germany, and (2) that Turkey
should deny passage through the Straits to warships and
transports other than those of Black Sea Powers,”
Shotwell, Straits. 133”3^* For the complete text
of the Tripartite Pact, see League of Nations Treaty Series,
Vol, 200, l6?-75*
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The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was not happily
received by the Wilhelmstrasse,

On November 3» Ribbentrop

instructed Papen to inform the Turkish Foreign Minister
Saracoglu that Berlin considered the Pact a violation of
Turkey*s responsibilities as a neutral power and "an in✓>o

ternational affront to Germany,"

Saracoglu answered with

the familiar statement that the Pact was not against Ger
many, but merely a defensive measure, Further, Turkey
had wished to limit the extent of the Pact, but the Allied

Powers had refused,

29

Ribbentrop also talked with Turkish

Ambassador Gerede and accused Turkey of advocating the en
circlement policies of the Allies,

Gerede denied any such

implications and stated that Berlin5s information was
simply not correct.

Throughout the remainder of the Phony

War, Germany followed a policy of neutrality towards Tur
key and worked to insure that any attempt on the part of
the Turks to fulfill their duties under the Tripartite Pact
would be checked by a fear of the Soviet Union, J20
28

D.G.F.P.. Series D, VIII, 372,

^
Ibid,, 389, Specifically, Turkey had wanted to
limit Article 3 which stated: "So long as the guarantees
given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Roumania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April,
1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively
with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all
aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France
and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities in
virtue of either of the said guarantees.1'
Ibid,, 27-8, The Phony War was the period be
tween the defeat of Poland and the invasion of Norway,
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With the conquest of Norway and the following inva
sion of France, the attitude of Turkey became of great
importance to Germany,

The Germans felt that should Italy

enter the War and conduct its operations either in France
or the Balkans that the Turkish Army would surely move
against the Italians in accordance with the Tripartite Pact,
Consequently, the Wehrmacht might be forced to over-extend
its available man-power and endanger the chances for final
victory.

Thus, the Ftthrer attempted throughout the initial

phases of the French Campaign to keep Mussolini out of the
conflict, at least temporarily,-^1
When the extent of the German successes in France
became evident during the latter part of May, the Turkish
government began to modify its stand on how strictly the
Tripartite Pact would be interpreted if Italy took an
active role In the war.

On June 2, Turkish Prime Minister

Seydam released a statement on the European conflict which
avoided any mention of the treaty with Great Britain and
France,

Also, an editorial appeared in the Turkish news

paper Tan, previously anti-Italian, which commented that
"if a belligerent Italy were to confine operations to the
French frontier, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean Turkey’s ’security area* - might still remain outside the
31 Wilhelm Keitel, The Memoirs of FIeld-Marshal
Keitel, (New York, 1965), 111; and D.G.F.P.. Series D,
IX, 513-1**.
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war."

32

On June 10, 19*K), Italy declared war on the Allies.

Turkey now had to make a decision.
Four days later, the Turkish government issued a
confidential statement to the Germans which said in effect
that if Turkey entered the war at the present time, there
was a definite chance that it might result in a Russo-Turkish war.

Therefore, Turkey had decided to put into effect

Protocol No. 2 of the Tripartite Pact and preserve its
position of neutrality.-^

Berlin was relieved by Turkey’s

assumption of neutrality, for it could now turn its full
attention to the invasion of Great Britain without fear
of immediate involvement in the Balkans.

Prior to 1939 * Germany did not particularly eoncern
Itself with the position of Turkey, for the Turks were fol
lowing a neutral policy.

However, when the Nazis began

planning the invasion of Poland and the Turks started
moving in the direction of alignment with the Western Powers,
the importance of a neutral Turkey became clear to the
Wilhelmstrasse.

A close association with the West would

force the Germans to take Turkey’s position into serious
account in the event of a European war.

In an attempt to

change Turkey’s views, Papen was sent to Ankara as the Ger
man Ambassador.
Quoted from Survey, Neutrals, 3^7*
^
P.GoF.P... Series D, IX, 566. This protocol stated
that Turkey would not be compelled by its obligations under
the Tripartite Pact to take any action resulting in an armed
conflict with the Soviet Union.
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P a p e n ’s arrival came too late to forestall the AngloTurkish Declaration,,

However, he continued working to stop

the conclusion of a more encompassing and definitive treaty
and at the same time tried to bring T u r k e y ?s views closer
to those held by Berlin,

Initially, the Ambassador was

unsuccessful due to Turkish fear of Italian motives in the
eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans and the promises of
aid which the Western Powers offered if there were a war
in Turkey’s "security area,”

After the conclusion of the

Nazi-Soviet Pact, Berlin realized that one trump card
existed short of invasion which could possibly control the
sway of Turkish foreign policy - fear of an expansionminded Russia,

With this in mind, the Wilhelmstrasse

attempted to prevent a Russo-Turklsh treaty.
The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was a disappoint
ment to Berlin, but considering that it followed the failure
of Russo-Turklsh negotiations and was worded so that it was
not an actual threat to Germany, the Pact was definitely
not a complete defeat from Berlin’s point of view.

The

German Foreign Ministry figured that the mere thought of a
Russian Straits would be sufficient to keep Turkey in the
role of a neutral, and

it was.,

proved correct.

CHAPTER VI
THE GERMAN - TURKISH FRIENDSHIP TREATY
19^0 - 19*H

Italy *s declaration of wax and Turkey’s refusal to
furnish actiye aid to the Allies in June 19^0 caused the
Third Reich to begin pursuing ways to draw Turkey closer
to the Axis orbito

The geographical importance of Tur

key was apparent to the Germans, especially in relation
to operations in the direction of the Suez Canal,

Ber

lin was anxious to gain concessions for the transit of
war materials and troops, if necessary into the Near
East,^

And it would be much easier if the Germans were

^ The Near East is analogous to the British Middle
East and includes Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,
Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and the countries of the Arabian
Peninsula,
12k
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allowed to traverse Turkish territory,,

As a move in this

direction, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop attempted to
force the replacement of Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoglu,
In July 1940 , the German Foreign Ministry began the
publishing of a sixth German White Book consisting of
French military and diplomatic documents which had been
captured during the French Campaign,

The documents

given the greatest attention by the Germans were those
allegedly containing information on plans for Allied opera
tions in the Near East, and most significantly, against the
Russian oil fields located in the Caucasus,

Concerning

the operations in the Caucasus, the Germans made a special
effort to emphasize the role supposedly played by France’s
Ambassador in Ankara, Rene Masslgli,2 and Turkish Foreign
Minister Sukru Saracoglu,

According to the White Book,

Masslgli had had an interview with Saracoglu in which the
latter suggested that air attacks on the Russian oil fields
take off from a base within Turkey, 3 Consequently, the Ger
man propaganda machine was now demanding Saracoglu*s dismissal.
The Turkish government denied emphatically that either
it or any of its ministers had been involved in any dealings
2

Rene Masslgli, (18881938-1940,

),

Ambassador to Turkey

^ Kilie, Turkey, 84; and D,G,F.P,, Series D, X, 12425, In view of this informatlon Ribbentrop was also con
sidering demanding the removal of Masslgli from his post
through the German-French Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden,
The French Ambassador was soon recalled, but whether or not
for this specific reason, I do not know.
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of that type.

Turkish Prime Minister Seydam publicly

stated that his country's policy had been and was directed
solely towards guarding its own Interests and had never
suggested that such an act be directed against Russia.
It soon became evident that, in spite of Ribbentrop*s
accusations. Turkey was not going to dismiss Saracoglu
without a complete investigation.
The Foreign Minister had built his image within the
government to such an extent that Seydam was hesitant to
oust him unless the Prime Minister was prepared to accept
responsibility for the alleged incident.

And more impor

tantly. the Turkish public, in light of the capitulations
following the First World Wax, was extremely touchy about
doing anything which might be considered the result of
pressure by a European power.

One official in the Turkish

Foreign Ministry asked Papon:

"Why are you creating a

second Delcasse case?" k

Ambassador Papen denied that there

was any parallel with the present situation and added that
the Third Reich was not concerned over who conducted Turkish Foreign Policy.
k

D.G.F.P., Series D, X, 233* The Delcasse case
refers to the First Moroccan Crisis, 1905-1906, in which
William II of Germany made speeches in Tangiers calling for
free trade and equality in Moroccan affairs. The German
Foreign Office then suggested an International conference
to bring reform and guard interests of countries interested
in Morocco. Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister, who was
looking for French ascendency there, opposed the German
plan. However, the French cabinet was not in agreement
with Delcasse, and he was forced to resign.
K

Considering what had happened, Papen surely must

12?

Berlin soon realized that Turkey could not be coerced
Into removing Saracoglu„ Turkey Indicated that it was
willing to fight even if pressure were brought by Russia,'
though no pressure appeared from that sector*

And in

these circumstances, the German Foreign Office let the
matter drop*^
At the beginning of the Battle of Britain in August
1940, Germany realized that this campaign would be greatly
benefitted if the Axis were able to attack the British
Empire at different points of its vital interests*

Speci

fically, a joint German-Italian operation against the
Empire in the Near and Middle East*

It was obvious that

a friendly Turkey would be an asset to any such operations,
for the Turks could present an unpleasant threat to the
flank of any military movements in that direction*

So

throughout the following months, Berlin tried to bring a
recalcitrant Turkey into a closer association with the
Axis*

However, these efforts by Germany soon received

a definite setback*
Italy’s invasion of Greece on October 28 posed a
direct threat to the sovereignty of Turkey.

Turkish

have said this with 11tongue-in-cheek”, but nevertheless
he said it. Ibid,
6

In his memoirs, Papen flatly disavowed any major
role in Ribbentrop*s plot, Papen, Memoirs, *1-63-64, However,
it is evident in the official messages he sent to the Ger
man Foreign Office that he played a vital role*
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officials questioned Papen on the effect that the ItalianGreek war would have on German policy*

He replied that

Berlin felt that it was Italy's concern and that the
Italians could solve the problem through their own means.
However, Germany wanted to make clear that If Great Britain
opened a front in Greece, the Reich would likely reconsider its position.

7

On November 29, Papen met with President Indntt and
extended overtures for Turkish cooperation in the New Order.
The Ambassador stated that he was authorized by Berlin to
offer Turkey assurances on the same basis as those given by
Great Britain in the Tripartite Pact.

Germany realized that

Turkey's commitments to Britain were completely defensive
and felt that the assurances of the Axis Powers added to
those of the British would surely meet with the approval of
the Turkish people.

Also, Turkey would not have to accept

a British victory as the only answer.

Inbntt asked the Am

bassador what Germany's position was in respect to peace
in the Balkans.

Papen answered that, as previously stated,

Berlin had complete confidence in Italy's ability but
would intervene if a British front were created in the
Balkans.

When asked what was meant by a British front,

Papen said the presence of operational forces.
7
8

8

Series D, XI, 679-80.

Ibid.. 742-^3. Actually, at this time, the situa
tion was not good for the Italians, and Great Britain was
sending as much aid as possible. Thus, Papen*s statement
as much as meant that Germany would take action in the Balkans,
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The President stated that Turkey hoped the Germans
would not find it necessary to extend military operations
into the Balkans,,

But he was Interested in the authenticity

of the rumors that the Third Belch would invade Greece In
order to save the situation for the Italians.

Papen ad

mitted there was a. vague possibility but assured the Presi
dent that if it did occur, Germany would protect Turkey’s
interests.

In reference to the assurances offered by Ger

many, InCntt mentioned Turkey’s profound distrust of Italy.
The German Ambassador replied that Germany would be guaran
tor of any assurances and that Italy would pose no problems.
In closing, Papen pointed out that though the European war
was not over, it was reaching a, turning point; thus, it was
important for the Turks not to hesitate too long before
deciding on a definite course of action.

The President

stated that he would instruct Foreign Minister Saracoglu
to contact Papen after a serious consideration of Berlin’s
suggestions. 9
On December 2, Saracoglu met with Papen.

The Foreign

Minister stated that his government was interested in the
New Order in Europe as presented by the Axis and would
probably like to take an active role, especially concerning
problems In the Balkans and the Near East.

However, he

added the Axis would have to guarantee the sovereignty of
Turkey and Its zones of interest. 10

Also the Turks would

^ DoGoFoP.„ Series D, XI, 7^3«
10 The zones, of course, were the Balkans & eastern Med
iterranean.
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not care to negotiate with Italy.

Papen answered that all

decisions would he made in consultation with the Italians,
hut he would try to arrange for the negotiations to he conducted hy Germany. 11
Two weeks later, State Secretary Menemencioglu questioned Ambassador Papen concerning the state of the political
conversations.

Papen replied that Berlin had not sent any

further instructions and was most likely awaiting the outcome of the Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations.

12

Menemencio'glu

accepted the explanation, hut little did he suspect the
true reason for Berlin’s hesitancy.
On December 13, 19^0, Hitler issued Directive No. 20,
’Operation Marita’ - the invasion of Greece,

The German

Foreign Ministry knew that this military operation placed
the proposed German-Turkish negotiations in a different
light.

The Turks did not want further intervention in the

Balkans and had even stated that a peaceful southeastern
Europe was a basis for talks with the Germans.

Therefore,

Berlin evidently felt that any further attempts to draw
Turkey closer to the Axis would he wasted until the Italian-Greek conflict was resolved.

So, for the next several

months, the Germans directed their efforts in Turkey towards
11
12

P.GcF.P,. Series D, XI, 7 6 k ,

Turkey was attempting to bring Bulgaria into a
closer association with the Balkan Entente, hut was un
successful.
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assuring its neutrality during the forthcoming German
intervention,, 13
During March 1941, a political revolution occurred in
Iraq supported by the Axis, By the end of the month, the
1
Regent, Abdul Ilah,
fled from Baghdad, and pro-Nazi
Rashid Ali1^ assumed the premiership on April 4,

Immedi

ately, Rashid All contacted Papen In Ankara and asked for
military aid,

Germany was anxious to aid the rebels; how

ever, it was busy in Greece and, more importantly, Berlin
would have to secure the right of transit for arms and
troops through Turkey in order to give their cohorts
cient support.

suffi

Thus, Berlin decided to waituntil the con

clusion of the Balkan Campaign before turning its attention
to the problem in Iraq,
It did not take the Nazi war machine long to add
Yugoslavia and Greece to its list of occupied countries.
By April 24, both areas had capitulated to Germany, and
the following day Papen met with Turkish Ambassador Gerede
F0r a more detailed discussion of Germany’s
political policies in Turkey from January - March 1941,
see Chapter i: , pp, 21-24,
14
,
Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq 1939-1941; was the
maternal uncle of the InfantKing Faisal II,
Rashid All el-Gailani, Premier of Iraq March
1940-January 1941, and Aprll-May 1941; fled to Germany
after the failure of the revolt; sentenced to death in
absentia,; after the war was granted asylum in Saudia Arabia,
1£
George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs,
(New York, 1953)# 224-25, [Hereafter cited as Lenczowski,
The Middle East,]
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to discuss the possiblity of a German-Turkish mutual treaty0
The German Ambassador brought up the question of Iraq and
asked Gerede If Turkey would be willing to back that coun17
try’s desire to gain independence.
Gerede answered that
though he hoped that Germany and Turkey would pursue a
parallel policy concerning the Near Eastern Arab States,
he was not certain whether the treaty with Great Britain
allowed Turkey to make any agreement with the Germans re
garding Iraq.

However, he personally would support any

German proposals In that connection.

l8

In Berlin, there was a definite move to bring Turkey
into closer relations with the Third Reich.

On May k t

Hitler delivered an address to the Reichstag in which he
praised the inspired leaders of the Turkish Republic and
the achievements they had made since the defeat of the First
World War,

The Ftthrer also complimented Turkey’s realistic

attitude in preserving its independence and not, such as
19
Yugoslavia, following the wishes of the British, ^ In line
with this policy, Ambassador Papen was recalled to Germany
17

Actually, Iraq had gained its full independence In
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, However, it was obvious
from the terms of the treaty that Great Britain was the
most favored nation and obtained many rights within Iraq
not enjoyed by oi:her nations. It was probably this fact
that caused Papen to refer to Iraq as not independent.
For a discussion of the treaty’s major provisions, see
Lenczowski, The Middle East, 219-20.
18

D-Cr.F.P., Series D, XII, 637“38.

19

Ibid., 1021.
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and directed to acquire the right to ship arms for Iraq
across Turkey,
Upon returning to Ankara, Papen was visited by the
20

Iraqi War Minister, Naji Shawkat,

The Minister informed

Papen that the Gailani government in Iraq was still deter
mined to resist British attempts to restore the former
government to power,,

Nevertheless, he hoped that Turkey

could be persuaded to continue mediation of the dispute if
only to gain time.

Papen agreed that Turkish mediation

should continue, for it would allow more time for the mo
bilization of German-Italian assistance.
might impair Anglo-Turkish relations.

In addition, it

However, the Ambas

sador pointed out, in the present circumstances the Axis
would have a difficult time sending adequate military
assistance to Iraq.

But it was hoped that this question

would be settled very soon.

21

On May 16, Ambassador Papen met with Foreign Minister
Saracoglu and discussed German-Turkish relations.

Papen

stated that Berlin was extremely interested in sending war
munitions to Iraq.

And he had been directed to inquire if

they could be shipped through Turkey.
absolute security of the transit route.

Germany would demand
However, he added

that the war materials would be addressed to Iran so that
Turkey would be guarded against any obvious violation of
20

Sayid Naji Shawkat.

Iraqi War Minister, April-

May 19^1.
21

PoG.F.P.. Series D, XII, 812.

13^

its treaty with Great Britain*

Saracoglu made no Initial

objection to these proposals and said that he would present
them to his government,,

But he said that if it was recep

tive to Germany's proposals, it would first be necessary to
contact the British Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen and in
form him that Turkey felt it necessary to clarify its posltlon towards the Third Belch,

22

After reading the report of the conversations, Ribben
trop instructed Papen to conduct oral negotiations aimed
at the conclusion of an open treaty with Turkey plus a
secret protocol which would allow Germany the right of un
limited shipment of war munitions through Turkey.

Also,

the German Foreign Minister told the Ambassador to explain
that the treaty Turkey had concluded with France and Great
Britain wa.s no longer of any value,

France had been de

feated and Britain was in no position to render effective
aid to Turkey,
German side.

Furthermore, France was moving towards the
Thus, the agreement had lost both Its legal

and practical foundations,

Bibbentrop believed that if

nothing else,-Turkey would be able to explain the proposed
treaty with Germany on reasons of self-preservation, in
view of the fact that Britain could no longer supply sup
port against the supposed German and actual Russian danger.
In regard to the Russian threat, Papen was directed to state
that G@rma.ny would provide sufficient protection to the
22

D.GoFoP o, Series D, XII, 828.
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Turks.2 3v And as a final incentive the German Ambassador was
to mention the possibility that some land near Adrianople
and one or more Islands in the Aegean might be given to
Turkeyo

pit

The following day, Papen telegraphed Berlin and told
the Foreign Minister that evidently he had misinterpreted
the Ambassador’s previous reports, for it would not be easy
to effect such an extensive treaty with Turkey,

In fact

it would be impossible at the present time to conclude a
treaty which would allow Germany to ship through Turkey an
amount of war material to be determined solely by the Ger
mans,

Papen admitted that he had said that InSntt was going

to alter his relations with Britain, but this did not mean
that the change would be immediate.

Actually, it was im

perative that Germany allow Turkey gradually to change its
relations with the west for it would not be to Berlin’s
advantage to try forcing Turkeys hand,

Papen reminded

Ribbentrop that since the start of the war, public opinion
in Turkey had been in favor of a British victory simply on
the basis of Italo-Turkish antagonism.

Therefore, the

23 D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 836-3?.
2l\G,F,OoDo, Turkey, 10. There Is a close correlation
between these documents and those contained in D,G,F.P,,
Series D; however, occasionally they do differ. According
to Jfickh, Rising Crescent. 250-51, Turkish Ambassador Gerede
had been offered, in addition to the above, fifty per cent
of the output of the Mosul oilfields and a fifteen - year
mandate over Syria, if Turkey would permit Germany to
transmit war materials across Turkish territory. However,
I found no other reference to this information.
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Wilhelmstrasse should continue along a moderate policy, be
cause any flagrant disregard of Turkish national dignity
could possibly result in a coup d1etat similar to the one
in Yugoslavia.2'”’
Two days lapsed before Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
replied to Papen9s communique, but in the telegram he agreed
with the German Ambassador*s statements and cancelled the
previous Instructions.

Instead, the Foreign Minister dir

ected the Ambassador to conduct the negotiations in several
phases.

Initially, the Foreign Ministry wanted an agreement

permitting the passage of war material through Turkey.
Papen was Instructed to explain that the Turks would gain
a guarantee of their national sovereignty and possibly ad
ditional land.

However, the Turkish government must under

stand that Berlin wanted the right of unlimited transit, If
the need should arise.

26

On May 20, Ambassador Papen presented Foreign Minister
Saracoglu with a list of proposals and suggested that they
be used as the basis for discussion.

The documents con

sisted of an open treaty defining the mutual understanding
between the two countries.

Along with three secret proto

cols dealing with areas of land to go to Turkey at the con
clusion of the war, transit of war materials, and a trade
agreement.

The Turkish negotiators agreed with the chief

25

D.G.F.P o, Series D, XII, 839-^1.

26

G.F.O.D.. Turkey. 13-15.
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points, although Menemencioglu felt that his government
might be influenced by Great Britain.

A question also

arose concerning the French request for arms transit to
Syria,

Saracoglu indicated that a judicial situation

existed due to the lapse of the Franco-Turki sh trade
agreement, but that the transit request would be given
27
every consideration by Turkey,
Several days later, Great Britain replied to Turkey's
feelers on the negotiations with Germany,

The British made

such caustic remarks against Turkey's participation in the
talks that Saracoglu expressed concern that they might break
relations with Ankara,

Thus, the Turkish Foreign Minister

felt that it would be better for his government not to provide any excuse for the world to think that Turkey broke
its word with Britain,

State Secretary Menemencioglu handed

Papen a tentative declaration to be made public simultan
eously with the proposed treaty which stated that Germany
would not ask anything of the Turks incompatible with the
Anglo-Turkish treaty.

The German Ambassador objected to

the declaration, because he felt that Berlin would probably
have to be satisfied with oral promises concerning the
transit of arms.

The Turkish government then withdrew the

declaration and stated that it could not give Germany even
oral promises about the transit of arms.

Papen argued that

at least in regard to French-controlled Syria the Turks had
27

DoGoFoP*. Series D, XII, 866-67,
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a legal obligation, but he was rejected by the Turkish
opinion thats

"One must be In a position to reply to the

English that nothing had been agreed upon which directly
28
or indirectly might be aimed against the former allies,”
Nevertheless, the next day Papen and Saracoglu drew
up a tentative agreement pending the approval of their
individual governments,,

The open treaty merely stated

promises of non-aggression by each of the signatories, The
secret protocol, on the other hand, contained the changes
in Turkey's frontier which would be taken Into account at
the time of peace negotiations, Papen believed that the
political effect of the treaty on world opinion would be
far more important at that time than shipment of material
and, therefore, recommended that Berlin conclude the treaty.
The Ambassador reasoned that the proposed German-Turklsh
friendship agreement contained several aspects beneficial
to the Axis:

it would appear to the other nations that the

final British ally in Europe had lost confidence in Britain's
ability to win the war; Great Britain could no longer count
on Turkey; and Britain's anticipated verbal attacks on Turkey
29
would push the Turks closer to the German point of view,
Ribbentrop9s reaction to Papen*s report was anything
but agreeable.

He criticized the Ambassador for promising

Turkey areas of land and receiving nothing in return,
28
29

. Series D, XXI, 886-8?,
Ibid,. 887-89,
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Further, he stated, if Turkey were willing to allow shipment
of war material addressed to Afghanistan and Iran, then it
did not make sense why the Samsun-Teheran route through
Turkey should be the only one allowed for passage, especially in light of the fact that earlier Germany had trans30
ferred materials to Iran via Iraq,
The German Ambassador defended every action he had
taken during the negotiations.

Generally, he felt that the

Turkish government should not be forced into making conces
sions which it could not justify before both world opinion,
and more Importantly, its fellow-countrymen.

If this did

happen, there could very easily be a coup d ’etat,

Papen

requested permission to continue the talks on the present
basis.

Ribbentrop refused to grant such authority and in

structed him to adopt a, more demanding policy.

However,

the Ambassador was directed not to resume talks until
June 2.
By the first part of June, the situation was completely
reversed in Iraq.

Britain had sent reinforcements from

Palestine, aided by a motorized regiment from Transjordan,
These troops fought several successful battles and by the
30

Turkey allowed the Axis to send small quantities
of war materials to Iraq in a camouflaged manner. That is,
the goods were addressed Iran or Afghanistan when actually
they would end up in Iraq, Also, Turkey permitted the ship
ment of aviation fuel (which it interestingly classified as
non-war material) to Syria. DoG.FoP., Series D, XII, 88?,
915o For disagreeing opinions, see Kilic, Turkey, 891;
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, 1?0„
31

D qG oF.P.. Series D, XII, 915.
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end of May entered Baghdad,,

The rebellion was over.

Berlin

now took a different view of the German-Turkish negotiations.^2

Foreign Minister Elbbentrop telegraphed Papen on June 1
and informed him that due to the change of circumstances in
Iraq during the last few days . Berlin was not interested in
the transport of war materials across Turkey.

Thus, a

political treaty was no longer contingent on a commitment
by the Turks.

Ribbentrop instructed the Ambassador to

notify Saracoglu that Germany was now in basic agreement
with the previous proposals.

Enclosed with the Foreign

Minister's message was a separate telegram containing drafts
of a treaty and a. secret protocol drawn up by Berlin*

In

the open treaty. Germany requested mutual promises of nonaggression and consultation over questions of common interest.
And in the secret protocol, the Germans promised to guarantee
Turkish sovereignty in the Straits, if Turkey would take into
account the necessities of German shipping.

Further, the

Reich would consider Turkish territorial desires in south
eastern Europe, at the conclusion of the

p e a c e .

33

The following day. Papen questioned Ribbentrop as to
the advisibility of the wording of Article 1.

Though it

32

Due primarily to the Luftwaffe's commitment in
Crete. Germany had not been able to provide much aid to
the Rashid All regime. However, about fifty German planes
did land in Iraq. Lenczowski. The Middle East. 226.
33 For the complete text of Ribbentropfs proposals,
see D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 938-40.
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proposed a non-aggression pact for Germany, Turkey would be
free to attack the Reich any place outside Germany’s national
frontiers.

Also, the Ambassador thought that the apticle

should be constructed so that it precluded an attack on
Turkey by any other power allied with the Third Reich,

In

answer, the Foreign Minister reminded Papen that the Axis
was the master of Europe, and he was certain that Turkey
was aware of this fact,
fear of a Turkish attack.

Thus, the Third Reich had little
And concerning the second cri

ticism, Berlin would have no objection if the Turkish gov
ernment desired to protect its frontiers by concluding
treaties with other nations, namely Italy,
Throughout the next week, negotiations continued be
tween the two countries.

Various phrases in the treaty

drafts were added and deleted by mutual agreement.

Berlin,

however, would not budge on what it considered to be the
essence of the treaty - neutrality on the part of Turkey,
On this point the Turkish government was willing to refrain
from any military cooperation with Great Britain.

But the

Turks would not agree to abandon political discussions with
the British because such talks could become absolutely
necessary In cases like the administration of the Baghdad
Railway if Britain occupied Syria.Ribben trop accused
^

D.G.F.P.. Series D, XII, 952, 95^-56.
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After the British victory in Iraq, it became likely
that they would soon attack Vichy-controlled Syria. The
Baghdad Railway was regarded by the Turks as their property,
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Turkey of trying to protect Itself from Germany while
openly aiding Great Britain In Syria,

However, Papen as

sured the Foreign Minister that such was not the case.
Turkey was only trying to protect its property and sincerely desired to assume a neutral position.
On June 1?, Papen reported to Berlin that he had
compared treaty texts with Foreign Minister Saracoglu and
except for a minor revision, both parties were in full
agreement.

The Ambassador stated that Turkey was prepared

to conclude the agreement the following evening, and he
requested authorization to sign the treaty.

Ambassador

Papen was immediately granted full powers, and the GermanTurkish Friendship Treaty was concluded at Ankara, June 18,
1 9 ^ 1 »37

The treaty pleased the Germans,

In it, the two states

agreed to respect each other9s territory, to refrain from
action, direct or indirect, against one another, and to
settle all questions affecting their common interests by

and the fact that the route crossed the Turkish-Syrian fron
tier four times would put transportation within Turkey on
a precarious basis if Britain occupied Syria and the Turks
were not able to negotiate with them. More importantly,
since Turkey was cut off from Europe, the Baghdad Railway
was the main connection with the outside world. On June 8,
19^1» British troops invaded Syria and an armistice was
signed on July 1*!-. However, Turkey was not forced to close
the railway,
36
37

DqG,F,P,. Series D, XII, 102*1-25,

For the complete text of the treaty, see D,G.F,P,,
Series D, XII, 1051*
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peaceful means,,

Germany, no doubt, would hare preferred

a closer understanding with the Turks,
necessitated military Intervention,

But this might have

Thus, Berlin settled

for a neutral.Turkey to insure flank protection during the
invasion of Russia on June 22.

Turkey’s failure to act during the advance of the Axis
forces into France in the spring of 194-0 left Berlin with
the idea that the Turks could be negotiated into a position
of neutrality, if not into an outright alliance with Ger
many.

Ribbentrop took the first step when he unsuccessfully

attempted to force the Turks into adopting an attitude
favorable to the Germans by disgracing Saracoglu and the
Turkish government.
The Italian invasion of Greece in October 194-0 dealt a
blow to Nazi hopes of a German-Turkish alliance because of
the mistrust Turkey felt for the Italians.

However, the

subsequent spectacular German conquest of the Balkans and
the potential threat posed by the huge concentration of
forces in Bulgaria caused the Turks to reconsider their
position.
Berlin’s request for the right to transit war material
across Turkish territory was carefully considered by Ankara,
Personally, the Turks were favoraMe to the idea, but Great
Britain, with whom they had a close alliance, objected
vehemently.

Turkey was caught between the two belligerents.

iM
Fortunately, the Germans withdrew their request, allegedly
due to the failure of the Rashid Ali rebellion, and settled
for the mildly worded Friendship Treaty,
The agreement was certainly less than Berlin wanted,
but the Nazis had to be content unless they were willing
to endanger the Russian campaign and divert substantial
forces for an attack on Turkey,

However, the Germans did

receive one benefit from the agreement » a guarantee of
Turkish neutrality.

And, furthermore, if the Wehrmacht

was successful in Russia, it would present such a threat
to Turkey that unless the Turks wanted to suffer a similar
fate, a close alliance with Germany would be the only
reasonable alternative.

CHAPTER VII

THE EFFECT OF OPERATION BARBAROSSA
ON GERMAN - TURKISH RELATIONS

19*H-19*14

As the Wehrmacht poured across the Russian frontiers
from the Baltic to the Black Sea on Sunday morning, June 22,
19*ML» there was great excitement throughout Turkey,

The

Turkish government, which had been deeply concerned over
Russians hostile attitude and the definite possibility of
a combined Russo-German operation against the Straits, now
felt that it had been granted at least a temporary re
prieve.

Turkish public opinion regarded both Germany and

Russia as actual threats to Turkish sovereignty and was
anxious to see each side destroy the other.

However, due

to Its geographical position and the possibility of in
vasion, Turkey was careful not to agitate either party.
1*1-5

\k6

Prior to the invasion of Russia, Hitler had con
templated an advance from Bulgaria through Turkey to Suez,
but because of British successes in the Near East, nothing
was actually planned.

At the end of June, the Ftthrer issued

amendments to Directive No. 32 which concerned preparations
for events after the defeat of Russia,.1

The directive

called attention to the expected British buildup in the
Near and Middle East, and ordered plans to be drawn up for
the assembling in Bulgaria of adequate troops to cause
Turkey’s capitulation either freely or through force.
Also, an offensive was to be planned from Transcaucasia
against Iraq to be launched in conjunction with the one
through Turkey.

Neither of these operations was to be put

into effect until Russia was defeated.

2

However, unaware

of Hitler’s plans for the future, the Turkish government
continued to express its satisfaction with the course of
events in Russia.
In a, conversation with Foreign Minister Saracoglu
and State Secretary Menemencioglu, Papen attempted to
explain that it would be in Turkey’s self-interest, in
view of its mistrust of Russia, to join with the Reich
1 Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, 78-82. The actual dir
ective had been issued to the Commanders-in-Chief of the
Wehrmacht on June 19. Whether or not the amendments con
cerned Turkey, I do not know. But Trevor-Roper seems to
indicate as much,
2

Francis H. Hinsley, Hitler’s Strategy. (Cam
bridge, 1951) t 156. [Hereafter cited as Hinsley,
Strategy,]
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as soon as possible.

He pointed to Great Britain's de

cision to side with Russia and stated that the British,
who never in the past had advocated European solidarity,
must be considered a definite enemy of Europe,

The Turkish

statesmen were in sympathy with the ideas put forth by the
Ambassador, but they were hesitant to commit their govern
ment until the situation in Russia was clearer.

Instead,

they told Papen that for the present it was necessary to
remain neutral, which placed a. limit on the extent of Tur
key's collaboration with the Reich.

But if in the future,

it developed that a closer alliance with Germany was in
Turkey's interests, it would be assured.

3

As the Wehrmacht advanced deeper into Russia, the
definite possibility arose in the minds of many Turkish
generals and statesmen that Germany might soon win an
overwhelming victory.

Also, there appeared a concern, es-

4

pecially among the Pan-Turanians,

for obtaining from the

Germans guarantees of freedom for the millions of Turkish
speaking peoples of the Soviet Union.

Specifically, Pan-

Turanian circles within Turkey wanted to create these areas
with the exception of Azerbaijan,^ into an outwardly

3

Survey, Neutrals , 353•

4

A movement within Turkey consisting of government
officials, army officers, and most importantly, the Turkish
intelligensia, who desired a national unity for all the Turks
in the world.
They were especially interested in the area
between the Black and the Caspian Seas, including the Crimea.
^ A region south of the Caucasus Mountains and west
of the Caspian Sea.
It is one of the w o r l d ’s most famous
oil-deposit areas.

1^8
independent Turkish state which would serve as a buffer
area between Russia and Turkey.
On August 5? Ambassador Papen reported to Berlin the
existence of this movement.

After explaining the general

feelings within Turkey and the Turklsh-tspeaking areas to
wards Pan-Turanianism, he recommended that Germany support
the idea.

Also, he attached great importance to the forma

tion of a strong state in the area above the Caucasus.
About a week later, Ribbentrop answered Papen’s communiquS
and explained what Berlin believed should be the aims of
the German diplomatic effort in Turkey,
The Foreign Minister felt that until Russia was
definitely smashed during the coming fall, the Embassy
in Turkey should not pursue an overly aggressive policy.
He believed that no territorial demands should be made on
Turkey, and on the contrary, that Papen should emphasize
Turkey’s role as guardian of the Straits.

Ribbentrop

agreed with P a pen’s view of the Pan-Turanian question, and
suggested that Turkey’s introverted imperialistic tendencies
be promoted by the Embassy.

Further, he instructed the

Ambassador to assume a negative attitude to all peace over
tures and attempts at compromise, especially concerning
Great Britain.

The Foreign Minister was of the opinion

that if every German mission abroad followed this policy,
it would make it easier for Berlin to pursue Its objectives

1*1-9
In the future,
l
On August 25, Ribbentrop met with Turkish Ambassador
Gerede and brought up the question of Turkey's official
attitude toward the Turkish populations in the Caucasus.
Gerede stated that Turkey was not interested in any ter
ritories outside its boundaries, at least according to the
present policy.

The Ambassador further stated that the

Pan-Turanian idea no longer existed in Turkey.

The Foreign

Minister did not press the topic but informed Papen later
of the conversation.
7

Early in September, a Pan-Turanian leader, Nurl P a s h a /
visited German State Secretary WeizsSeker.

Hurl Pasha

explained his views on Pan-Turanianism and admitted that
the movement was not as strong in Turkey as he and his
It had been reported through United States and Bri*
tish radio and press reports during July that Ambassador
Papen had started a peace offensive to begin after the con
clusion of the Russian campaign. Papen, of course, denied
the reports, and was supported by Paul Leverkuehn, German
assistant military attache in Istanbul. D.G.F.P.. Series
D, XIII, 207-08, 228-31, 305-06; and Ian Colvin, Chief of
Intelligence,, (London, 1951), 182. [Hereafter cited as
Colvin, Chief of Intelligence,] The truth seems to be that
Papen had advocated to the Nazi heirarchy the need for pre
senting a "constructive peace plan" to Europe at the con
clusion of the Russian campaign which would hopefully meet
with its approval. According to former German Ambassador
to Italy, von Hassell (1932-1937), Papen maintained that
Hitler did not object to the idea, Ulrich von Hassell,
The Von Hassell Diaries. 1930-19^. (New York, 19^7), 217.

7

Nuri Pasha. A wealthy factory owner and brother
of Enver Pasha, Turkish War Minister during World War I,
who had once occupied a leading post in the Islam Orlu
(a Pan-Turanian organization in Turkey); he was reputed
to have particular sympathy for his brother's Pan-Turanian
plans.
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cohorts desiredo

WeizsUcker stated that Germany had no

political,, but only economic interests in the area of the
Caucasus, and, therefore, approved of Turkey either incor
porating the area or establishing an eastern Turkish state,
Pasha added that he would like to stay on in Berlin as an
advisor concerning the Caucasus, with which he was extremely
familiar concerning its geographic, ethnographic, military,
and economic aspects,

WeizsUcker, somewhat hesitant to

grant this request, instructed him to contact Under State
Secretary Woermann

8

in regard to further discussions,

Woermann and Nuri Pasha held several discussions during
September 19^1.

In answer

to questions placed by the Under

State Secretary, Nuri admitted that Ataturk’s policy fol
lowed the principle that Turkey would, except for a few
frontier changes, not seek objectives beyond its present
boundaries.

However, he explained, this was merely a matter

of expediency caused by fear of the Soviet Union,

Further

more, Nuri felt certain that at the proper moment both the
Turkish government and the Turkish people would adopt the
ideas espoused by the Pan-Turanians,

9

In his report to

the Foreign Ministry, Woermann recommended that Berlin
should encourage the creation of ethnically Turkish states
8

Ernst Woermann. German diplomatist; Director of
the Political Department, and Under State Secretary at the
German Foreign Office.

9

It was not specifically stated what the proper
moment would be, but it would probably arrive when Russia
was defeated.
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In the area desired by the Pan-Turanians*

But he advised

that Germany study carefully the economic implications
before handing the land to the Turkish government010
By the end of October, the German Foreign Office had
started to take positive action concerning the Pan-Turanian
question*

Minister von Hentig‘L1 was recalled to Berlin to

consult with Nuri Pasha, on the question*

Also* the 0*K«W*

12

had been directed to separate the ethnically Turkish and
Mohammedan prisoners of war, in the hope of gaining the
Turkish government’s good will*

Ambassador Papen reported

to the Wilhelmstrasse that the Turkish government did not
object to Germany placing prisoners of Turkish ethnic
origin in special camps.

However, the Turks were opposed

to any policies which would accentuate Pan-Turanian propa
ganda within Turkey, for it might place their government
in a very awkward position.

Therefore, Papen recommended

that any such propaganda, be confined to the prisoner camps
and to the training of persons who might be sent into Ger13
man-occupied areas in Russia. J
During November 19*1-1, the German offensive began to
experience difficulties*
10
11

Hitler’s plan of completing the

P*G,F*P*. Series D, XIII, 571-75.

von Hentig* German diplomatist. Official at the
German Foreign Ministry who had been on temporary duty with
the Eleventh Army in the area of the Crimea.

12
x
13

The High Command of the German Armed Forces,

D oG qF.P*, Series D, XIII, 707-08*
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Blitzkrieg against Russia by capturing Leningrad and Moscow
and.occupying the Caucasian region was becoming the subject
of a spring offensive.

The Ftthrer demanded that Moscow be

captured before the end of the year, and a final drive was
launched by Army Group Center on November 16,

The assault

failed, and by December 6 the entire Army Group was under
extreme pressure from the R u s s i a n s O n December 7 the
third member of the Axis, Japan, attacked Pearl Harbor,
Four days later Germany declared war on the United States
and was soon followed by Italy,

With the United States *

declaration on the two remaining Axis powers, the sides
were definitely drawn.

However, the entry of the United

States into the war did:not particularly bother the Ftthrer,

15

Of far more importance to Hitler was the condition of the
"1^
Wehrmacht in Russia,
With the entry of the United States, the Turkish gov
ernment viewed the German-Russian war with greater concern.
Previously, Turkey had thought it possible that a compromise
could be reached between Great Britain and the Axis, but
with the United States actively on the side of the Allies
such ideas began to fade.

The Turks believed that the only

way their country could be kept intact would be by the
14

Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict,
19^1-19^5. (New York, 1965), 180, [Hereafter cited as Clark,
Barbarossa,1
Ciano, Diaries, i|>05; and Bullock, Hitler, 66l-6^,
Bullock, Hitler, 66^-65.
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reinstitution of the balance of power, especially in the
Mediterranean.

In a communique to Berlin, Ambassador Papen

explained this situation and emphasized that now more than
ever the Turkish Republic desired a policy of neutrality.
But, he stated, there were two conditions which might
possibly force Turkey to abandon the role of a neutral:
first, if the Axis were successful in defeating Russia, in
the spring; second, if the Wehrmacht occupied the Caucasus
and threatened Britain*s oil supply in the Persian Gulf.
In both instances, Turkey would see that it was unlikely
that the Allies could win the European war and would perhaps
be ready to support the Axis militarily.

But, Papen warned,

Berlin must not attempt prematurely to force Turkey to
assume an active status in the war, whether by ordering
the government to declare war or demanding transit rights.
Such actions would undoubtedly cause the Turks to join the
other side on the basis of violation of sovereign rights. 17
Throughout the winter of 19^1-19^2 * the Wehrmacht re
mained on the defensive in Russia.

By February, it was

evident that the German armies would pull through, but the
unusually cold winter was an ordeal that neither side would
forget.

1R

Because of this undecided situation, Berlin was

hesitant to push Ankara too far.
^
18

Nor was Turkey prepared

GoF.O.D.. Turkey. ^9-51.

The special medal given to those who participated
in this winter campaign was known as the Gefrierflelsch
Orden, the Order of the Frozen Meat. Clark, Barbarossa. 181.

15^

to accept a German victory as a fait accompli, The coming
German offensive could prove to be decisive.
While the Turkish government hesitated to commit it
self to either warring block, an assassination attempt was
made on the life of German Ambassador Papen.

On February 2^,

a man was killed by the premature explosion of the device
with which he had planned to liquidate the Ambassador,
who was only eighteen yards a,way.

The Turkish authorities

announced on March 5 that the dead man was Omar Tokat, a
communist, and that his co-conspirators, also communists,
had been taken into custody.

On Information gained by in

terrogation, the police raided the Russian non-diplomatic
offices in Antera. and also requested the Russian ConsulGeneral at Istanbul to surrender a suspect who was within
the consulate.

The Consul-General refused, but when the

police surrounded the building and threatened forced entry,
the man was soon given up.

On April 1, four persons, two

Russian and two Turks, were placed on trial in connection
with the assassination attempt.1^

The suspects stated that

prior to gaining Turkish nationality they had been involved
with communist activities in Macedonia, and after arriving
in Turkey, they had become communist couriers between Tur
key and Yugoslavia..

Sayman declared that both he and the

19
These people were: Georgi Pavlov, an official of
the Russian trade mission at Istanbul; Leonid Kornilov, also
a member of the Russian trade mission at Istanbul and allegedly
of the NKVD; Abd ur-Rahan Sayman, a Turkish medical student;
a.nd Sulaiman Sav, a Turkish barber.
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dead man had been instructed by the Russians to assassinate
Papen and thereby cause a war between Germany and Turkey,,
The Russians had told the assassin that by pressing a cer
tain button of the device, he would produce a smoke-screen
behind which he could escape.

Evidently, he had pushed the

button before firing and had killed himself.

20

Because of the failure of the plot and the immediate
efforts by the Turkish government to apprehend those in
volved, Berlin hesitated to criticize Turkey,

Hitler,

in commenting on the event and political assassinations in
general, was very content to blame the entire incident on
the Russians,

21

The event no doubt helped to increase

Germany’s prestige within Turkey and conversely caused the
Turks to view the Russians with considerable suspicion.
In June 1942, the Germans launched their summer offen
sive,

Germany’s success in the Crimea, and especially in

the direction of the Caucasus, had a definite influence on
the Turkish government’s views towards the Pan-Turanian
movement.

During late August, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu

20

Kirk, Middle East, 452-53<> I could not find exactly
what type of device was used in the assassination attempt,
nor did I discover what happened to the accused.
21

Adolph Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations, (New
York, 1961), 316-17® [Hereafter cited as Hitler, Secret
Conversations.1 Interestingly the Ftthrer remarked that
’’For my part, I’ve never allowed anyone to resort to assas
sination in our political struggles.” Propaganda Minister
Goebbels believed that the British Secret Service was in
volved in the plot on Papen’s life, Joseph Goebbels, The
Goebbels Diaries. 1942-1943. (New York, 1948), 102-04.
22

Numan Menemencioglu was appointed Foreign Minister
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told Papen that contrary to the suspicions in Berlin that
Turkish troops had been withdrawn from the Russian-Turkish
border, Turkey did not sympathize with the Russians and
23
would not enter into any negotiations with them*
Menemencioglu siad that Turkey realized that Germany faced an im
mense task in Russia, and the Turks were ready to assist
the Third Reich in every way possible short of war.

Speci

fically, the Turkish government was interested in the
cultural existence of the Turkish minorities in southern
Russia and would be willing to cooperate with Germany in
this area.

However, when questioned as to the type of

cooperation Berlin could expect the Foreign Minister an24
swered that he was not sure at that time.
The following day, the Ambassador met with Prime
Minister Saracoglu who continued to elaborate on the future
of the Turkish minorities within Russia,

He felt that since

the majority of the people in the minority regions belonged
to the Turkish race, that Turkey had a legitimate interest

in August after the death of Prime Minister Refik Seydam on
July 7, Shukru Saracoglu replaced Seydam as Prime Minister,
Germany had hoped that Ambassador Husrev Gerede would be
appointed Foreign Minister, because of his pro-German out
look, Hitler, Secret Conversations, 4*1-3, Gerede was re
placed by Saffet Arlkan, the previous Minister of Defense,
1940-1941, who remained Ambassador to Germany until the
cessation of relations in August 1944,
23
J Berlin was obviously refering to the Russo-Turkish
negotiations during May 1942 which were actually no more
than a renewal of the previous Russo-Turkish Non-Aggression
Pact,
?4
Turkey. 82-84,
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In the solution to the question.

He suggested that a. portion

of the younger people be sent to universities within both
Germany and Turkey which would have the advantage of orien
ting the regions towards both countries.

However, as Prime

Minister, it was his duty to insure that for the present
the Russians would not be given an excuse to slaughter the
Turkish minorities.
tral position.

This was the reason for Turkey's neu-

2 *5

In his report to Berlin, Papen outlined the conversa
tions with the Turkish officials, and then added his own
opinions.

The Ambassador agreed with the idea, that the

only way to reach a lasting solution of the Russian ques
tion would be to obtain the cooperation of the various min
orities in the country by educating them to the idea of
independence within the German framework.

Then Germany

could appoint one of these educated local inhabitants to
appear outwardly as the head of the government though the
actual power would be in the hands of a German director.
The Ambassador admitted that this completely differed from
the German administration in the Ukraine and other regions
in Russia.

But he believed that in view of the Turkish

question, and the fact of the common Mohammedan religion,
the area would otherwise have to be administrated on a
German police basis.
25

G.F.O-.D., Turkey. 87-90.

26

Ibid.. 91-93.
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On September 12, Foreign Minister Bibbentrop notified
Papen that the German Foreign Ministry had no desire to
enter into talks with Ankara concerning its future co
operation in the administration of the Turkish minorities.
Furthermore, he said that there was no reason at this time
for Germany to extend assurances to Turkey that its wishes
would be given any consideration in this matter.

However,

Berlin would reconsider its position if the Turkish gov
ernment changed its political attitude toward the Third
2?
Reich.
The German offensive, which had been steadily moving
through southern Russia since the previous June, received
a serious blow in November with the Russian encirclement
of Stalingrad.

This was followed by a series of defeats

and the fall of Stalingrad on February 2, 19^3.

The ini-

tiatlve seemed to have passed to the Russians.

Berlin in

structed Ambassador Papen to find what effect the Axis
defeats in Russia, North Africa, and the South Pacific had
©n Turkish neutrality.

The Wilhelmstrasse was informed

that since Turkey did not desire Russian ascendency in
Europe, it did not intend to renounce its neutrality and
28
would defend it in all circumstances.
The Allied declaration at Casablanca of Unconditional
Surrender, and its extension to Great Britain of a free
27
28

GoF.O.P., Turkey. 104-06.
rbid.. 118-19.

159
hand In Turkey , was followed at the end of January 19^3 "by
Prime Minister Winston Churchill meeting with President
Infintl at Adana, Turkey.

The Prime Minister was rebuffed,

when he tried to enlist Turkish support, with the comment
that Turkey would not enter the war until it was imperative
because of post-war reasons.

Papen reported to Berlin that

Turkey's role in the war was the topic of conversation and
suggested that Germany stabilize the situation through
assurances of some sort.

Several days later, Hitler tele

graphed a message which stated that Germany had no aggres
sive intentions toward the Turkish people.

The President

expressed his gratitude for Hitler's communique and added
that only in extreme circumstances wouldhis country declare
war on Germany. 29
As a result of the Adana conference it was evident in
Berlin that no binding agreements had been concluded with
the British.
policy.

For the present, Turkey would follow a neutral

Turkish fear of German reprisals, if they joined

with the Allies, and Allied reprisals if they joined the
Germans would necessarily cause that country to align with
the victor only at the last moment. 30
In March, the Germans recovered from the defeat at
Stalingrad and launched a counter-attack.
29
30

With a. dozen or

Survey, Neutrals, 356; and Papen, Memoirs, 495-96,

Frederick W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship; Mus
solini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism. {New York,
1962), 188. [Hereafter cited as Deakin, The Brutal Friendship.]
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so fresh divisions strengthening the southern front, the
Wehrmacht advanced up to eighty miles in certain areas
"before the spring weather halted further operations.

The

German High Command now began to plan for a new offensive
to be launched during the summer.
In Ankara,9 the Turkish government was receiving pressure from both the Axis and the Allies,

Great Britain was

trying to obtain permission from Turkey to establish an
advanced air base between Istanbul and Izmir.

However,

the Turks were proving very obstinate, largely because of
the German military position.

The Turkish negotiators

argued that the German summer campaign might be directed
against Turkey as well as Russia.

Further, it was sus

pected by the British that Berlin had intimated to the Turks
that their cities were very accessible to aerial bombardment.

31

In any case, Turkey remained neutral.

On July 5s 19^3» the German offensive in Russia surged
forward.

For eight days, the German forces hammered at the

Russian defenses with only minor gains.

Two days later,

the Russians launched a counter-offensive and immediately
penetrated the German lines.

The Wehrmacht was not aware

of the fact, but except for a few short-lived occasions it
would never again regain the initiative.
The Italian surrender in September led to the British
occupation of the Dodecanese islands of Samos, Cos, and
Survey, Neutrals, 356; and Knatchbull-Hugessen,

l6l

Leros.

It appeared to Berlin that Britain was attempting

to demonstrate to Turkey that it could join the Allies
without fear of German reprisals.

Against the advice of

the military to evacuate German outposts in the Aegean,
Hitler ordered an aerial bombardment of the islands to b©
followed by an invasion.

The attack began on November 12,

and by the middle of November the successful German action
32
had assured Turkish neutrality.
Throughout the remaining months of 19^3* the Allies
met in a series of conferences held in Moscow, Cairo, and
Teheran.

One of the points agreed upon by both the Bussians

and British at the Moscow conference was that Turkey should
be brought into the war.

This was presented to the Turks

at the Cairo conference in November.33

But Turkey, pointing

to the close proximity of the Luftwaffe refused to budge.

3k

Again, at the Teheran conference, the Allies agreed to try
persuading the Turkish government to declare war on Germany.
This time, they set a target date, February 15, 19*Mk

Ho w -

i

ever, at the second Cairo conference, they were met with a
series of Turkish demands for military supplies which had to
be delivered before the Turks would venture towards align
ment with the Allies.

Meanwhile, Papen had been informed

of the British negotiations through Operation Cicero.
32

He

Hinsley, Strategy. 231-32; and Papen, Memoirs, 503.

33 This was the first of two Cairo conferences; the
second was held after the Teheran meeting.
3k

Ismay, Memoirs. 330.
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immediately warned Ankara that compliance with the Allies'
requests would undoubtedly lead to German reprisals.

Con

fronted with the lack of military materials and German
threats, the Turkish government refused to commit itself. 35
As the Russian forces approached the Balkans in early
1944, the position of both Germany and Turkey became very
difficult.

The Allies had agreed at the second Cairo con

ference to end Lend-Lease supplies to Turkey, and this was
put into effect during March 1944 on the grounds that the
Turks had not lived up to the terms of the Tripartite Pact.
The Turkish government strongly objected, but to no avail.
More importantly, from Germany's point of view, its forces
in Bulgaria were no longer able to perform their proper
function.

Thus, it became only a matter of time before

Turkey would have no alternative but to join the Allies.
On May 1, the Turks, under Allied pressure, stopped the
shipment of chromite to Germany. And three months later,
with the Allies invading Europe in both the east and west,
the Turkish Republic severed relations with the Third Reich.

Germany's successes in Russia during 1941-1942 did not
3-5 Survey, Neutrals, 359« The Allied Leaders decided
that supplying Turkey with sufficient materials would create
too large a drain on Operation Overlord.
Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters,
1939-1945, (New York, 1964), 399, Specifically, the Ger
man forces were prepared to launch an attack on European
Turkey should the Turks join the Allies - Operation Gertrude,
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produce the results in Turkey that Berlin desired.

It had

hoped that the Turkish government would consider the conflict
all hut over after the Wehrmacht captured Stalingrad and
advanced towards the Caucasus,

But the Turks, playing the

game of neutrality and waiting until there was no alterna
tive, refused to commit themselves,

Turkey did not want

to join the losing team.
In an effort to gain Turkish cooperation, the Germans
hinted that they might be given a part in the future administration of Turkish minorities in Russia,

In Pan-Turanian

circles, these proposals were very attractive, but the
cautious policy of Turkey’s leaders repressed these ideas
to a minimum,

Germany was not pleased; however, there was

little it could do besides threaten that if Turkey did not
assume a more pro-Germa,n policy, it would not be consulted
on these matters in the future.
As the events in Russia began to turn against Germany
in 19^3* Berlin was not as demanding towards Ankara,

The

German Foreign Ministry now took the position that perhaps
a neutral Turkey would better suit its purposes, at least
for the time being.

The Germans knew that the Allies were

trying to gain Turkey's active support, and they were in a
better position than the Reich,

Therefore, whenever it

appeared that the Turkish government was leaning too strongly
towards the Allies, the Wilhelmstrasse threatened reprisals.
This policy was effective only as long as Germany could
carry it out.

16*}-

By the summer of 19^» the Third Reich was under attack
from both the east and west.

In these circumstances, the

attitude of Turkey was of minor importance.

When the Tur

kish government broke relations In August, Nazi Germany was
fighting for its existence and accepted the decision with
out mentioning reprisals.

Perhaps Berlin realized that if

it attacked Turkey, it would provide Russia with an excuse
to rush to that country's rescue, thus allowing a further
extension of the hated.communist menace.

CONCLUSION

Germany and Turkey had conflicting objectives early
in the formative years of the Third Reich*

Berlin did not

want a close understanding between the Balkan countries.
Nevertheless, throughout the 1930’s the Turks pushed for
the creation of a mutual security system within the Bal
kans, and they were partially successful with the creation
of the Balkan Entente*

But with the Germans, Italians,

and Russians all actively pursuing their own interests
in the Peninsula, the Entente proved to be no more than a
loose organization of states with largely divergent ideas.
This was exactly what the Germans wanted, because it allowed
for easier political and economic exploitation.
Economically, Turkey provided Germany with numerous
resources.

The Germans controlled the chromite exports

until Berlin halted the delivery of heavy war materials in
165
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1939 s and. Turkey reciprocated by stopping the export of
that vital alloy,,

In the long run, this was the Third

Belch's biggest mistake in its relations with Turkey,,
it was not evident at the beginning of the war*

But

Germany

was not on a full war economy in 1939, and its stockpile
of chromite was considered sufficient for a short war*
If Hitler had known that Prance and Great Britain would
declare war after the invasion of Poland and that the war
was to last for an extended period, the Nazi economy would
undoubtedly have been regeared*
market would not have been lost*

The Turkish chromite
However, In other econ

omic areas, Turkey continued to be both a large supplier
and market for the Third Reich*
The Turkish Straits served a definite purpose in Nazi
foreign policy.

After originally expressing disinterest In

that strategic waterway, Berlin used it with advantage in
dealings with the Russians*

A vague promise that Russia

could eventually establish bases in the Straits was a part
of the lure for the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet NonAggression Pact*

But In 19^*0, when the Soviet demands for

the bases became a threat to Germany's objectives, Berlin,
in an effort to gain Turkey's good will, mentioned Russia's
plans to the Turkish government*

In addition, the Nazis

stated that if Turkey would conclude a treaty with Germany
along the lines of the Tripartite Pact, the Reich would
guarantee the sovereignty of the Straits.

But the Turkish

i6y

government refused„ Throughout the war, the Third Reich
was never allowed to send its warships openly through the
Straits,

Germany did not force the issue, since it believed

that the collapse of Russia would open the waterway to all
Axis shipping.
The documents received in Operation Cicero clearly
outlined the vast extent of the Allies’ war effort,

Why

it was disregarded by the Nazi leaders is largely left to
supposition.

Probably the documents informed Berlin of

what it did not care to admit « that because of the huge
Allied industrial complex and growing military strength,
further resistance by the Axis would only prolong the out
come of the war.
Turkey’s political position became important to Ger
many in 1939 when the Wehrmacht prepared for the Polish in
vasion,

Formerly, the Turkish government took a neutral

stand in international affairs, but during that summer the
Turks made a definite move towards alignment with Great
Britain and France.

Berlin tried unsuccessfully to fore

stall any agreement by requesting Rome and Moscow to give
Ankara assurances that they had no designs on Turkish ter
ritory.

Though the Tripartite Pact was signed, it was not

directed towards Germany, and Berlin felt that a potentially
hostile Russia would keep Turkey neutral,
The W ehrmacht1s smashing victory in France and Italy's
declaration of war impressed on the Turks what their future
might hold if they assumed a belligerent status.

Berlin
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used this opportunity to begin negotiations for a GermanTurkish Pact,

Turkey was hesitant either to join the Axis

or to conclude a treaty which would be viewed unfavorably
by Britain.

However, the Italian attack on Greece and the

consequent German invasion of the Balkans demonstrated to
Turkey the need to negotiate some type of agreement with
the Third Reich or it might be next.

The German-Turkish

Friendship Agreement signed in June 19^1 was not all that
Germany wanted, but it did assure Turkish neutrality during
the forthcoming Russian campaign,

And Berlin believed that

after Russia was crushed, Turkey could be easily drawn into
the New Order.
During the military successes of 19^1-19^2, Berlin
tried to entice the Turks into active cooperation by
offering them promises of political control over the Turkish
minorities in Russia,

There was a definite interest in Tur

key especially among the Pan-Turanians, but the Turkish gov
ernment refused to commit itself until the Russian defeat
was a certainty.
Red Army.

In 19^3 * the Wehrmacht was stopped by the

Germany now wanted to be assured that Turkey would

remain neutral.

Therefore, whenever it appeared as though

Ankara was drifting too close to the Allies, the Reich would
threaten reprisals.

In this manner, Turkey was kept a neu

tral until pressured by the Allies into breaking relations
in August 19^.
Germany was correct in not forcing Turkey to join the
Axis powers.

Prior to a Russian defeat, the Turkish govern
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ment would never have accepted such an ultimatum unless
the Nazis had invaded and defeated the Turkish Army,

Had

Berlin ordered an invasion before the Russian campaign,
little would have been gained,

A victory would not have

been easy and undoubtedly would have necessitated post
ponement of Operation Barbarossa,

Admittedly, it might have

opened the way to the Near East and allowed Germany to
fully exploit the Turkish economy.

But the Nazis would

have had to consider at least one serious problem.

In

view of Russia's interests in the Straits and other parts
of the Near East, would Moscow have allowed it?
highly unlikely.

It was

Short of declaring war, the Russians

would have demanded zones of influence both in the Straits
and in other areas,
agreed to this.

Germany certainly would not have

Therefore, until Russia had been defeated,

a neutral Turkey was of far more benefit to the Third
Reich than a hostile one.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliographical Essay
Throughout the wealth of documents covering the
Second World War5 there were few which dealt with the pre
cise problem of German-Turklsh relations*

The multitude

of document publications concerning the period prior to
the outbreak of the war generally held nothing of impor
tance „ the notable exception being the Documents on British
Foreign Policy which contained an interesting account of
negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact*

The volumes

dealing with the Ntlrnberg Trials provided many wasted hours
of enjoyable readings, because the Allied tribunal was far
more interested in hanging the accused than in providing
an explanation of Nazi foreign policy*

Hitler Directs His

Wax* and Nazi-Soviet Relations were both useful and con170

171
tained much-material used In this thesis, German Policy
in Turkey, and' the Ftthrer Naval Conferences provided some
Information, but the former was largely a tirade against
the Pan-Turanians and the latter referred only occasionally
to operations in the Black Sea.
Undoubtedlys the prime documentary collection for
this topic proved to be the Documents on German Foreign
Policy.,, Series C and D 0 Series C was the less valuable of
the two, because of the sparse number of documents con
tained for the years 1933”1936<>

Bu-k Series D, though it

ended in December 19^1 (much to my regret), formed the
basis of my thesis.

If these volumes had not been available,

this study could not have been written.
Memoirs and diaries made up the bulk of the other
primary materials consulted.

Actually, most had very little

to say concerning Germany's relations with Turkey,

Goebbels

and Mussolini gave brief mention to the subject, as did
WeizsScker, Kassel, and Keitel,

Clano's Diplomatic Papers,

Ciano *s Diaries, and Haider *s Private War Journal discussed
Turkey's importance during the war, but generally and in
a superficial manner.

Hitler's Mein Kampf merely left the

idea that Turkey was not worth worrying about.

Perhaps,

the greatest disappointment were the books by Schacht,

He

was so busy explaining why nobody understood him, that the
treatment of the Third Reich’s economy was far from adequate,
Bazma, Moyziseh, and Schellenberg all provided extremely
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interesting and valuable material for the chapter on
Operation Cicero,

Without these books, that chapter would

have had to be omitted.
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull gave a good appraisal of
Turkey’s Importance from the United States’point of view
but was of little value.

Shotwell»s Turkey at the Straits

explained much of the history of the Straits question, es
pecially during the 19th century.

However, it was pub-

lished in 19^0 and of little use for the war period.
Knatchbul1-Hugessen devoted several chapters to his stay
In Ankara.

But he was too critical of the Germans and too

laudatory toward the Turks; also his statements were far
from enlightening.
appointment.

Papen’s Memoirs was another major dis

While the Ambassador spent many pages explaining

the situation in Turkey, he seemed too intent on building
his role as peace-maker and international "good guy,"

But

then, with his reputation as a pro-Nazi, perhaps he had
every right.
Secondary sources were very important in the prepara
tion of this thesis.

Many of the books cited in the bib

liography did not dwell at any length on the German-Turkish
problem but did add information not found elsewhere.

Chur

chill’s volumes presented an excellent over-all picture of
the situation in Turkey throughout the war, although he did
not go into detail.

In The Power of Small States the author

provided an interesting analysis of Turkey’s neutrality
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and how it was able to remain in that position.

Woodward’s

British Foreign Policy occasionally referred to Turkey, but
the lack of footnotes was a definite drawback*

The series

published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs
included two volumes, The War and the Neutrals and The Middle
East In the War* both contributed greatly to the study*
Especially valuable were the multitude of footnotes.

Several

economic studies were investigated though most considered
only the period prior to the war.

Sweezy’s Structure of

the Nazi Economy was very good in the description of Ger
man foreign trade.

Germany’s Economic Preparation for War

barely mentioned Turkey; however, its value lay In the il
luminating evaluation of the German economy at the out
break of the war.
omic designs

The most thorough study of German econ

in Turkey were the two volumes entitled

The Economic Blocade. The author provided Insights not
found in purely German sources.

And although it was writ

ten from the British viewpoint, the importance of German
trade in Turkey was highlighted,
Kilic’s Turkey and the World was extensively used for
background material.

The author was often too pro-Turkish

to be taken very seriously.

Lord Kinross, while writing an

excellent biography of Ataturk, said virtually nothing about
the Turkish president’s opinion of Nazi Germany.

One of

the best of the secondary books was The Middle East in
World Affairs. The roles of Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq

17^

during the Second World War were all given close attention.
And it included Germany’s intrigues within each country.
A more recent and exhaustive study in the same vein was
The Third Reich and the Arab East,

Colvin's Chief of In

telligence was regrettably unfootnoted, but included an
Informative chapter on diplomatic life in Ankara.
The vast majority of related articles contained
nothing of any value to the topic.

Most of them were writ

ten during the war or shortly afterwards and consequently
were extremely prejudiced and sympathetic toward Turkey.
The two most worthy of mention were written by Cramer and
Edwards, and they provided nothing new,

Kempner's article

"The Highest Paid Spy in History" was a recital of informa
tion found in Moyzisch's Operation Cicero.
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